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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKEY’S NEW HUMANITARIANISM AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 
 
ONUR SAZAK 
PhD Dissertation, July 2018 
Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. E. Fuat Keyman  
Keywords: Humanitarian aid, effectiveness, conflict, traditional and emerging donors 
Traditional donor dominance in humanitarian intervention has come under greater criticism and 
scrutiny in the last two decades. The humanitarian aid deployed to conflict-affected countries 
over the last half century by the Great Powers such as the majority of G7 nations, as well as the 
post war intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, or international 
nongovernmental organizations like OXFAM and CARE, are deemed politicized, interest-
driven, and negligent of beneficiary’s needs. In the middle 2000s, several rising powers 
challenged the conventional traditional donor approach to humanitarian aid and attempted to 
introduce alternative methods of humanitarian intervention, which would prioritize the needs 
of the beneficiary and which would be free of the donor’s political, economic, and security 
interests. In addition to Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, Turkey has been one of these 
rising global actors with an alternative approach to humanitarian intervention. This dissertation 
studies Turkey’s new and alternative take on humanitarianism. It explores whether Turkey’s 
certain principles and practices make its aid more effective, when compared to that of traditional 
donors and other emerging actors. The dissertation especially focuses on the relationship 
between Turkey’s opting for ethical, bilateral, unconditional, and beneficiary-driven 
humanitarian intervention and the effectiveness of its aid. Based on two case studies, the 
dissertation finds that while unconditionality, prioritizing beneficiary’s interest, bilateral 
engagement, and moral obligation enhance Turkey’s access to conflict-affected communities 
and durability of its operations, the sustainability of Turkey’s humanitarian engagement is still 
exposed to the same challenges experienced by traditional donor; and therefore, these 
challenges should be further studied.  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN YENİ İNSANİ YARDIMLARI VE YARDIMLARIN ETKİLİLİĞİ  
 
ONUR SAZAK 
Doktora Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman  
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsani yardım, etkililik, çatışma, geleneksel ve yükselen bağışçılar 
Geleneksel bağışçıların insani yardım ve insani müdahale alanlarındaki hakimiyeti son yirmi 
yılda ciddi eleştiri ve incelemelere konu olmuştur. G7 gibi ülkeleri içine alan “Büyük Güçler”in, 
Birleşmiş Milletler gibi devletlerarası örgütlerin ve OXFAM, CARE ve benzeri uluslararası 
insani yardım kuruluşlarının insani müdahalelerini kendi siyasi, güvenlik ve ekonomik 
çıkarlarına uygun yaptıklarına, fayda-sağlayıcının ihtiyaçlarını ise gözetmediklerine dair 
yaygın bir görüş oluşmuştur. 2000’li yılların ortasından itibaren bazı “yükselen güçler” 
geleneksel bağışçıların insani yardıma konvansiyonel yaklaşımlarını reddederek alternatif 
uygulamalar geliştirmişler ve bunları yaymaya çalışmışlardır. Bu alternatif yaklaşımlar 
bağışçının siyasi, güvenlik, ekonomik çıkarları yerine, fayda-sağlayıcının ihtiyaçlarını merkeze 
almaktadır. Brezilya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney Afrika gibi, Türkiye de bu yükselen küresel 
aktörlerden biridir ve alternatif insani yardım prensip ve politikalarına sahiptir. Bu tez 
çalışması, Türkiye’nin insani müdahale konusunda yeni ve alternatif yaklaşımlarına 
odaklanmaktadır. Tez çalışması özellikle, Türkiye’nin insani müdahaleye dair bazı ilke ve 
uygulamalarının tesis ettiği yardımlarını, geleneksel bağışçılar ve diğer gelişen güçler 
tarafından yapılan yardımlara oranla, daha etkili kılıp kılmadığını araştırmaktadır. Çalışma, 
Türkiye’nin yardımlarını birebir, fayda-sağlayıcının menfaatini gözeterek, herhangi bir şart ya 
da çıkar gözetmeden, etik ve ahlaki sorumluluktan yola çıkarak yapması ile Türkiye’nin 
yardımlarının sert çatışma alanlarına erişimi ve kalıcılığı arasında pozitif bir ilişki olduğunu 
göstermiş; fakat aynı zamanda Türkiye’nin yardımlarının sürdürebilirliğinin, geleneksel 
bağışçıların yardımlarının etkisini olumsuz etkileyen risk ve zorluklara karşı açık olduğunu 
kaydetmiştir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to fill a significant void in academic research with respect 
to Turkey’s recent rise as a humanitarian actor. In 2013, Global Humanitarian Index’s 
designation of Turkey as the third largest donor of humanitarian assistance after the United 
States and Sweden1 has fostered academic interest in Turkey’s newfound role, not only as an 
emerging actor with significant regional influence, but also as a prospective reliable provider 
of humanitarian aid and development assistance.  There are no studies so far with an aim to 
assess the effectiveness of Turkish humanitarian operations. The extant academic works on the 
topic have either focused on a particular aspect of Turkey’s humanitarian practices in the world, 
or they have been limited in their nature to descriptive narratives. These studies have often shied 
from demonstrating a hypothetical relationship between fundamental principles of Turkish 
humanitarian engagement and aid effectiveness. Therefore, this thesis is unique in the sense 
that it investigates the effectiveness of Turkish humanitarian engagement with conflict-affected 
populations in a comparative manner.  
 
A comparative approach is a necessary, yet an underappreciated and scarcely-used, method in 
concluding whether Turkey’s principles and engagement models are genuine and whether they 
are immune to the deficiencies for which traditional donors are criticized. The majority of 
emerging actors, including Turkey, have presented their motivations for intervention and 
methods of deployment as viable alternatives to conventional, and allegedly deficient, practices 
by traditional donors. This postulation necessitates evidence that emerging actors themselves 
do not succumb to the same vices. To draw this conclusion, the type of criticism that traditional 
donors have encountered for their motivations and practices should be acknowledged.  
                                                        
1 “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013,” (Development Initiative, 2013), 25. 
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Slim argues that traditional donors—made up by major European countries, the majority of 
which have colonial past, the United States, the intergovernmental organizations founded by 
the West as part of the post-World War II liberal order, as well as Western international 
nongovernmental organizations that mushroomed in the 1960s— are confronted with three 
major criticisms: First, the Western-led conventional humanitarian intervention is perceived by 
recipients and critics as continuation of colonial aspirations with postcolonial interests. The 
proponents of this camp advance that by deploying massive human resources and 
organizational capacity, the traditional actors simply overwhelm and takeover decision-making 
mechanisms in the conflict-affected or disaster-stricken country. For the adherents of this view, 
crammed refugee camps with less than humane conditions, long lines in front of water, food, 
and medical stations are illustrations of the West’s attempts to place the former colonies into 
bondage through new ways and to exercise its will over them. The second critique is that the 
assistance from these conventional actors are often accompanied by hidden political, security, 
or business interests. Slim calls this the political subterfuge criticism. In other words, the donor 
relinquishes its assistance only in certain cases that would yield some form of political, security, 
or economic gains. These gains are frequently listed as receiving local support for 
counterinsurgency operations, prevention of refugee influx into the West, and sustaining 
regimes that are supportive of the donor’s foreign policy agenda. The third criticism has to do 
with the traditional donor’s consequentialist approach to committing its aid. The critics accuse 
traditional donors of concentrating their resources on cases that would yield the most tangible 
gains—be it reputation, political influence, or elimination of a security threat—with the least 
amount of material and human resources costs.2 
 
The aim of this dissertation is therefore twofold: First, it will shed light on the effectiveness of 
Turkey’s humanitarian intervention and its impact on the communities in conflict-affected 
countries. Second, depending on the outcomes of the first task, it will demonstrate that to what 
extent Turkey’s novel approach has insulated its humanitarian intervention against the pitfalls 
that undermined the effectiveness and sanctity of traditional donor interventions. The study 
shall accomplish this goal by comparing Turkey with traditional donors, which are made up of 
mainly Great Powers, intergovernmental organizations (IOs), and international 
nongovernmental organizations (iNGOs). The purpose of the comparison is to seek answers to 
the following research question: by not adhering to the principles and practices that have guided 
                                                        
2 Hugo Slim, “Wonderful Work: Globalizing the Ethics of Humanitarian Action,” in Mac Ginty, Roger and 
Jenny H. Peterson, The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action (New York: Routeldge, 2015), 20-23.  
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traditional donors in their humanitarian enterprises for over a century, is Turkey’s assistance to 
conflict-affected countries in fact more effective? This question simply stems from Turkey’s 
own declaration, in both public and private sectors, that Turkish humanitarian intervention is 
premised on moral obligation, unconditional engagement, dismissal of interest-driven 
strategizing, and constructive bilateral relations and interaction with the beneficiary country.3  
 
While the chapter on Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding will 
offer justifications for these principles, Turkey’s humanitarian credo forces us to consider 
whether the principles declared earlier are not shared by traditional donors, and whether their 
presumed absence in traditional power conceptualization of humanitarian intervention render 
the latter’s assistance less effective.    
 
These postulations on a possible causal relationship between the donor’s principles on and 
central approach to humanitarianism and the effectiveness of its intervention have resulted in 
the following hypotheses:  
 
1. The more the donor’s humanitarian intervention is motivated by its political self-
interests, the less effective its aid is;  
2. The more the donor tethers its decision to deploy humanitarian assistance on 
assurances of desirable consequences, the less effective its aid becomes;  
3. If the donor relies on a universalist, multilateral and overwhelming bureaucratic 
superstructure for the deployment of its assistance, the less effective its aid is.  
 
The counterfactuals of these hypotheses would be formulated as such:  
 
1. The more the donor is motivated by its duty-driven ethics, instead of political, security, 
and economic consequences, the more effective its aid will be.  
2. The fewer conditions the donor attaches to its humanitarian commitments, the more 
effective its aid will become.  
3. The more the donor will engage the recipient community bilaterally without admitting 
third party intervention, the more effective its aid becomes. 
 
                                                        
3 “Turkish Emergency Humanitarian Assistance,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Website, accessed on 
August 8, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa.  
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These hypotheses are constructed on one dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables. The dependent variable is the “effectiveness of humanitarian intervention.” The 
independent variables are the following principles that may or may not motivate the donor’s 
involvement in humanitarian actions: “moral obligation,” “conditionality,” “political, security, 
and economic interests,” “universalist means of intervention,” and “bilateral mode of 
engagement. The donor’s opting for several of these principles when deploying its 
commitments is hypothesized to affect the quality of its assistance to the communities who 
suffered under atrocious conflict situations. These postulated relations will be tested through 
two country-focused case studies. These countries are Somalia and Afghanistan.  
 
As will be further elaborated in the methodology chapter, Somalia and Afghanistan are the two 
countries where the traditional donors’s and Turkey’s humanitarian operations can be 
comparatively studied. Both countries are failed states. They have endured decades of violent 
internal conflicts and wars with neighboring states. Both have received sovereign assistance 
and hosted IOs and humanitarian iNGOs. Furthermore, Turkey’s humanitarian entry point into 
each country, and its positive reception by local communities, have contributed to Turkey’s 
prestige and its image as a robust force to reckon with in the eyes of traditional donors.  
 
The case studies, constructed upon the data collected on the ground and in Turkey between 
2012 and 2015, provide ample levels of analyses that could be hashed out the attributes of each 
actor’s humanitarian action, as mentioned in the hypotheses. To extract these attributes, process 
tracing and semi-structured interviews will be used. The majority of these interviews had been 
conducted prior to the beginning of this research. The author of the dissertation has been 
involved in various peace operations studies executed jointly by Istanbul Policy Center, 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), American University, and New York 
University, and SaferWorld between the years 2012 and 2015. Interviews conducted then were 
validated by the responses to a recent questionnaire distributed in 2017 with major government 
agencies and Turkish NGOs. As will be discussed in further detail in next chapters, the 
responses have proven that very little has changed in Turkish humanitarian sector in terms of 
approach and principles. In addition, the author of the dissertation visited Afghanistan in 2014. 
The interviews conducted during this brief, ten-day visit, with local beneficiaries, Afghan 
officials, Turkish officials on the ground, and representatives from international organizations 
and sovereign nations provided important data for this research.  
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A challenging part of this dissertation is anticipated to be the conceptual and operational 
definitions of aid effectiveness. What criteria should we look for in order to classify the outcome 
of a politically-motivated, consequentialist, and universalist mode of humanitarian engagement 
by a traditional power “less effective”? Or, how can one ascertain that moral and puritanical 
considerations, unconditional commitments, the lack of political interests and one-on-one 
engagement render Turkish aid more effective? What are the tangible evidences of success? 
Although the literature review will demonstrate that benchmarking in humanitarianism is a 
slippery slope, some form of concrete standards is necessary to assess the effectiveness of aid. 
More important, these standards should not be decided only by traditional donors, who have 
dominated the field for the last one and half century until the advent of new actors like Turkey 
in the beginning of 2000s. With respect to this conundrum, the conceptual and operational 
definitions will be drawn from a set of criteria from both Global Northern and Southern aisles 
of humanitarian politics. The employment of key standards and benchmarks will be further 
clarified in Chapter 4.  
 
The literature review has been conducted to obtain a better understanding of the current 
discourse on humanitarianism. A brief scan of literature discloses that humanitarian sector has 
existed for over a hundred and fifty years. In this long span, traditional donors’s norms, 
principles and practices have dominated both the literature and discourse on humanitarianism. 
As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the literature does attest to, and offers sufficient 
evidence to prove, that in the long chronology of humanitarianism the principles upon which I 
built my hypothetical construct took precedence over one another in different eras. For example, 
whereas the period between late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century were defined 
by the role of duty-driven ethics behind humanitarian action, the post-World War II and the 
Cold War eras were the quintessential years of politics- and interest-induced humanitarianism. 
Similarly, the late 1980s and much of the 1990s witnessed the rise of universalism in 
humanitarian sector, while the late 1990s and 2000s were swarmed by grand strategies, cost-
benefit calculations, feasibility studies and consequential strategies carried by humanitarian 
actors. The fact that humanitarian crises created in each era was worse than the previous one 
subtly points to the ineffectiveness of humanitarian interventions driven by these principles.  
 
The literature on the formative years of humanitarianism especially offer interesting similarities 
and key lessons for Turkey. The puritanical justification and the moral obligation argument that 
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twentieth century have almost identical connotations to Turkey’s reasons for extending its 
humanitarian aid to conflict-affected and disaster-stricken countries. As humanitarian 
organizations and leading countries in this field at the time believed, Turkey too, throughout 
the early 2000s, reformed its foreign policy and brought order to its internal affair to the extent 
that it generated sufficient capacity to share it with fragile states in order to alleviate suffering 
and restoring human dignity in these places. The literature also points out that Turkey’s duty-
based approach may not be immune to pitfalls that traditional donors had fallen into following 
the first époque of humanitarianism. It provides illustrations of the limits of duty-based ethics 
in the context of humanitarian intervention. One deficiency is the unintended negative 
consequences of good and moral intentions. Another is that while the goodwill of the donor 
may not know boundaries, its resources do. Therefore, sooner or later however well-intentioned 
a donor may be, it will have to choose between the recipients. More ominous, that selection is 
likely to be tainted by political interests or consequentialist calculations. To what extent, Turkey 
is capable to protect itself from transitioning into a more consequentialist or political donor 
deserves to be studied further, over a broader span of time series.   
 
One shortcoming with the discourse on humanitarianism, scholarly content on the rising 
powers’s approach to humanitarian assistance is still developing and is not in adequate volume 
to provide patterns or trends. The fact that the majority of the countries that are classified as 
rising powers still suffer from several political stability and economic volatility issues. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to assess the longevity of their contributions to the humanitarian 
sector. Nonetheless, as will be further elaborated in the next section, the number of academic 
work on the intentions, motivations, and methods of influential players like Brazil, India, China, 
and South Africa is increasing. These studies begin to move beyond the mere description of the 
phenomenon observed among these countries. They have become more inferential and shed 
light on the possible direction rising powers’s contributions will evolve. In light of this 
increased curiosity for rising power methods and motivations, more studies should be also 
conducted in Turkey with a view to extracting Turkey’s best practices and projecting it on world 
audience to promote alternative modes of engagement with conflict-affected countries.  
 
This dissertation therefore values an inductive approach to comparing Turkey’s experience with 
that of the traditional actors. It does not depart from a deductive, grand theory. Nor does it 
commence on the research from the baseline that rising power approach is inherently good and 
the traditional donor approach is bad. Even though the conventional approaches to deploying 
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humanitarian assistance have not eradicated the root causes of man-made disasters, and in even 
some cases they have exacerbated them, such principles as strategic consequentialism and 
multilateralism employed by traditional donors can provide important lessons and valuable 
directions for newcomers to the field. In other words, this dissertation is not set out on a course 
to entirely refute the time-tested applications by traditional donors. Neither it is inclined to 
conclude that Turkish methods and principles are all virtuous and effective. Rather, the prime 
motive in conducting this study is to identify the challenges and rewards that each donor gets 
for behaving in certain way while deploying its humanitarian commitments.  
 
The thesis demonstrates the existence of a relationship between Turkey’s unique take on the 
suggested variables and the effectiveness of Turkish intervention. The case studies suggest that 
Turkey deploys its material assistance and civilian capacity to some of the worst and most 
entrenched conflict zones in the world without attaching any robust political conditions or 
making a cost-benefit analysis on tangible gains. The Somalia case shows that neither Turkish 
officials nor the public had too much knowledge about Somalia, and nor did they have time to 
engage in the matter through public debate and information campaign, when the official 
delegation of then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s arrived in Mogadishu in 2011. 
Somalia then had been facing the wort draught of its history. Similarly, the Afghanistan case 
illustrates that when Turkish government declared Turkey’s participation in the International 
Security Assistance Force, the dominant rhetoric in the news and among punditry revolved 
around Turkey’s moral obligation to help liberate and develop its fellow Muslim brethren in 
Afghanistan, a country with which Turkey has had maintained friendly relationship since the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Like Somalia, in Afghanistan too have Turkish 
humanitarian organizations and government development agencies operated in some of the least 
secure areas, giving seldom consideration to economic, military, or political gains. In fact, 
Turkey’s condition for joining ISAF was that its military contingency would not partake in 
combat missions; the sole objective of the Turkish troops on the ground would be to assist with 
key infrastructure reconstruction and training.  
 
While these cases robustly demonstrate that Turkey’s entry-point to conflict-affected countries 
is always driven by duty-based ethics and moral concerns, they do not conclude that they always 
retain the moral justifications that set this emerging donor on the path to helping these countries. 
In fact, while Turkish intervention departs from a heightened sense of moral obligation, the 
country’s self-interest comes to play further along the country’s engagement in the donor 
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country. The case studies will offer several illustrations with respect to Turkey’s self-interest 
coming to play. In the Somalia case, this cycle starts in 2013, when Turkey decidesd to 
contribute financially to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for its operations 
to eradicate al-Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. Following this decision, Turkish 
humanitarian workers on the ground came under increased attacks from al-Shabaab, resulting 
in a raid on Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu. Furthermore, the opening of the Turkish military 
academy in Mogadishu in 2017, and operationalization of the Somali cadet training mission, 
posits another contrast to the moral obligation argument. This development clearly alludes to 
strategical Turkish interests in the country and the rest of the region, for Somalia has the vastest 
coastal line in East Africa, a strategic territory for maritime trade routes. The Afghanistan case 
study too suggests more recently Turkey has begun using its involvement in Afghanistan to 
facilitate peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan and stability in the region. On more local 
level, Turkish military contingency restricted its presence to the international airport, into which 
Turkish Airlines flies daily.  
 
Overall, a proof of relationship between the aforementioned variables and aid effectiveness 
exists, however, it is not conclusive with respect to Turkey’s guiding principles and 
sustainability of its bilateral and unconditional engagement. As illustrated in Chapters 5,6, and 
7, Turkey departs from duty-based ethical baseline. It prioritizes the needs of the beneficiary 
and national ownership. It cuts the red tape and avoids further harm on beneficiary by not 
integrating itself into a greater multinational platform. All of these characteristics add to the 
longevity of Turkish engagement in difficult terrains. However, the extended duration of 
Turkey’s presence in conflict-affected countries also paves the way for future experiments and 
studies on the former’s resilience against not succumbing to the problems haunting traditional 
donors today. In this respect, the dissertation fills an important vacuum vis-à-vis the 
effectiveness of Turkish aid and development assistance models, and it leaves the door ajar for  
further studies on important shortcomings between Turkey’s utilization of, or disregard for, 
these principles and its aid effectiveness. In brief, the thesis also serves a bridge through which  
academic community with vested interest in improving aid as an effective conflict resolution 
instrument can further examine the performance of emerging actors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
Mankind’s impulse to alleviate the suffering of others is as old as the beginning of history. Yet, 
the initiative to rationalize, institutionalize, and organize this primal disposition is nearly two 
centuries old. Consequently, literature on humanitarian intervention is vast. Nonetheless, it is 
not too radical a feat to organize it according to the eras that are dominated by one or several 
of the individual components of the theoretical of framework of this research. That is, the 
literature on humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention can be compartmentalized into 
four distinct periods. Each period corresponds to the advent and domination of an approach to 
humanitarianism that makes up the theoretical construct of this research. These five periods are: 
1) from the Battle of Solferino (1859) to the end of World War II (1945); 2) the Cold War era; 
3) the post-Cold War period; 4) the post 9/11 world. 
 
Each of these periods contains a different discourse on what humanitarian action should be, 
under which circumstances it should be deployed, how it should be administered, and what its 
ultimate outcome ought to be. Although the literature does not demarcate them with such 
distinct borders, a comprehensive and systematic study of the scholarly work on the 
development of humanitarianism and humanitarian actors offers adequate evidence that each 
aforementioned era is defined consecutively and respectively by the ethical (classical), political, 
universalist, consequentialist, and comprehensive (peace building) approaches to humanitarian 
action. In brief, the review of such vast fields of literature, in the proposed compartmentalized 
fashion, not only will foster our understanding of the discourse that produced our current 
knowledge on humanitarian action, but the process also will demonstrate how limitations of 
each theoretical engagement have fueled the current debate on the effectiveness of humanitarian 
interventions. More important, a thorough review of the literature will lay the foundations for 
hypothesizing whether the different principles and practices of emerging actors in the post-
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2010—more specifically that of Turkey, for the purposes of this dissertation—will fill the void 
and render humanitarian action more effective in the context of facilitating a lasting peace in 
conflict-affected communities.  
 
2.1. The Dawn of Humanitarianism and the Primacy of Duty-Based Ethics 
Although it is difficult to assess humanitarianism’s origins, the first recorded contemplations 
on the virtues of humanitarian action can be traced back to an interim era of calm that followed 
the Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth century. This intermission, however, was occasionally 
cut short by sporadic clashes between the major European powers and smaller states struggling 
for their independence and sovereign rights. One such battle occurred between the Franco-
Sardinian Alliance commandeered by Napoleon III and Emanuel II and the Austrian army near 
the sleepy town of Solferino in 1859.  
 
The Battle of Solferino marks an important signpost in history. The improvements in war 
technologies—specifically in long range projectiles such as artilleries—and the advent of 
conscripted armies had brought battlefields closer to urban areas. Dunant revisits the 
technological terror he witnessed between the two armies in the following passage: “The 
Austrians, from their vantage points on the hills, swept the French with artillery fire and rained 
on them a steady hail of shells, case- and grape-shot. Soil and dust, raised by this immense 
cloud of projectiles as they thundered into the ground, mingled with the thick fumes of smoking 
guns and shells…. Everywhere men fell by thousands, with gaping wounds in limbs or bellies, 
riddled with bullets, mortally wounded by shot and shell of every kind.”1 Even though Solferino 
was not the first incident that exposed civilians to the efficient destruction capability of 
contemporary armies, the images from this battlefield were instrumental in the precipitation of 
public interest in an intervention to protect the victims. As a characteristic of this period, 
ordinary citizens’s exposure to the atrocities of war rose, as more firepower and conscription 
drew casualties from their midst in an unprecedented volume. Noncombatants in this era 
witnessed firsthand the violation of the sanctity of human body and wholeness of communities 
by professional armies of unforeseen sizes and capabilities. The increased exposure of civilians 
to the cruelties of the battlefield resulted in precipitation of new ideas and ways to lessen the 
suffering of both combatants and noncombatants caught in the destructive path of war.  
 
                                                        
1 Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Geneva: International Commitee of the Red Cross), 8-9.  
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The increased public sensitivity regarding indiscriminate destruction unleased by modern 
warfare at the time found a champion in a Swiss businessman named Henry Dunant, who not 
only bore witness to the violence on the battlefield in Solferino, but who also took it upon 
himself to study it with a view to devising an organized way of caring for the victims. With 
Dunant’s vivid account of the atrocities committed on the battlefield in Solferino his 1862 essay 
“A Memory of Solferino,” the first seeds of humanitarian intervention had been sown. Dunant’s 
observations from the war and his ensuing activism for the rights of the wounded to care and 
treatment produced two groundbreaking results in humanitarian intervention and international 
human rights.  
 
The first was the creation of the International Committee of Red Cross in 1863. A task group 
of five influential and respected military, medical, and legal experts of the time2 convened to 
create a body that would extend civilian care for the wounded soldiers and injured civilians as 
a result of war. Dunant’s proposal was to found permanent civilian associations that would also 
exist in peace time and enter into arrangements with government to secure access to the 
wounded and injured before waiting for the breakout of hostilities.3  These societies would force 
governments to think about the casualties before a conflict erupted; and similarly, the societies 
would train medical personnel and stock up on resources at the outset of conflicts. These designs 
gained solid footing with the resolutions agreed upon during the Geneva International 
Conference of 1863. The charters approved in this conference gathered all Red Cross and 
similar societies in belligerent countries and declared one unified modus operandi, hence giving 
birth to the International Committee of Red Cross and the further Red Cross and Red Crescent 
movements in the world.4 
 
The second important outcome of Dunant and his peers’ work was the first Geneva Convention 
in 1864 and the recognition of universal rights of the wounded and injured in wars. Convened 
with the unequivocal diplomatic support of the major powers at the time, namely all of the 
governments of Europe, including the Ottoman Empire, as well as the United States, Brazil and 
Mexico, the first Geneva Convention established the general rules to protect civilians extending 
                                                        
2 Gustave Moynier, Henry Dunant, Dr. Louis Appia, Mr. Theodore Maunoir, and General Guillaume-Henri 
Dufor (a year later Henri Dufor would be a signatory of the Geneva Convention in 1864).  
3 Francois Bugnion, “Birth of an Idea: The founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement—from Solferino to the original Geneva Convention (1859-
1864),” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 888 (Winter 2012): 1313.   
4 Ibid., 1320.  
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medical care on the battleground and the wounded.5 The Swiss delegation had reported back 
the major outcome of the conference in the following words:  
 
As is rarely the case at diplomatic congresses, there was no question of a 
confrontation over contradictory interests, now was it necessary to reconcile 
opposing requests. Everyone was in agreement. The sole aim was to reach formal 
agreement on a humanitarian principle which would mark a step forward in the law 
of nations, namely the neutrality of wounded soldiers and of all those looking after 
them. This was the wish expressed by the Conference of October 1863 and the 
starting point for the 1864 Conference.6 
 
The articles of the Geneva Convention in 1864 was an important step towards international 
recognition of the rights of the wounded soldiers and civilians ruined by the cruelties of war. It 
was the cornerstone of the following Geneva conventions, upon which international law 
concerning the rights of the victims of wars, refugees from both manmade as well as natural 
disasters, and other displaced and vulnerable groups would be erected. However, a greater 
accomplishment of Dunant and his four peers was, albeit unknowingly, to initiate a discourse 
on humanitarianism. Dunant’s essay on the Battle of Solferino can thus be accepted as the first 
body of literature on the virtues of a logical, organized, institutional, and universal approach to 
humanitarianism. After all, Dunant had witnessed the plight of those whose lives were wrecked 
by the war first hand and utilized empirical observations in his essay to support his call for 
international jurisprudence to protect the rights of those who were wounded during fighting.  
 
Dunant and his peers also relied on the former’s eyewitness testimony from the Battle of 
Solferino to argue in favor of granting access to organized civilian initiatives—that is, the 
International Committee of Red Cross—to the battlefront to care for the fallen. The Swiss 
businessman had seen that the old convention of setting up field hospitals to protect caregivers 
from the exchange of hostilities was simply not working and resulting in deaths that could have 
been prevented only if these actors had greater access to and immunity on the battlefront to 
extract and treat the wounded and injured. The expanding size of the armies, as well as the 
surging firepower capabilities of armies had necessitated instant and large-scale intervention 
                                                        
5 Ibid.  
6 Les Congres de Geneve, Rapport adresse au Conseil federal par MM. Dufour, Moynier et Lehmann, 
Plenipotentiaires de la Suisse, Imprimerie Fick, Geneva, 1864, p.3 in Bugnion, “Birth of an Idea,” 2012, 1325.  
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by medics and civilian caregivers if the wounded were to be saved or civilians to be rescued. 
This would have been merely impossible with distant field hospitals, camps and services for 
the displaced and most vulnerable entities such as children, women, elderly, and persons with 
disabilities.  
 
An ethical predisposition towards the tendency and responsibility of man to do good unto others 
emerges as the main motivation behind humanitarian action in these early days. Barnett and 
Weiss call this inclination “deontological or duty-based ethics.”7 They argue that it is grounded 
in Kantian ethics that “some actions are simply good in and of themselves regardless of their 
consequences.”8  Unlike a Hobbesian take on ethics and the nature of man, this line of thinking 
posits humanity as the baseline of good actions and one’s moral duty to ensure others’s 
wellbeing. That is, being human is adequately an end in itself in order to engage and help those 
who are in dire conditions. Therefore, to fulfill the bare minimum obligation of humanity, 
humanitarian actors are dispositioned to help others and justify their actions on this duty-based 
imperative. In Barnett and Weiss’s words, “Ethical action, in short, is defined by the act.”9  
 
The opposite of this duty-driven, ethical approach to humanitarianism is what Baron, Pettit and 
Store (1997) call “consequentialist ethics.”10 Consequentialist ethics by definition evaluates the 
necessity of humanitarian intervention on the feasibility and achievability of its outcomes. It is 
therefore synonymous with “grand strategies” which determine “the rightness of an action” on 
the criterion “whether it helps to bring a better outcome than its alternatives.”11 Therefore, its 
focus on the end product casts a serious doubt over the morality of any consequentialist take on 
humanitarian intervention. Consequentialism will be explored further as the overwhelming 
wave that swept away humanitarian operations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, 
because feasibility, publicity, and posterity were observed as visible tenets of the low threshold 
set by consequentialist approach—and quite detrimental to the overarching principle of 
alleviating victim’s suffering—in this era, the dissertation will not utilize this classification as 
part of ethics or morality. It henceforth will refer to any undertaking devised with the feasibility 
of its outcome as an approach, engagement, view, position.  
                                                        
7 43.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Barnett and Weiss, 44.  
10 Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slore, Three Methods of Ethics, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 
1997.  
11 Ibid.  
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Going back to the primacy of ethics in the period that started with the Battle of Solferino and 
lasted until World War II, we notice the triumph of a short-term, limited intervention with a 
specific view to alleviating the suffering of the victims of war, over the long view of addressing 
the root causes of conflict. In “The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and 
Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action,” Craig Calhoun recognizes these two 
diametrically opposing views on the ontology of humanitarian action.12  According to Calhoun, 
at the heart of the debate are the following two questions: “Should we act based on our 
conviction that our action is good in itself,” or “Should we refrain, knowing that good as it may 
be, our action will benefit only a small community at a greater cost?”13  
 
Each question, and the resultant perspective on the essence of humanitarianism, has its own 
scholar-champion. The moral, duty-driven, rapid intervention with limited scope finds its voice 
in David Rieff.14 Rieff’s A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis not only is one of the 
defining texts on the purpose of humanitarian intervention, but it also is one of the strongest 
cases made in favor of grounding humanitarianism to its original principles and instruments of 
an immediate action only to eliminate the suffering of those exposed to man-made and natural 
disasters.15 He suggests that tangible and quick remedies, such as the provision of immediate 
medical care, drinkable water, food supply, shelter and other emergency relief for the wounded 
and injured, are the only realistic and effective means of preserving lives and restoring dignity.16 
He rejects any multidimensional, coalesced, long-term interventions in the name of eradicating 
the root causes of human suffering.17   
 
Calhoun juxtaposes Rieff’s originalist position with Michael Ignatieff’s pragmatic and 
consequentialist take, which utilizes humanitarianism as an instrument to correct the evils that 
have nurtured conflicts and directly or indirectly resulted in human suffering.18 Ignatieff’s 
version of humanitarian intervention, which consists of a broad set of actions with individual 
tenets like multidimensional platforms hosting diverse participants and broad mandates from 
                                                        
12 Craig Calhoun, “The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in the Field of 
Humanitarian Action,” in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Humanitarianism in Question (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 73 – 74.  
13Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Calhoun, 74.  
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rebuilding institutions to rebooting inclusive political processes, resembles today’s 
comprehensive peacebuilding strategies at best. Similarly, the humanitarianism Ignatieff 
envisages is a calculated, political, and furthermore, universalist exercise focusing on the 
consequences and replicability of feasible strategies with good outcomes. Its success depends 
on the concerted and harmonious performance of a diverse and crowded bunch of agents with 
specific subject-matter expertise on different humanitarian consequences of conflicts.19 The 
examples of this approach can be found in the immediate post-Cold War era and the dominant 
universalist perspective on humanitarianism at the time. 
 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the reverberations of the enlightenment 
period from a century ago had set in motion a sea change in the established cognition of society, 
individual rights, and man’s obligation to one another at the time. The role of the Enlightenment 
pioneers like Adam Smith, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson and their 
contemporaries in this transformation cannot be overstated. These empiricist thinkers heralded 
the path to a new social order founded on the primacy of individualism, individual rights and 
liberties in all aspects of life—from social scientific observations to economic transactions 
based on specialization and competition.20 Although it is beyond the scope and expertise of this 
dissertation to study each philosophical achievement of the Enlightenment era, their 
consolidation in the social, political and legal order of the eighteenth century society in the 
West is paramount to understanding the link between individual rights and liberties, moral and 
contractual obligations, and humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century.  
 
Although associating any humanitarian deed with capitalism may be perceived counterfactual, 
the discourse on ethics and organized humanitarian action does not discredit the contributions 
of capitalism. On the contrary, it rests upon several scholarly works that show a significant 
relationship among the advent of capitalistic societies, the emergence of bourgeoisie, and an 
increased sense of moral-obligation of fellow men to one another’s welfare.21 The literature 
almost converges on the effect of capitalism’s certain values and instruments on the redefinition 
                                                        
19 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004.  
20 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic 
Thinkers, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999.  
21 Deidre N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006.  See also Shelby T. McCloy, The Humanitarian Movement in Eighteenth-Century France, 
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of one’s obligations to himself and to the others. For example, increased private property 
ownership and the economic and legal structure that was developed to protect the rights and 
interests of one against the others—be it the state or fellow citizens—changed the perception 
on the concept of individual rights and freedoms. As a consequence, this cognitive shift in the 
bourgeois’s view of forced labor posed the most significant challenge to the institution of 
slavery in the nineteenth century. While the dissolution of slavery under the shifting moral, 
spiritual, political, and economic realities at the time is not one of the topics undertaken in this 
dissertation, the changing attitudes on property and labor as factors of production at the turn of 
the eighteenth century offer an important explanation on the momentum that made 
humanitarian intervention for the protection of the victims of conflict possible.  
 
One of the clearest explanations offered on how the rise of capitalism sowed the seeds of 
humanitarianism in this era comes from Thomas Haskell in his two-part journal article 
“Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility.”22 Haskell’s careful 
deconstruction of the development of free market dynamics resulted in two important 
accomplishments in explaining how capitalism ushered in humanitarianism in the nineteenth 
century. The first achievement was Haskell’s refuting the “social control theory,” which, to 
Haskell, was premised on two dubious assumptions: The first one is that the social control 
theorists had chosen only one of the attributes of capitalism’s rise, and that was the advent of 
the bourgeois class, to explain humanitarianism’s advancement. Second, they wrongly assumed 
that the bourgeoise’s drive to humanitarian cause was to a great extent driven by their material 
and economic interests.23  
 
With regard to the second assumption made by the social control theorists, that the majority of 
the abolitionists, who fought for the elimination of slavery in the nineteenth century, 
unequivocally belonged to the bourgeois origins led them to conclude that an overarching class 
interest was at play.24  The defendants of the function of class interest, such as David Brion 
Davis, in eradicating slavery are observed to have placed too much faith in the resolve and acts 
of singular religious sects.25 One of these was the Quakers. Haskell illustrates the confounding 
                                                        
22 Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility – Part I,” The American 
Historical Review 90, 2 (April 1985): 339 – 361, see also Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the 
Humanitarian Sensibility – Part II,” The American Historical Review 90, 3 (June 1985): 547 – 566. 
23 Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility – Part I,” 341.  
24 Ibid.  
25 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823, Ithaca, 1966.  
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causal link Davis tried to draw between the Quakers’s characteristics as “businessmen” and 
“epitome” of the Protestant ethics and antislavery movement in the following manner: 
 
The Quaker reformers who were so prominent in antislavery and every other 
humanitarian endeavor of the age were often fabulously successful businessmen who 
epitomized the Protestant ethic and the capitalist mentality. Either directly or through 
close family connections they were deeply involved in industry, shipping, banking, 
and commerce; they knew firsthand the task of devising new modes of labor 
discipline to replace older methods of social control. As members of an 
entrepreneurial class confronted by an “unruly labor force” prone to “uninhibited 
violence” and not yet “disciplined to the factory system,” late eighteenth-century 
reformers had strong incentives to formulate an ideology that would “isolate specific 
forms of human misery, allowing issues of freedom and discipline to be faced in a 
relatively simplified model.”26 
 
Contrary to the social theorists’s conviction that the material interests behind bourgeoisie’s 
antislavery stance resulted in an increased humanitarian sensitivity, the following époque of 
industrialization simply replaced one form of forced labor with another. As history tells us, the 
century that followed saw the continued exploitation of the poor and underprivileged classes 
for the material gain of the bourgeoise and aristocracy as part of the production chain as cheap 
labor. Compared to slavery, the conditions that bound the labor in the post-enlightenment era 
were more humane and less barbarous. However, even in this period of mass industrialization, 
those who did not belong in the aristocracy or bourgeoise were still deprived of the socio-
economic rights. Stripped of these privileges and confined to unsanitary, unjust and inhumane 
labor, it was nearly impossible for anyone who fell outside these classes to exercise the kind of 
self-interest, self-motivation, and moral obligation that the Enlightenment enumerated among 
the necessary characteristics of a truly independent man who can think and act for himself. 
Thus, as Davis et. al would argue, whatever motivations the abolitionists and other bourgeois 
divisions might have had, the emancipation of forced laborers were selective, and while it 
benefited this class, it also advanced the humanitarian sentiments at the time on the side.  
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Haskell, however, counterargues that rather other properties of capitalism drove the 
development of humanitarianism. In fact, Haskell’s variables fill an important void between the 
concretization of humanitarianism in the second half of the nineteenth century and the birth of 
the self-aware, self-possessed individual with obligations to the wellbeing of his society. 
According to Haskell, the market, as a property of capitalism, is responsible for the 
development of humanitarianism, not the capitalist class. He suggests that any hypothetical 
relation derived from the class interest or selectivity is too limited in scope and breadth to 
explain a phenomenon as comprehensive, and as durable, as humanitarianism. Therefore, 
Haskell concludes such a sea change of ideas was only possible through a more elaborate, 
encompassing and replicable catalysts of social change. And such transformation itself was too 
inclusive to have been driven by a certain class and to have been applied selectively. Haskell 
thus ascertains that several specific facilities and principles introduced by the market changed 
the cognition of man in the way that he saw himself and that he related himself to others. These 
facilities and principles further challenged the individual’s perception of the following 
impediments that until then restricted one’s impulse to intervene with the other’s misery: a 
convoluted moral obligation, a conventional necessity of affinity, the lack of method, and an 
absence of a precedence of successful intervention. We infer from Haskell that the 
neutralization of these challenges yields the “four preconditions to the emergence of 
humanitarianism as a historical phenomenon.”27 His definition of the four preconditions is as 
follows:  
 
First and most obvious, we must adhere to ethical maxims that make helping 
strangers the right thing to do before we can feel obliged to aid them. If our ethical 
convictions permit us to ignore the suffering of people outside our own family or 
clan, then there could be no basis whatever for the emergence of those activities and 
attitudes that we call humanitarian.… A second precondition...is that we must 
perceive ourselves to be causally involved in the evil event. Once again, being 
causally involved does not meant that we regard ourselves as “the cause” but only 
that we recognize our refusal to act as a necessary condition without which the evil 
event would not occur. Along with this prerequisite goes the third. We cannot regard 
ourselves as causally involved in another’s suffering unless we see a way to stop it. 
We must perceive causal connection, a chain made up of the cause-and-effect links, 
                                                        
27 Ibid., 357.  
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that begins with some act of ours as cause and ends with the alleviation of the 
stranger’s suffering as effect. We must, in short, have a technique, or recipe, for 
intervening—a specific sequence of steps that we know we can take to alter the 
ordinary course of events…. The fourth precondition, the one that finally gets us into 
a psychological frame of mind in which some of us will feel compelled to act, is this: 
the recipes for intervention available to us must be ones of sufficient ordinariness, 
familiarity, certainty of effect, and ease of operation that our failure to use them 
would constitute a suspension of routine, an out-of-the-ordinary event, possibly even 
and intentional act in itself.28 
 
The market, from Haskell’s point of view, was the only means at the time for meeting these 
preconditions and nurturing a global consciousness towards humanitarianism. And it depended 
on its three innovations that shaped modern individual’s perception of himself, of his role in 
the emerging social and economic order, as well as of his responsibilities and obligations to the 
others.29 In other words, the market’s acceptance of a platform of free, conscious and willful 
exchange of goods, services, and labor—ideally without any intervention on the transacting 
parties from a third entity—required three mechanisms to be in place for the sustenance of this 
practice: The first was disciplining and education of the individual to partake in a slowly-
emerging Weberian-style of meritocracy that tethered the survival of the society to 
specialization, professionalization, economic distribution and utilization of resources. Weber 
saw the substitution of a social order made up of economic interests, and apt members to carry 
them out, with religious orders as the prerequisite of transformation from traditional to rational 
society. 
 
Contract was the second indispensable instrument that addressed the vacuum identified in the 
form of four preconditions to humanitarian intervention. It accomplished this in several ways. 
First, it provided the very recipe for individuals to engage one another on lucrative terms and 
without resorting to violence or coercion by the sovereign. The type of this engagement could 
be anything ranging from business transactions to ceasefire negotiations or even providing aid 
for the victims of natural disasters and wars. In Haskell’s words, “when contracting parties 
commit themselves to bring certain designated events to pass, they fix the future with regard to 
                                                        
28 Ibid., 357-358.  
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those events, thereby providing each other with a significantly stabilized environment in which 
to operate.”30 Now equipped with a bucket list of instructions and conditions, a failure to meet 
which carried serious financial, legal, and reputational damages, an ordinary individual was not 
only guaranteed favorable results—provided that he followed a certain path of premeditated 
agreements, but he also could anticipate the direction in which his transaction would unfold. 
Contract was heretofore a powerful tool that generated confidence by presetting the obligations 
of the agent that pledged to carry out certain actions or deliver tangible goods. Similarly, 
contract dictated the circumstances and conditions under which the promise had the right to 
expect the promised acts from the promiser. In other words, from the dawn of the civilization 
until the eighteenth century, an average human being had been afforded an instrument that 
rendered future a sense of predictability.31  
 
Second, as contractual relations increased, so did the necessity and appreciation of man’s ability 
to exert control over his choices and affairs. This ability was simply referenced as “self-
possession.” Self possession, to a great extent was a byproduct of the changing perception on 
the rights and entitlements of an individual in the era of contracts. Because contracts drew limit 
around what can and cannot be expected from the promiser of a deed, the notion of breaching 
these limits, and forcing the promiser to deliver on commitments that he did not make, was 
increasingly regarded immoral. The spread of this conviction reinforced an average individual’s 
confidence the he was in charge of his affairs. An individual who had this level of discipline 
and steering power over his affairs was naturally preferred to transact with in a market sociert 
for the reasons of reliability and predictability. On the other hand, any person who was forced 
into relinquishing control over his most fundamental needs and affairs was not only detrimental 
to the functioning of a capitalist social order, but it was also in breach of divine contract with 
the creator. Therefore, a self-possessed man not only became a cornerstone of a progressive 
society with his Weberian attributes of professionalism, education, and discipline, but he was 
also placed in possession of rights that were inseparable unless he chose to discharge them on 
his own free will.  
 
The ability of self-possession that derives from an increased contractual bond between 
individuals, and between the individual and the society at large, in the eighteenth century was 
preamble to the rise of the “age of principle” in the proceeding century. And principle, or acting 
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on principle, is the third important instrument that the market provided for an ordinary man to 
care and help others. How self-possession leads to principled actions was best illustrated by 
Nietzsche’s meditations on the virtues of the “sovereign individual.” As alluded to numerous 
times in The Genealogy of Morals, a compulsory element of Nietzsche’s definition of the 
sovereign individual is the ability to resist the natural tendency of human physiology to forget.32 
Nietzsche regards this “active forgetfulness” as a vital function of human being for him to 
continue on with his life sustaining absolutely minimum mental and physical hardship. 
Therefore, therefore to the eminent philosopher it is truly phenomenal that man in the eighteenth 
century concurred to give up this ability by promising not to forget and bound himself to future 
commitments by the means of contract:  
 
 …this is the utility, as I have said, of the active forgetfulness, which is a very  
sentinel and nurse of psychic order, repose, etiquette; and this shows at once why  
it is that there can exist not happiness, no gladness, no hope, no pride, no real present, 
without forgetfulness. The man in whom this preventative apparatus is damaged and 
discarded, is to be compared to a dyspeptic, and it is something more than a 
comparison—he can “get rid of” nothing. But this very animal who finds it necessary 
to be forgetful, in whom, in fact, forgetfulness represents a force and a form of robust 
health, has reared for himself an opposition-power, a memory, with whose help 
forgetfulness is, in certain instances, kept in check…so that it is by no means a mere 
passive inability to get rid of a once indented impression, not merely the indigestion 
occasioned by a once pledged word, which one cannot dispose of, but an active 
refusal to get rid of it, a continuing and a wish to continue what has once been willed, 
an actual memory of the will: so that between the original “I will,” “I shall do,” and 
the actual discharge of the will, its act, we can easily interpose a world of new strange 
phenomena, circumstances, veritable volitions, without the snapping of this long 
chain of will.33 
 
Nietzsche does not only offer a methodical description of this divergence from man’s inherit 
nature, but he also goes further in explaining the reason for it. The robust resistance against 
forgetting rewarded an ordinary individual with a number of quintessential features to 
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demarcate his temporal and spatial areas of influence, as well as to chart the boundaries of his 
sovereignty. Man learnt to differentiate between accidental and intended phenomena, to think 
causally, to see the future as he saw the present, to bring certainty to the future by coming up 
with conditions to honor and identifying sacrifices whose fruits he would anticipate to glean in 
the future.34 Hence emerged the sovereign individual, who was “calculable,” “disciplined,” 
“necessitated.”35  These features constituted the bare minimums for any man to discharge his 
will at the time of his choosing—or at the time agreed upon by contracting parties—in the 
future.  
 
If we take the ability to discharge will in the future in a prompt, repetitive, and reliable manner 
as a necessary function of principle—or principled action—then a logical conclusion dictates 
an incorruptible causal relation between principle and one’s possession of fundamental 
freedoms and rights. Therefore, emergence of principle in tandem with the entrepreneurial stage 
of capitalism was no accident. Diligence to recall, honor, and deliver previously agreed terms 
in the future also spoke to the internalization of morals. The covariance between morals and 
market instruments yielded in certain communities an awareness of the relation between 
principal freedoms and principled action. Two scholars offer insights and illustrations on the 
internalization of this enlightenment. Atiyah argues that the eighteenth century was not only 
known as the Age of Contract, but also as the “age of principle.” The age of principle, in 
Atiyah’s analysis, has two important connotations: First, it placed in the society certain 
expectations from its individual members. These expectations in summary were to act with 
virtue, to treat others equally and fairly, and to honor pledges made in the context of a social or 
business contract. The ability to fulfill these responsibilities was the sign of the individual of 
principle.36 As principled behavior increased and principles of political economy, principles of 
ethics, and principles of jurisprudence and commercial behavior rose, so did the odds of success 
for a person who had a firm grasp on principles.37  
 
Second, certain classes, or communities, of the capitalistic society recognized principle as the 
ultimate contract between man and the divine. Mostly Quakers and the bourgeois of the late 
eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century communities embraced this approach to spirituality and 
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principled behavior. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that the abolitionists were mainly 
consisted of Quakers and the bourgeoise. To the contrary, in Haskell’s estimate, “the 
abolitionists were notoriously men and women of principle…they bear more than a passing 
resemblance in this regard to Nietzsche’s ‘sovereign individual.’”38 Haskell recognizes that just 
as in Nietzsche’s sovereign individual, the contemporary man of the Enlightenment must have 
the instruments and rights in possession to devote attention to the future consequences of his 
present actions.  
 
Heeding the insight of John Woolman, a significant eighteenth-century abolitionist and a 
thinker, proves the unorthodox connection between contract, principle, and faith true. 
Furthermore, his written words on the subject provide the missing piece of the puzzle with 
respect to how secular market principles—coupled with morals and spirituality—tie to 
humanitarianism. In his essay “Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes,” Woolman 
specifically draws his own conclusions on the unacceptability of slavery by the standards of 
principled men. Woolman especially draws on two reasonings—one being spiritual, and the 
other being more contractual. The following excerpt from Haskell’s account of Woolman’s 
approach explains the scholar-abolitionist’s rationale:  
  
Then Woolman addressed two anticipated objections. The first was that the Golden 
Rule does not really require care for strangers. This he countered with a passage from 
Leviticus: “The stranger that dwelleth with you shall be as one born amongst you, 
and thou shalt love him as thyself.” The second was the slaveowner’s plea that, 
having made an investment and undertaken risk, he was now entitled to the slave’s 
labor. Here Woolman responded that the master’s property in the slave is “wrong 
from the beginning…. if I purchase a man who hath never forfeited his liberty, the 
natural right of freedom is in him….” The crucial novelty of Woolman’s own 
perspective—the element of his thinking that set him far apart from most of his 
audience in the 1740s but that, when more widely shared a century later, helped swell 
antislavery ranks—was his recognition of the causal relationship that exists in market 
societies between supply and demand.39 
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In summary, the historical backdrop leading to the first efforts of an organizational and 
institutional approach to humanitarianism had its roots in the Enlightenment’s novel ideas and 
market-oriented instruments. Such instruments and moral values as systematized education, 
contract and principle not only instilled in an individual capacity to effect control over future, 
but also a rare confidence to improve others’s fortunes. It would be important to heed Haskell’s 
following canvassing of the big picture:  
 
The argument presented here is not that markets breed humane action but that in the 
particular historical circumstances of late eighteenth-century Anglo-American 
culture the market happens to have been the force that pushed causal perception 
across the threshold that had hitherto made the slaves’s misery (and much other 
human suffering) seem a necessary evil. One would no more expect markets 
continually to elevate the morality of the population than one would expect oxygen—
in the absence of which ignition cannot occur—always to produce fire.40 
 
The market-created instruments—namely professional education, recipe-based contract, and 
principled action—set in motion the legal and moral clockworks that resulted in the advent of 
humanitarianism that Henry Dunant et. al pioneered in the middle nineteenth century. A careful 
investigation of Dunant’s memoirs from the battle points to heavy burden on the moral 
obligations provoked by the gruesome imagery of the combat between the Franco-Italian and 
Austrian armies. Similarly, the process that created the International Committee of Red 
Crescent offers an unambiguous illustration of the utilization of a recipe-based contract to 
preserve the physiological, psychosocial, and legal integrity of both combatants and 
noncombatants that had been harmed by merciless warfare of that time.  
 
In the beginning of this chapter we briefly alluded to Dunant’s observations on the Battle of 
Solferino and highlighted the battle as the catalyst of an organized humanitarian response to the 
evils of war. The battle’s effect on the development of noncombatants’s moral obligation to 
care for the wounded and injured also ought to be emphasized. The following segments from 
Dunant’s essay establish the link between a lack of adequate care for the wounded at the battle 
and the bystanders’s urge to meet their moral obligations by intervening to tend to the fallen. 
In this respect, Dunant’s “Memory of Solferino” is an important contribution to the literature 
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and one of the most vivid accounts of wars destructiveness. However, what separates it from 
other similar chronicles is its bearing witness to human element—the plight of an ordinary 
citizen to save the battle-weary from clutches of death.  
 
Virtuous treatments of strangers by each other is the moral of the Battle of Solferino in Dunant’s 
Memoir, and it will be explored in-depth. Yet, another equally prominent contribution of his 
work is the exposure of inadequate medical care and merciful acts during the battle. Dunant 
observed that in the heat of the battle, warring sides seldom respected the sanctity of the 
caregivers on the field.  Dunant reported that even though field hospitals were marked with 
black flags to discourage the enemy from firing in the direction of first-aid posts or field 
ambulances—and “it was tacitly agreed that no one shall fire in their direction”—these spots 
were often targeted and shells had battered these supposedly spared positions.41 “Their 
quartermasters and ambulance men are no more spared than are the wagons loaded with bread, 
wine and meat to make soup for the wounded. Wounded soldiers who can still walk come by 
themselves to these ambulances; but in many cases they are so weakened by loss of blood and 
exposure that they have to be carried on stretchers or litters.”42 
 
The armies that met at Solferino were equally unsparing as far as the civilians were concerned. 
Dunant had the following to report on the day after:  
 
When the sun came up on the twenty-fifth, it disclosed the most dreadful sights 
imaginable. Bodies of men and horses covered the battlefield; corpses were strewn 
over roads, ditches, ravines, thickets and fields; the approaches of Solferino were 
literally thick with dead. The fields were devastated, wheat and corn lying flat on the 
ground, fences broken, orchards ruined; here and there were pools of blood. The 
villages were deserted and bore the scars left by musket shots, bombs, rockets, 
grenades and shells. Walls were broken down and pierced with gaps where 
cannonballs had crushed through them. Houses were riddled with holes, shattered 
and ruined, and their inhabitants, who had been in hiding, crouching in cellars 
without light or food for nearly twenty hours, were beginning to crawl out, looking 
stunned by the terrors they had endured.43 
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What impressed Dunant was in spite of the fear and risk that civilians felt from observing the 
destruction unleashed by modern warfare, they were not cowed into dismissing the post-battle 
responsibilities for those who suffered. As the earlier anecdote suggests, the people of Solferino 
volunteered their skills and goods to provide some comfort to those who had survived the terror 
of the battlefield. The locals’s response to the suffering of the wounded, in spite of their 
restricted means, deems Solferino a unique event and safely registers it in history as the debut 
of humanitarian intervention solely on ethical premise. Dunant reported that the residents had 
demonstrated tremendous courage and generosity by opening their houses, barns, shops and 
even the church, without seeking material gains or wealth.  The Swiss chronicler’s observations 
in fact proves the primacy of moral obligation on people’s drive to care for the casualties of 
war, because material gains from aiding the broken men from the field were negligible. On the 
contrary, we infer from Dunant’s report that the scarcity of goods would have been a formidable 
cause to deter the town people from sharing what little they had with those hanging by tread on 
the brink of life and death: 
 
The town [speaking of Castiglione] was completely transformed into a vas 
improvisedhospital for French and Austrians. On the Friday, hospital headquarters 
had been established there, and wagons full of lint, equipment and medicines had 
been unpacked. The townspeople gave all blankets, linen and mattresses they could 
spare. The hospital of Castiglione, the Church, the San Luigi monastery and barracks, 
the Capuchin Church, the police barracks, the churches of San Maggiore, San 
Guiseppe, and Santa Rosalia, were all filled with wounded men, piled on one another 
and with nothing but straw to lie on…. Private houses were very soon taken over; the 
more well-off among their owners welcomed officers and soldiers, and busied 
themselves in providing what little they could do to relieve their pain. Some ran 
wildly through the streets looking for a doctor for their guests. Others went to and 
fro in the town distraught, beginning to have the dead taken from their houses, for 
they did not know how to get rid of them.44 
 
The selflessness the townspeople in the face of an unprecedented terror and suffering soon 
relented to disorganization and confusion. This particular observation by Dunant underscores 
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another important attribute of the early humanitarianism; that is, while duty-driven ethics was 
a necessary cause of action, it was not adequate. Without an organized approach erected on 
recipe and mutually-agreed principles, a de facto action often led to waste of human and 
material resources. In the case of Solferino, such absence of an organized effort resulted in a 
tragedy on the second day of recovery. Dunant observed that both soldiers and ordinary 
civilians were quickly overwhelmed by the steadily increasing number of the casualties, and 
they were soon overwhelmed by grief.45 “There was water and food,” noted Dunant, “but even 
so men died of hunger and thirst; there was plenty of lint, but there were not enough hands to 
dress wounds.”46 Apparently, a shortage of doctors and other medical professionals had left a 
critical vacuum of medical care, which resulted in increased deaths. Moreover, the panic that 
took hold with increased casualties and delirious state of the wounded rolled the townspeople 
into a state of futility and despair, causing some of them to desert their homes and migrate to 
nearby dwellings. 
 
The evidence and details pertaining to the power of duty-driven ethics on ordinary people’s 
intervention to help those who suffered the consequences of modern warfare can be multiplied. 
In fact, without “the moral sense of the importance of human life; the humane desire to lighten 
a little the torments…or restore shattered courage; the furious and relentless activity which a 
man summons up at such moments,” the kind of collective focus and energy to relieve an 
innocent victim, suffering from the fear and destruction of war would not have been possible. 
In other words, the absence of organized models for humanitarian intervention until then singles 
out ethics as the only driver for humanitarian cause.47 However, another lesson drawn from 
Dunant’s experience is the necessity of a recipe-based, legal framework. Duty-driven ethics 
might have gotten people out of hiding to help others at times of distress. Yet, it was the 
consolidation of these efforts under the banner of the International Committee of Red Cross 
(ICRC) in 1864 which made humanitarianism effective.  
 
The ICRC was the first private organization in history that challenged the realist school of 
international relations theory by asking states to consider the welfare of humans while engaging 
in war with one another. The first Geneva Convention of 1864 provided the legal baseline for 
the ICRC’s mandate on the protection of victims of war. The ICRC’s advent filled an important 
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gap in coating the humanitarian efforts on the field with legal structure. Forsythe defines this 
sequence by highlighting the necessity of action “in the field” first, followed by legal 
codification.48 According to Forsythe, “the moral imperative led law, not the other way 
around.”49 Although the closest example to the ICRC in the nineteenth century was Anti-
Slavery Society (founded in 1839), in terms of its embeddedness in the legal framework of 
Western liberalism, neither the Anti Slavery Society nor any other organization had 
demonstrated the same effectiveness as the ICRC. What made the ICRC unique, explains 
Forsythe, was its ability to regularize and successfully scale up the humanitarian actions on the 
field by utilizing international law.50 In other words, “law was to facilitate and ensure the 
repetition of the practical action that had already occurred.”51  
 
In summary, the ICRC model of protecting civilians in armed conflicts by getting states to 
accept and honor international legal codes and the provision of short-term humanitarian relief 
had been the only modus operandi since Dunant’s groundbreaking account of war until the end 
of World War II. The literature review conducted so far has reinforced that neither the concept 
of moral obligation nor ICRC’s advocacy for international humanitarian law had precipitated 
without pretext. On the contrary, the new discourse on social order emerged with the 
Enlightenment era and the advent of capitalistic societies empowered ordinary men with 
effective instruments to improve not only their own future, but that of others as well. In that 
regard, the development of contractual relationship instilled the ideas of social equity, 
dependability, and the virtues of recognizing and acting on certain principles for all mankind. 
This new thinking expanded the breadth of an individual’s moral obligations, toward himself, 
his community, and the greater society in which he partook. Thus became the norm for an 
average citizen not to withhold any resource in his possession in his plight to help end the 
misery of his neighbor, however close or distant the victim may be. The example of his goodwill 
was replicated, organized and deployed through an international system based on fundamental 
codes of humanitarianism and overseen by an impressive network of organizations that we have 
come to know as the ICRC.  
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2.2. Post-World War II and Politicization of Humanitarianism  
The humanitarian system founded on the principle of moral obligation and an international legal 
order of civilian protection during the times of war continued relatively unaltered in the period 
leading to World War II. The scope and mandate of the ICRC operations had broadened during 
the Russian-Japanese War of 1905 and throughout World War I. In a succession of Geneva 
Conventions until the Great War, the ICRC’s mandate had been enlarged to cover the humane 
treatment of prisoners of war and to make sure that the legal codes pertaining to the rights of 
prisoners were upheld. Similarly, on the battlefield, the ICRC branches around the world carried 
out standard operations consisting of emergency relief distribution and medical care for the 
wounded combatants and noncombatants in the line of fire. In the years and events building up 
to World War II, field operations had come a long way since Dunant’s “Memoir of Solferino.” 
In particular, the presence of the ICRC, and its Muslim denomination Red Crescent (first 
founded in the Ottoman Empire), on the battle fields had increased and was growingly respected 
by the combatants. The insignias of a red cross, or crescent, on the backdrop of white were 
recognized and respected as immunity from being targeted by the enemy. In contrast to 
Dunant’s battlefield in Solferino, the ICRC archives show visible presence of ICRC stations, 
scattered inside and outside of war zones. The enlarged presence and activities, however, did 
not offer a new technology, instrument, or strategy in regard to the deployment of short-term 
humanitarian aid. At the end of the day, the overarching mission was still the alleviation of 
victim’s suffering, tending to his primary needs through the provision of clean water, food, and 
shelter, and the restoration of his dignity.   
 
All of this changed with World War II. An important characteristic of World War II was urban 
warfare. Carpet bombings and block-to-block fighting in the strategic cities of the European 
theater emerged as the two new features of warfare during World War II. Both characteristics 
had dire impact on civilians and created two new challenges as far as humanitarian intervention 
was concerned. First, mass destruction resulted in mass casualties and an ensuing migration. 
Although forced migration was not uncommon during the Great War and the previous wars of 
the early twentieth century, the scale of refugees that the urban warfare and earth-scorching air 
raids on densely populated was unprecedented. The ICRC branches spread out to Europe found 
itself in the middle of a complex refugee crisis, which was not going to be resolved by provision 
of basic emergency relief. Permanent shelters and safe havens were needed for the duration of 
the war and the postwar reconstruction.  
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The second challenge created by the changing dynamics of warfare was the total destruction of 
major strategic and fundamental infrastructure, including key government buildings, utilities 
facilities, schools, hospitals and residential areas. By the time the war was over and the dust 
settled, major European powers—regardless of the side on which they fought during the war—
were facing a significant scarcity in monetary, material, and human resources. The challenge 
of rebuilding physical infrastructure was overshadowed by an even more perplexing task of 
reconstructing the collapsed political and economic systems of the defeated nations. As the first 
comprehensive nation building project in history, the reconstruction of Europe presented perils 
that neither the nascent intergovernmental organizations at the time or the seasoned 
transnational charities had confronted before. Although the ICRC’s centennial was rising over 
the horizon, its operational portfolio was fundamentally restricted to immediate humanitarian 
relief activities, which did not extend beyond provision of emergency supply of food, clean 
water, shelter and medicine. A continental nation building project, which not by the least 
included jump starting Europe’s stalled economy by a series of both macroeconomic and 
institutional resuscitations, was clearly outside ICRC’s conventional jurisdiction.   
 
By definition, the post-World War II reconstruction efforts—mainly in Europe, and to a certain 
degree in East Asia—were political, and to an equal degree—economic endeavor. Although at 
the initial stage of intervention, the emphasis was still on ending human suffering and restoring 
dignity via the provision of key supplies, a larger political vision and comprehension of 
economic reconstruction, as well as development, were needed for the project to succeed. 
Putting up shelters was one thing, reinstating the German Bundestag and Bundesbank another. 
Furthermore, in the majority of these countries, humanitarian supplies and field hospital would 
have lasted for only so long. Although lives could have been saved in the immediate aftermath 
of the cessation of fighting, without permanent municipal, health and security services people 
would have eventually lost their good health, sense of security, and the community would 
quickly descend into anarchy.  With the depletion of supplies in an environment without key 
governmental and social services, violence would spur and a relapse into conflict would have 
been unavailable.  
 
The chief challenge in the context of the post-War reconstruction was therefore not only to 
come up with quick intervention schemes and lightning-fast relief for the suffering, but it also 
was to rebuild necessary infrastructure and institutions to extend the protection, comfort, and 
stability that short-term instruments had provided well into the future. In the absence of these 
 31 
facilities, it would have been only a matter of time before the prolonged dire conditions would 
have caused the suffering lose hope and resort to brute force to better his conditions. Such long-
term planning, and reinstatement of comprehensive institutions required more than a sense of 
moral obligation and generosity—the two drivers of humanitarian action nearly a century ago. 
More important, a reconstruction project of such magnitude necessitated funds that no single 
nation or organization could have underwritten on its own.  
 
The advent of the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (known as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development at the 
time of its creation), in part played a role in the financial recovery and developmental aspects 
of the post-war European reconstruction. The IMF’s contribution was substantial, but it was 
geared towards preventing the next financial crisis by making liquid reserves available to cash-
strapped countries under the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This way, the states would be 
provided with an alternative to defaulting on their debt and would avoid instigating a global 
financial uncertainty that would fuel another world War. Consequently, in spite of its significant 
role in stabilizing the volatile post-War European financial makeup, the IMF was not a leading 
force in the actual nation building in Europe.  
 
The World Bank, on the other hand, carried out vital development projects that resulted in the 
return of some normalcy to the countries that were devastated by the war. The World Bank 
projects encompassed a broad milieu of infrastructure reconstruction projects from irrigation 
systems to repairing pucker holed highways under the heavy artillery barrage and air raids 
during the war. The World Bank funds were used in rebuilding vital government services and 
their facilities. These projects encapsulated schools, hospitals, bridges, toll roads, 
hydroelectricity dams, power distribution lines, pipelines, etc. The World Bank’s another value-
added input into the societies whose indigenous systems were crumbled in the war years was 
to tailor systems that would be used by these facilities. From classroom curriculum to 
emergency response protocols, the World Bank was adamant that the civilians, who suffered 
casualties on a scale that had not been witnessed before, would have the necessary tools not 
only to recognize and prevent the next catastrophe, but also to survive. Per its make up the 
World Bank was an international enterprise, yet its presidency belonged to the Americans, and 
the European in return controlled the IMF. Therefore the World Bank projects were at least 
approved by a steering committee of executives and board of directors. Therefore, the 
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development projects with a view to expediting communities’s recovery processes were 
approved in a more collaborative and democratic manner putting the victims first.  
 
The Marshall Plan, on the other hand, represents the true arrival of the politicization of 
humanitarian relief and nation building at large. The United States’s previous experiences with 
relief during World War I had trouble the highest echelons of the U.S. Department with the 
consequences of entrusting the control of relief operations to third parties. In light of past 
experience, the senior bureaucracy in charge of post-war Europe’s reconstruction wanted to 
make sure that the money spent was aligned with U.S. interests and was deployed along the 
strategies for fulfilling these interests.  
 
The literature on humanitarian intervention concomitantly suggests that in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II humanitarian intervention took a distinctive political form. Unlike 
the financial and developmental reconstruction efforts led by the IMF and the World Bank, 
which were formulated more along the lines of an intergovernmental scheme, merging politics 
and humanitarianism was a conscious U.S. foreign policy strategy. Although the United States 
had been involved in humanitarian relief during and after World War I, the landscape then was 
dominated by charity organizations. Although, some international charities such as the ICRC 
had representatives of sovereign nations on their boards, they still operated independently in 
their decision making and deployment. In fact, the literature does not offer a comprehensive, 
single-state driven humanitarian program until World War II. It nonetheless demonstrates the 
link between  the strain that the Great War put on duty-driven, scattered humanitarian 
organizations with little resource to respond to a continental destruction and the sovereign 
nation’s rise as an alternative humanitarian actor.  
 
Towards the end of the Great War, this sovereign actor was none other than the United States. 
In fact, its deployment of humanitarian relief as an extension of the Wilsonian internationalism 
greatly influenced its inclination to tie political conditions to its generosity nearly 20 years later. 
Although the Wilson administration pioneered the ideology and philosophy behind it, the 
successive Hoover administration carried out the U.S. humanitarian relief operation targeted 
Belgium, which at the times was believed to have suffered most under the German occupation.52 
The success of this privately organized and unanimously U.S.-led operation encouraged the 
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United States to organize two more humanitarian operation, albeit one of them with a more 
universal cause and greater breadth. The Children’s Fund in this respect, and as apparent from 
its name, was created by the Hoover administration as an international charity that collected 
and channeled private and governmental donations to eight million children.53 While the 
Children’s Fund provided significant boost to the imagery of a superior morality of U.S. foreign 
policy, Washington’s second humanitarian operation not only damaged this perception, but it 
sowed the seeds of the politicization of humanitarianism, a discourse which is still current since 
its conception nearly a century ago.  
 
Known as the Hoover-Nansen Mission, this second privately-organized U.S. operation sought 
to provide emergency relies and basic supplies to the victims of the Russian civil war between 
the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. However, as Belgrad stresses, this was perhaps the first known 
case in the literature in which the recipient of the aid was deliberately seduced into supporting 
the donor’s political regime. Belgrad charges Hoover with creating “a Trojan Horse to infiltrate 
and subverts the Soviet government,” by establishing a distribution system outside the control 
of the Soviet government to provide food, medicine, and economic means.54 Hoover, in other 
words,  hoped to catalyze a transition into democracy, and to turn the tide against the 
Bolsheviks, by empowering the populations who suffered by starvation, disease, and violent 
clashes between the two factions. Lenin’s recognition of United States’s ulterior motive, 
however, stopped the U.S. plan in its tracks. The failure of the plan and the funds spent in vain 
provided a valuable lesson for the United State, which would affect the place of humanitarian 
aid in U.S. foreign policy two decades later.  
 
U.S. humanitarian intervention in the Soviet civil war set in perspective for the United States 
an important cost-benefit analysis of humanitarian intervention. From Washington’s point of 
view, providing relief for the victims and alleviating their suffering were necessary, but not 
adequate, outcomes of any aid operation. By departing from the conventional nineteenth 
century norms of humanitarian intervention, which favored acting upon moral obligation with 
a limited scope of restoring physical and emotional wellbeing of the beneficiary, the United 
States made the elimination of the root causes of suffering a priority. Furthermore, the advent 
of international organizations in charge of political, economic and social restoration at the end 
of World War II, the majority of which were products of U.S. vision and design anyways, fueled 
                                                        
53 Ibid., 4. 
54 Ibid.  
 34 
Washington’s resolution to acquire intended political outcomes in exchange of the funds it 
committed. In addition, its failure to influence the political transition in the Soviet Russia two 
decades ago motivated the United States to be more particular, unilateral, and authoritative with 
respect to the reasons and methods of its relief operations.  
 
The Marshall Aid for the reconstruction of the post-War Europe is a significant marker of the 
rupture from duty-driven ethical approach. The phenomenon that replaced it, and reigned for 
much of the twentieth century, was a longer term developmental approach, accompanied by 
political conditions and self interests of the donors. It also was a reaction to the United Nations’s 
universalist alternative to relief and reconstruction, which will be explored further in the next 
subsection. As regards the Marshall Aid, the conundrum that the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) presented was a major contributor to single-handed 
U.S. intervention. The UNRRA was UN’s immediate post-War facility to administer donations 
to provide relief for the victims of the war. However, donations were committed by 
governments, and the authority to distribute them belonged to the UNRRA. U.S. Congress, as 
the only body in the American political system to approve budget and foreign aid, opposed this 
arrangement. The sentiment that the United States had to be in charge of where, when, and how 
aid was dispensed also resonated with foreign policy circles.  
 
One particular champion of more U.S.-administered aid was George Clayton, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He was distrustful of international organizations such 
as UNRRA. He was particularly concerned with the elongated and long decision making 
processes at these intergovernmental bodies. Clayton believed that the prolonged debates and 
unnecessary bureaucratic processes at deeper levels wasted valuable American taxpayer money 
and compromised U.S. self interest in the political, social, and economic reconstruction of 
Europe.55 Clayton believed that the United States could not repeat the mistakes of UNRRA. 
The case in point was the exploitation of UNRRA funds in the reconstruction of Chinese 
provinces destroyed during World War II. The aforementioned shortcomings in decision 
making, deployment, and coming up with clear, achievable goals yielded mismanagement and 
looting of resources which could have saved additional lives from the U.S. State Department 
point of view.  
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Clayton’s counterproposal for the reconstruction of Europe thus required that “the United States 
must run the show…and the plan should be a European plan” to prevent “chaos of bloodshed 
and disorder” during the implementation of the plan.56 Clayton’s emphasis on U.S. ownership 
of all aspects of aid deployment resonated with then Secretary of  State George Marshall. 
Marshall favored a centralized administration of United States’s commitment of economic 
assistance to Europe. Later echoed in Dean Acheson’s memoirs, the United States’s position 
was a clear preference of rationalization and materialization of aid over acting on moral 
obligation to end the individual’s suffering.57 Belgrad highlights the U.S. inclination towards 
this pragmatic approach to humanitarianism referring to the latter’s dismissal of compassion in 
government decisions.58  
 
The eruption of the Cold War was the overarching cause of  this realist approach to aid. Even 
before the deployment of the Marshall Aid, a probable Soviet Union towards the Mediterranean 
had motivated  Washington to devise the the ultimate economic reconstruction package for 
Greece and Turkey, what is known as the Truman Doctrine today. The aid was conditional on 
the two countries’s honoring their commitments to democracy and the international liberal 
order. Also known as Public Law 75 domestically in the United States, established the primary 
objective of U.S. Foreign Policy “to contain Soviet expansionism by building a coalition of 
like-minded states through assistance programs that reached from the economic to the 
military.”59 Similar to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan made the U.S. assistance to  
Western European states conditional on the latter’s siding with the Western interest at all times. 
The United States was the sole designator of these interests, and Washington defined them as 
prerogatives of these states to pursue trade and economic policies aligned with those of the 
United States. Furthermore, the recipients of the Marshall assistance would control the flow of 
people, trade, and capital within their boundaries while aligning their own social policies with 
that of Washington.60 
 
All in all, the calculated U.S. entry into humanitarianism, first, at the end of the Great War, and 
then, in the post-World War II reconstruction period ushered in an era of politicized 
humanitarianism. Since then political ends to humanitarian means have been the defining 
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characteristic of the predominantly Western, or Global Northern, relief programs. In the Cold 
War context, politicization of humanitarian and development aid in the Cold War period is self-
explanatory. The world divided between two superpowers struggling for the domination of 
global order, aid often was the preferred instrument of buying and maintaining allies. From the 
U.S. point of view, the peace and stability of its newly-independent allies, which emerged at 
the end of Huntington’s second wave of democratization, were important to its own supremacy 
over world politics. They had to be maintained via relief campaigns and reinforced through UN 
peace operations in order to avoid their tumbling into the Soviet influence. This common Cold 
War practice of marrying humanitarianism with political interests of the donor would cause 
irreparable political damage to both recipient countries and the stability of vast regions from 
Africa to Latin America, to East Asia at the end of the Cold War.61 As will be further elaborated, 
the politicization of aid would juxtapose peace makers, intergovernmental or nongovernmental 
relief agency workers with political and military agents who would provide support for their 
tyrannical regimes in the eyes of the recipients at the lowest level.  
 
The end of the Cold War, however, did not bring the curtain down on the politicization of 
humanitarianism. On the contrary, the late 1980s, much of the 1990s and 2000s were the 
pinnacle of the political approach to humanitarian engagement with the conflict-affected 
countries and the post-conflict settings. On the contrary, while the number of conflicts 
remarkably decreased at the end of the twentieth century, both the volume of aid and the number 
of interventions have increased; and with it, so has the enumeration of cases according to their 
political significance. Few scholars in the literature point to counterfactual relationship between 
the number of conflicts and international community’s appetite for intervention. And even 
fewer tie this to political interest attached to the decisions of the donor. James Fearon is one of 
these scholars. Fearon reports that both the number of refugees and civil wars around the world 
have been in decline since 1991.62 He explains the reason why there is continued rise in relief 
aid in spite of fewer conflicts via “a change in major-power foreign policies after the end of the 
Cold War. Emergency relief aid each year since 1991 has been highly concentrated on a small 
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number of high-profile cases such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.”63 
Fearon argues that all of these cases are generally “internationally mandated interventions in 
conflict-ridden states by consortia of intergovernmental organizations, major powers, 
nongovernmental organizations, and private contractors motivated by humanitarian concerns 
and/or fears of refugee flows, regional wars, terrorism, or other ‘spillover’ effects.”64 
 
An important finding that Fearon highlights in his effort to explain this negative correlation 
between the number of civil wars and increase in relief operations is that “the top emerging aid 
recipient in this period [1995 – 2004] is always a country that the United States had just bombed 
or invaded in pursuit of of regime change (Afghanistan and Iraq) or ending a civil war (Bosnia, 
Serbia regarding Kosovo).”65  He further observes that “emergency aid has been concentrated 
on countries with high profile internal conflicts—civil wars that for one reason or another attract 
the attention of the United States, the Security Council, and often the international press.”66 In 
other words, the Great Powers that deploy humanitarian assistance to the countries that have 
either been invaded by themselves or trapped in a vicious cycle of civil war, are motivated by 
the political capital that their engagement buys with both international community and domestic 
constituency.  
 
In brief, while the Cold War politics of amalgamating political indoctrination and humanitarian 
aid was over, aid in this époque was tied to a different end goal: fighting terrorism and 
democracy promotion. From Bosnia to Kosovo, Afghanistan to Iraq—even all the way to the 
blooming of the so-called Arab Spring—humanitarianism has been molded into a “force 
multiplier.” Barnett and Weiss remind us how this new coating of humanitarianism was crafted 
in the infamous speech of the former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Barnett and Weiss 
recall that addressing a gathering of private aid agencies, Powell remarked that in addition to 
diplomats and military deployed in Afghanistan, “American NGOs are out there [in 
Afghanistan] serving and sacrificing on the frontlines of freedom. NGOs are such a force 
multiplies for us, such an important part of our combat team.”67 Powell’s admission of aid as a 
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force multiplier, in fact, takes the politicization of humanitarianism to an entirely new tier; 
former statesman’s language candidly affirms its weaponization. However, even before digging 
water wells and demanding high-value targets from the recipient villages became synonymous 
in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases, humanitarian intervention was the keyword that the United 
Nations often resorted to justify its Chapter VII peace operations in a range of failed states 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
2.3. The Rise of Universalism through Multidimensional UN Peacekeeping and 
Peacebuilding Missions 
The momentum of the Cold War rivalry observed in the context of humanitarian operations 
slowed down as a result of shrinking worldwide growth in the aftermath of the first OPEC crisis 
in 1972. The economic downturn had taken a toll on bilateral aid to proxy states. The 
unpopularity of the Vietnam war, and its reverberations in smaller east Asian countries, had 
made it difficult on the United States to deploy contingencies to preserve stability in its allies. 
Notwithstanding these conditions, the number of interstate conflicts and civil wars had been on 
a steady incline since the second wave of democratization. Africa, Latin America, Southeast 
Asia, and the Middle East were the hotspots of conflicts waiting to catalyze a regional war with 
a robust involvement from the superpowers.  
 
Already entered the field as a humanitarian actor in 1949 through its Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), the United Nations had implemented relief and livelihoods programs for the 
Palestinians who lost their homes and had been internally displaced as a result of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in 1948.68 This was the first coordinated, multidimensional humanitarian 
intervention by an intergovernmental organization in history. Belgrad’s description of the 
bureaucratic organization of this first coordinated relief approach holds important clues to the 
problems that the UN’s universalist take would suffer frequently and continuously throughout 
its long existence. UNRWA was made up of an ever-growing bureaucracy run by two remotely 
distant groups: “a UN directorate composed of a relatively small cadre of international civil 
servants overseeing, from a distance, and a burgeoning local bureaucracy, which operated with 
ever-increasing autonomy.”69 Belgrad accurately recognizes that “over the course of almost 
five decades of service, both parts of that bureaucracy demonstrate a virtually unlimited 
capacity to act in a self-serving manner, generally at the expense of their clients.”70 
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In a short while after its creation UN’s humanitarian relief department became quickly 
susceptible to advancing its own political agenda instead of looking after the best interest of the 
local recipients. UN’s falling into this vice had been further exacerbated by its growing 
bureaucracy and the concomitant corruption. Moreover, the Clayton approach to humanitarian 
relief operations that we visited in the previous section had become a norm among major 
donors. The donors from amongst the Great Powers were quickly hijacking UN efforts to serve 
their own political and ideological interests.71 Since the national legislatures were in charge of 
allocating and appropriating UN funds, UN’s servitude to national political ends so early at its 
own existence had not been a surprise. Similarly, with its metastasizing bureaucracy and various 
departments, corruption was almost an anticipated externality from the largest 
intergovernmental bureaucracy which was entrusted with a stupendous range of mandates from 
preventing wars to feeding the hungry of the world. What complicated matters however was 
“the fact that in several cases distribution of aid in regions of the world where the need was the 
greatest was made contingent on pacification of local conflicts, so that the assistance could be 
made available without placing recipients and assistance personnel in mortal danger.”72 
 
Enter UN peace operations. The homage paid to UN peace operations in the discourse on 
humanitarianism is no coincidence. In fact, the observations in the humanitarianism literature 
on the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations from simple ceasefire observation missions to 
multidimensional integrated stability missions—the everything but the kitchen sink approach 
which encompasses military intervention, political consultancy, emergency relief, and 
economic reconstruction under one roof—is a testament to the detriment of a universalist 
practices of humanitarian engagement.  
 
A careful review of the literature and discourse on humanitarian engagement with conflict-
affected regions reveals three stages of development in the coming of the universalist approach. 
The first stage corresponds to the earlier UN peace operations that took place in the decade 
opening with the Palestine relief effort to the 1956 Suez crisis. Coops et al argue that, and this 
is corroborated by Belgrad’s assessment of earlier UN relief operations, at the early stages, the 
majority of UN peacekeeping deployments were ad hoc, without much planning, or formal 
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processes of recruitment and financial procurement.73 Their mandate were equally simple: to 
observe that the armistice between the antagonists were respected and held. Although these 
beginnings were modest—which involved first observation missions in Palestine and Kashmir 
with only 100 military personnel—modesty was quickly replaced by complexity in the 
aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis.  
 
In the second stage that followed from the Suez crisis to the end of the Cold War in the late 
1980s, the complexity of peace operations increased. The missions were no longer modest 
observations. The heat of the Cold War in this period had increased the chances for minor 
interstate conflicts to escalate into regional—and even worse, global—wars. Consequently, in 
the 1960s and 1970s one in every two wars invoked a UN peace operation.74 The universalism 
of these interventions was evident in their execution under unanimous UN control with the full 
support and authorization of Permanent Security Council Members “to utilize multilateral 
mechanisms offered by the UN Charter where possible well into the Cold War.”75 
 
The third stage of the evolution of universalism in humanitarianism is the defining era. Bellamy 
and Williams underscore a very important datum, that has nearly gone amiss in the majority of 
studies targeting multilateral peace operations. That is, of the 67 peace operations the UN 
deployed between 1948 and 2013, only 13 had taken place during the Cold War, while 54 of 
them were executed between 1988 and 2013.76 In other words, 80 percent of the UN peace 
operations correspond to a period defined by multidimensional operations, which included 
overreaching goals such as good governance, jumpstarting economy, and the provision of basic 
services in order to sustain the implementation of peace processes.  
 
Koops et al argue that contrary to their Cold War mandates, UN peace operations in the late 
1980s and throughout the 1990s were perceived as conflict management instruments, thanks to 
the prevalence of Western liberal institutions and multilateralism over the security structure of 
the Cold War era.77 While the Cold War missions had little post-conflict political and economic 
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restructuring calculated into their outcomes, the post-Cold War operations “embraced a much 
wider range of activities aimed at transforming entire sectors of societies, often in support of 
local peace agreements…. As a result, missions became multidimensional, including tasks in 
the areas of security, institution building, economic recovery, disarmament and reintegration of 
former combatants, facilitation of political processes and election.”78 The magnum opus that 
envisaged such an integrated, multidimensional approach was none other than the former UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. While the document made a 
convincing argument between the sustainability of peace and an all-encompassing 
reconstruction of conflict-affected actors, it paid very little attention to the lowest common 
denominator: the local beneficiary.79  
 
The new UN doctrine was largely implemented in Latin American and African missions. A 
review of the Secretary General’s unorthodox approach to peacekeeping showed that in 
addition to the number of military personnel, the number of international civilian personnel had 
doubled between 1988 and 1994. Similarly, while there was not a single country where the UN 
had been involved in electoral activities, the number of cases where the UN had introduced 
some form of political processes had hovered around 21 by 1994.80 However, as Koops et al 
suggest, UN’s intrusion with the internal affairs of the host countries sowed the seeds of local 
people’s hostility against any multilateral international organization that arrived in these 
countries with the promise of delivering peace and stability. The multidimensional, integrated 
UN missions deployed to Namibia, Mozambique, Haiti, and Cambodia were infamous 
examples of UN bureaucrats taking charge of the duties of sitting governments. Given that all 
of these states were either immersed in entrenched conflicts or slowly emerging into a post-
conflict environment, UN’s siding with government forces inadvertently made it a part to the 
conflict in the eyes of the civilians.  
 
Although the UN continues similar multidimensional integrated missions to date, it is safe to 
assume that it has learned several lessons from its past mistakes. A number of review processes 
in the 2000s in regard to UN peace operations provided a number of UN agencies with valuable 
insight as far as its past errors were concerned. However, fewer cases put the spotlight directly 
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on the virtue and benefit of such universalist mode of engagement with a conflict-affected 
country than the scandal in Somalia in the early 1990s. Since Somalia is one of the case studies 
presented by this dissertation to illustrate what Turkey does differently than traditional donors 
and whether it renders its aid more effective, the history of multilateral interventions in Somalia 
will be discussed in that chapter. Yet, it must be established that every action undertaken by the 
United Nations and other various multinational organization illustrates how a supposedly 
coordinated universalist engagement in an entrenched conflict can result in failure and more 
suffering than endured at the initial stages of the conflict.  
 
The multilateral approach gained so much popularity throughout the 1990s that other 
intergovernmental and multinational organizations, which until then had been mainly 
concerned with the delivery of emergency relief, deployed comprehensive peace missions to 
conflict-affected countries without developing any comprehension on the causes, history, and 
dynamics of the conflict. Pandolfi and Rousseau concede that with the UN’s introduction of a 
multitiered approach to facilitating peace and stability, other IOs and NGOs without proper 
mandate followed the suit and began to crowd the scene under the auspices of conflict 
management and peace facilitation.81 Since Somalia, with the eruption of major conflicts in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, with the swarming of the scene by other IOs and NGOs, 
“any significant distinction between civilian and military engagement disappeared almost 
completely.82 Humanitarian NGOs have coopted the agendas of the host states in the name of 
more effective deployment of assistance.  
 
Pandolfi and Rousseau stress that the erosion of boundaries between the soldier, civil servant, 
and relief worker not only resulted in a greater confusion on the side of the beneficiary, but it 
also rendered any peacebuilding activity futile. This has been due to the fact that nearly in all 
of the aforementioned cases from the 1990s, these agents who were deployed under one big 
multilateral apparatus were independently interacting and supporting different warring factions 
to the conflict without any coordination mechanism. It was not uncommon to observe in any of 
these missions civilian political consultants brokering different agreements with various 
warring factions, while peacekeepers struggled to get conflicting parties to respect a universal 
cessation of armed hostilities. This proved more difficult for the military contingents whereas 
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civilian consultants associated with this overbearing bureaucracy were perceived by locals as 
if they were cutting various deals with various warring factions against the interests of the 
locals, who had been the true victims of internal fighting. While the illustrations of this 
conundrum are dime a dozen—and they will be further explored in the Somalia case study--the 
case of the UN South Sudan Mission (UNMISS) offers a strong evidence of the things that can 
go wrong when a multilateral approach attempts to mend the scars of war, rebuild a country, 
and reinstitute the defunct government functions.  
 
After the escalation of the clashes between the Government of South Sudan and armed militias, 
UNMISS was deployed to the region and was mandated not only with the classic disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) duty, but it was also tasked to help the South Sudanese 
Government “establish and develop the institutions the new state needs to manage the whole 
range of government functions it is responsible for, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission 
and the National Constitutional Review Commission in 2012.”83 Per this assignment, UNMISS 
peacekeepers both toured alongside the South Sudan’s army in various DDR missions and 
advised the government on reestablishing certain political processes. Furthermore, the Civil 
Affairs Division of the mission provided all sorts of technical assistance and advise on a range 
of issues from conflict analysis to early warning systems, conflict management advice to 
holding discussions with key stakeholders.84 On the other hand, both UN humanitarian workers 
and the personnel of other nongovernmental humanitarian agencies worked on the ground to 
provide basic relief and emergency supplies.  
 
UNMISS’s joint DDR campaign alongside the South Sudanese army (SPLA), however, had 
serious repercussions for the humanitarians on the ground. While UNMISS’s mandate required 
the former to hold the latter accountable to international norms and standards, UNMISS 
inadvertently became a party to the conflict by supporting SPLA during the disarmament 
campaign in Jonglei in 2012, which turned out to be violent and resulted in major human rights 
violations.85 In 2014, Amnesty International issued a report that declared that as of 2018 the 
UN peace operation in South Sudan was still seen as a culprit to the South Sudanese government 
and army in its sensitization campaigns, which resulted in unnecessary violence by those who 
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did not want to give up their weapons easily, civilian casualties, and mass rapes.86 While the 
UNMISS tried to acquit itself by claiming that it had only provided logistical and transportation 
support, perception of an international organization participating in violence against civilians 
stuck with the local Sudanese. Many international NGOs (iNGOs) operating in the country 
suffered from this tainted image. “Given that the image of UN agencies and other iNOGs is 
closely linked to UNMISS, with the majority of the population unable to distinguish between 
the mission and humanitarian and development actors, the close association between UNMISS 
and the GoRSS [Government of South Sudan] also strongly affected the wider international 
presence in South Sudan.87 
 
In summary, both Boutros-Ghali’s vision of a comprehensive intervention for the lasting peace 
and Kofi Annan’s vow to cross sovereign borders to stop the states from committing crimes 
against humanity did more harm than good as far as humanitarian interventions of the 1990s 
and early 2000s concerned. Although universalism as a theory was poised to address different 
shortcomings of Kant’s perpetual peace, via more coordination, cooperation, and application of 
highest humanitarian standards to conflict-affected countries, universalism on the ground did 
not deliver any of these promises. At least, not in the 1990s, and until the first reform efforts of 
peacebuilding in 2000 with the former Secretary General Lakhtar Brahimi’s panel study on the 
shortcomings of UN peace operations. What transpired in reality, as Koops et al and Weiss 
conclude, was that multilateral approach failed to launch as a result of expansive mandates 
backed by very little political, financial, military, and expertise result. Furthermore, as Weiss 
points out, by tarnishing a nearly half century-long UN tradition of seeking the consent of a 
conflict-affected country before deploying its peace operations, the universalist approach 
positioned UN and other iNGOs in the eyes of the beneficiary as agents of hostile takeover of 
their national governments’s most fundamental functions.88  
2.4. Consequentialist Humanitarianism to Better Serve the Twenty-first Century 
Obligations?  
Another dominant theoretical approach to humanitarianism in the literature is 
consequentialism. We have already referred to ethic of consequences at the beginning of this 
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section. Advocated by strong scholastics voices like Michael Ignatieff, David Lake and Robert 
Powell, a consequentialist approach to humanitarian intervention requires strategic thinking on 
the outcomes of the intervention. Against the backdrop of multilateral UN missions gone wrong 
in the 1990s, and some in the 2000s, many more humanitarian workers and scholars debate 
whether indiscriminate intervention, driven by moral obligations, yield the intended results 
under the twenty-first century circumstances.  
 
Barnett and Snyder argue that thanks to technological improvements and increasing number of 
service providers, more donors are interested in the metrics of their commitments.89 The 
discouraging examples from throughout the 1990s, whether sovereign or private, more actors 
regard to accountability as an indispensable attribute of their moral duties. They desire to know 
whether or not funds and resources they deploy achieve the intended consequences. Or, are they 
stoking the deteriorating stability in the country. A step up from this concern is even a more 
complex thinking on the root causes of the conflict that necessitated the donors’s intervention. 
Following this line of thought eventually leads to the necessity of developing grander strategies 
to eliminate the causes of human suffering. In other words, the consequentialist approach to aid 
therefore validates the interventions that come with a grand strategy and policies “that are 
hypothesized to dissolve the underlying causes of conflict, how aid might be linked to these 
broader goals, and where their limited resources will have the greatest impact.”90  
 
The defenders of consequentialist ethical approach also cite the aid worker’s moral obligation 
to do his job better. One of the capstones of the literature on humanitarianism, Mary Anderson’s 
Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War decrees that the utmost responsibility of 
both the donor and field worker to make sure that the resources deployed directly contributed 
to the improvement of the recipient’s conditions. Anderson asserts that the deployment should 
be ceased, or withdrawn without hesitation, if the so-called intervention is worsening the 
recipient’s conditions or the status quo on the ground.91 Barnett, who had foreseen the Rwanda 
crisis precipitating long before the mass killings began in April 1994 and warned the United 
Nations, knows first-hand the psyche of any aid worker who had been an inadvertent complicit 
to atrocities and despicable human rights violations: “Many aid workers were shaken, 
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demoralized, and haunted by their experience in Rwanda where their aid prolonged the 
suffering of those in the camps that were controlled by the genocidaires.”92 
 
When consequence-oriented strategizing in humanitarian discourse is considered from Barnett 
and Snyder’s viewpoint, one concludes that it has virtues. One of the virtues is to better equip 
those who get on the ground solely on moral obligations. These actors are associated with David 
Rieff’s Bed for the Night agents. These agents act on the unequivocal humanitarian principles 
of impartiality, neutrality, independence, and equality (equanimity). Barnett claims that for 
Rieff and proponents, adherence to these principles as guidelines makes relief work relatively 
uncomplicated and modest.93 Furthermore, acting on these principles provides protection for 
aid workers against threats lurking in conflict zones. A most obvious one is to be perceived by 
one conflict participant as an accomplice to another warring faction. However, Barnett and 
Snyder argue that where a good comprehension of conflict dynamics is lacking, such misfortune 
can easily fell upon the well-intentioned relief worker. The only remedy to that is therefore a 
pre-deployment strategy concerning whom to engage and under what conditions.94 The scholars 
further posit that since the early 1990s the bed-for-the-night approach is in decline due to 
pressure for accountability by the donors and demand for moral superiority by humanitarian 
workers on the ground.  
 
Anderson’s “do no harm” position also has a strategy to it, Barnett and Snyder argue.95 Its 
strategic component comes from the early meditations on the foreseeable effects of the aid and 
possible undesired consequences. The practitioners of this principle attempt to restrict the 
malignant effects of humanitarian aids by evaluating the political, environmental and logistical 
factors that may result in the exploitation of the aid and further suffering of the potential 
beneficiaries. Yet, their only tool to stop that from happening is violating the neutrality principle 
and withholding aid from one of the participants in the conflict in order to bar the latter from 
using the aid to do further harm to its opponents or civilians. Maren underscores that falling of 
humanitarian supplies into wrong hands is quite a common practice. Maren concurs that “aid 
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can be effectively hijacked by combatants who are capable of appropriating aid directly through 
corruption, theft, looting, or via improved, but unfair, business opportunities.”96 
 
A moderate amount of strategy may in fact render humanitarian intervention more effective. It 
may comfort the conscience of the humanitarian worker that the work he is doing is good and 
benefitting so many lives, which would have been devastated without him. Furthermore, pre-
deployment strategy is an effective way of protecting the fieldworker against potential harms 
from the ground and helping donor steer clear from becoming a party to the conflict. 
Superfluous strategizing and overvaluation of consequences can easily strip aid from its 
benefits and result in the aforementioned side effects.  
 
The opponents of consequentialist approach warn against two harmful effects of this mode of 
engagement: precedence of donors’s interests over that of the beneficiary and diminishing 
effectiveness of aid due to the alienation of the recipient. With respect to the first concern, 
Hopgood claims that whereas major donors have their own problems with such concepts as 
“legitimacy, legality, cultural issues,” they add these values as requirements from the recipient 
to make sure that the donor faces no future adverse consequences as far as the virtue of its 
engagement is concerned.97 He makes the case that donor countries, agencies, corporations can 
easily agree on certain consequences that are easy to achieve at a low-cost deployment. In fact, 
a Weberian interpretation of globalization enables major donors to dismiss the human element 
of the humanitarian work and concentrate on their own gains:  
  
Bureaucracy and globalization are potential allies not enemies, as Max Weber 
pointed out, with rule-based decision making “without regard for persons” where 
personal qualities and emotions were irrelevant and calculability enhanced, suiting 
the needs of the market as much as the rational administration of complex tasks. 
Market-oriented bureaucracies can leverage massive social power through a division 
of labor based on specialization, standardization, and abstraction. This is most clear 
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in the arena of logistics, and it is superior logistics that has made Wal-Mart the 
world’s largest corporation.98 
 
In today’s consequentialism, the donor’s liberty to set any threshold and evaluate its success on 
a benchmark of its choosing stimulates new skepticisms over the effectiveness of aid. Diehl and 
Druckman underscore the essentiality of “specifying what constitutes peace operation success 
and developing an evaluation scheme” for theoretical development.99 Diehl and Druckman 
equally stress the importance of taking into account that there is a diversity of stakeholders in 
the humanitarian discourse, and standards of success for each of them is different.100 This 
simple fact itself illustrates the type of fallacies that may result from paying too much attention 
to the priorities of one subset at the expense of ignoring the needs of the others. “Although 
stakeholders may share some interests (e.g., limiting violence) these are not completely 
coterminous. For example, a contributing state may have as one of its goals limiting casualties 
to its personnel. Succeeding in that goal, however, may necessitate actions that undermine the 
international community’s task of protecting the human rights of the threatened population. 
Evaluating a peace operation according to certain criteria implicitly takes the perspective of one 
or more actors in the conflict. Thus, there needs to be recognition that success is defined in 
different ways by the various stakeholders with political and economic interests in the same 
operational goal.”101 
 
Hopgood further suggests that in a humanitarian environment where the donor country or 
organization is more concerned about its own benefit over that of the recipient, Wal-Mart too 
can deliver the same aid, without much concern for the wellbeing of the people on the ground. 
In fact, Hopgood argues, based on the Weberian interpretation of neoliberal economics, Wal-
Mart stands to do a better job than a sovereign nation or an IO. Hopgood’s reference to Wal-
Mart is not satirical. Although there is no known case of Wal-Mart’s involvement in the delivery 
of humanitarian aid, with the current pace of both sovereign and private donors’s outsourcing 
their humanitarian obligations as a cost-cutting and efficiency maximizing strategy, the 
objectives of humanitarian action can no longer be perceived only as saving lives, alleviating 
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suffering and maintaining dignity during and in the aftermath of conflicts or natural disasters. 
Hopgood’s allegory of Wal Mart as a substitute to the UN and other humanitarian organizations 
is not too radical in a world where major donors and IOs set their targets so low that they almost 
do not stand a chance of not meeting their goals. In Hopgood’s words, “consistent with 
neoliberal principles, a growing share of this money has been channeled through NGOs rather 
than the UN, with major donors wanting to target funds more directly on issues of interest to 
them and to have more control over how recipients spend the money.”102 
 
This tailoring of humanitarian causes according to the donor’s interests has led to adopting of 
certain corporate practices by nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. “These internal 
reorganizations enabled newly ‘branded’ humanitarian NGOs to seek corporate funds more 
effectively, their ‘product’-a moral brand with feel-good associations—now marketed 
alongside appeals for direct program funding.”103 Furthermore, Dollar and Levin, as well as 
Burnside and Dollar, contend that with every passing day both sovereign donors and iNGOs 
practice more selective multilateralism. The increased conditionalities and diminished 
thresholds for quality and effectiveness leave out those who do not meet these requirements or 
standards, without any regard for the urgency of their needs.104 
 
Another failure imminent upon over-strategizing and attaching donor-driven values to end 
products is the widening rift between the donor and the recipient. With every calculation going 
into the deployability of the assistance farther grows the distance between the benefactor and 
the recipient. A keen observer of the rift created by donor’s self-interest and security measures, 
Mark Duffield suggests that the recipient in the conflict zone has increasingly become aware of 
his own meaning to the donor. Duffield suggests that both the donor and the recipient are aware 
of the risks stemming from unaddressed conflicts to the security of the donor. Duffield views 
the traditional donor’s intervention through humanitarian and development assistance in 
conflict-affected countries more from the angle of international security and less from the 
perspective of helping beneficiaries gain skills and resources of self-reliance. He pinpoints that 
since the end of the Cold War and the spread of liberal interventionism in the world, “rather 
than aid being a neutral institution, would-be recipients have come to see international 
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assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy.”105 In other words, the Western donors 
engaged with conflict-ridden, fragile states are primarily concerned with temporarily stabilizing 
the situation in these lands. They are less driven by reaching the same development goals that 
they themselves have achieved and contributed to the advancement of their societies. 
Temporary stabilization with limited commitments to the fragile states necessitate cyclical 
interventions in these societies since self-reliance and self-dependency can hardly be achieved 
under these circumstances. The end result is thereby a contradiction, and to some, a creative 
tension within the liberal way of development, sustaining a permanent international security, 
and accomplishing sustainable or adaptive self-reliance in the global south.106 
 
Duffield also observes that the security-driven self-interest of the donor is also manifest in the 
field work. Duffield argues that from the moment humanitarian worker begins his training on 
aid deployment within a specific mission, he is placed in a bubble that separates him from the 
recipient even before he sets his foot on his destination. Various UN and iNGO trainings teach 
him to be aware of his settings all the time and not to trust the locals. The security bubble 
continues as part of his transportation: he travels on a special UN or iNGO aircraft. He gets 
picked up by often armored vehicles upon arrival and transferred to security compounds 
protected by peacekeepers and blast walls. For the duration of his tenure, he operates behind 
these walls. Fewer local beneficiaries can make it through the rigorous security checks and 
clearances to meet him on the compound to communicate their demands. On the other hand, he 
knows little about the ills of the country he is supposed to be helping because he is barred from 
wandering out of the compound and interact with his environs by tight security protocols of his 
employer.107 
 
Although this fortified model of intervention does not exacerbate the confusion of local 
stakeholders with respect to the intention of relief agencies any more than the multilateral peace 
operations of the 1990s, they do not present an effective defense against targeting of 
humanitarian workers. In “The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of 
Protective Principles,” Laura Hammond refutes Duffield’s postulation that securitization of aid 
further confuses recipients and thus reduces the effectiveness of aid by alienating the 
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beneficiary.108 Hammond instead argues that those targeting humanitarians in conflict zones 
were committing this action deliberately and driven by rational political and economic motives. 
“The attacks, committed in a public, highly visible way,” says Hammond, “are intended to 
demonstrate the might of the attacker, the weakness of the victim, and the inability of the 
opposing force to prevent such attacks.”109 Hammond stresses that it is exactly the power of 
humanitarianism and moral connotations that turn it into a popular target, not necessarily 
because of humanitarian enterprise’s weakening through the cooptation and politicization by 
Western powers. “The tactic is effective,” argues Hammond, “because given the power of 
humanitarianism, its subversion, either through co-optation or attack becomes a powerful way 
of sending a message not only to civilians trapped in the conflict but also to those living in safer 
places who might be in a position to offer their public, material, or financial support to the war 
effort.”110 
 
The main takeaway from Hammond’s analysis is that regardless of the depth of strategizing 
that goes into the consequences of aid, and in spite of the level of protective measures on the 
ground, the ontology of humanitarian action will always drive hostilities from parties of the 
conflict who have very little to gain from the peaceful settlement of the dispute.  On the other 
hand, as Hammond herself accepts, the greater number of attacks that Global Northern 
organizations drive than do Global Southern aid organizations still attest to the bond that the 
local stakeholders draw between Western military operations and the representatives of 
international organizations mainly associated with the Western liberal order.  
 
2.5. Rising Humanitarian Actors in the Literature 
A curious transformation has been unfolding in the domain of humanitarian aid and 
development assistance to conflict-affected countries since the dawn of the twenty-first century. 
The reclining influence of the Great Powers in security and economic spheres of global affairs 
is echoed by a similar waning traditional donor leadership in the provision of humanitarian aid 
and development assistance in the post-9/11 world. Parallel to the drive from rising powers to 
have a greater say over global governance,111 an emerging trend in the spheres of peacebuilding, 
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humanitarian assistance and development aid points to a disengaging Global North and a more 
active Global South. By the end of the first decade of 2000, a tipping point was reached when 
UN Secretary-General’s Senior Advisory Group on Post-Conflict Capacity declared UN’s 
waning resources to address most basic needs of conflict-affected countries and called for more 
national and Global Southern ownership in peacebuilding operations.112 The report was a 
breakthrough in terms of UN’s candor to admit its declining peacebuilding capacity, 
encouraging a triangular, Global North-South and South-South cooperation, to address basic 
humanitarian and development needs of conflict-affected countries. These needs were confined 
to the five fundamental areas of peacekeeping, the rule of law, inclusive political processes, the 
reconstruction of economy, and the provision of basic services (health, education, social 
services, infrastructure, etc.).  
 
The UN’s affirmation of its receding capacity and call for more Global Southern ownership of 
peace operations has not only alluded to a general decline in the Great Power hegemony, but it 
has also coincided with the advent of emerging powers. With their fast-growing economies and 
relative stability in their domestic affairs, emerging powers have become more influential in 
their respective regions from early 2000s and on. In fact, the clustering of successful emerging 
powers into cross-regional coalitions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) inspired scholars to go beyond the conceptualizations that separated international 
cooperation into such frameworks as multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral. A new categorization 
that emerged in this regard was minilateralism.113 Youngs define minilateralism as 
“cooperative frameworks grouping small numbers of states in a way that extends beyond merely 
ephemeral alliances.”114 This definition suits the emerging regional power coalitions such as 
BRICS, which takes a selective view of the tenets of the Western liberal order. Although these 
minilateral organizations share some values of the Western liberal order, such as trade and 
market liberalization, they are reluctant about internalizing a Western-style democracy or 
institutional development.115  An important characteristic of regional formations in this sense 
is that their desire to remain in their own regional cliques and to counter the rules and regimes 
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installed by the Great Powers is as equally strong as their will to coexist with these powers and 
contribute to their efforts in facilitating peace and stability.116 
 
Yet, the emergence of BRICS, in tandem with Turkey’s advent as a regional actor in Europe 
and the Middle East and Indonesia’s rise in South East Asia, was welcomed by the UN and 
other international actors of peace and development, on the premise that these new emerging 
actors would share the latter’s burden in peacebuilding and hence increase the legitimacy of its 
involvement in conflict-ridden Global South. Against this backdrop, and based on the 
recommendations from the “Secretary General’s Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict,” the number of Global-Southern driven initiatives to review the extant 
initiatives on civilian capacity deployment in peacebuilding operations.  
 
One of the most consistent and successful outcomes of these review platforms has been the 
Peace Capacities Network (formerly known as the Civilian Capacity Network). Think tanks 
representing BRICS, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey and Norway founded the network on a 
commission from the United Nations and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The network 
produced a rare white paper on the civilian capacities of its members in peace operations and 
post-conflict reconstruction in conflict-affected countries.  
 
An individual paper contributed by the author of this dissertation along with his colleague Teri 
Murphy117 not only demonstrated the scope of Turkey’s contributions to peace operations 
around the world, but it also became the very first comprehensive study—albeit a descriptive 
one—one Turkey’s entire humanitarian and development assistance. The report was well 
received by both governmental and non-governmental actors that either coordinated Turkey’s 
aid policies, humanitarian missions, or were deployed in the field to deliver and manage 
assistance delivery.  
 
The positive reception of this study led to other important research papers, mainly conducted 
at the Istanbul Policy Center. Co-written with Professor Fuat Keyman, Director of Istanbul 
Policy Center and Professor of International Relations at Sabancı University, “Turkey as a 
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‘Humanitarian State’”118 dissected the central tenets of Turkey’s “humanitarian diplomacy” and 
compared these principles with those of the emerging powers and traditional donors. The paper 
identified a number of unique characteristics that Turkey has employed in its humanitarian 
engagement with conflict-affected countries. The paper concluded that these attributes did not 
necessarily emerge as norms in the practices of either traditional donors or the other emerging 
actors. The study suggested that Turkey’s practices, for better or worse, were unique and ripe 
for scrutiny in terms of their effect on the impact of aid delivered.  
 
The other studies that preceded and followed these works heavily focused on specific sectors 
of Turkish humanitarian aid and development assistance. An important body of literature in this 
respect were produced by Bülent Aras, Hakan Fidan, and Rahman Nurdun on the anatomy and 
contributions of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA)—the key government 
agency in the coordination and deployment of humanitarian assistance.119  With respect to the 
role of Turkish nongovernmental organizations with an international operational capacity, we 
also observe an expanding trend of sectoral studies, with a focus on a variety of actors ranging 
from charity organizations like Türk Kızılayı (Turkish Red Crescent) to medical NGOs such as 
Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors Worldwide).120 
 
In brief, all of these studies, and similar ones, present a valuable insight into the landscape of 
Turkish humanitarian assistance. Their contribution in terms of the introduction of key actors, 
institutions, and challenges is indispensable. Nonetheless, very few of them wanders beyond 
descriptive accounts of new trends in humanitarianism. Yet, they all suggest a number of 
unexplored themes and dyads, such as state building versus nation building, conditionality 
versus unconditional support, that shape Turkey’s aid and development assistance practices in 
conflict-affected countries. Especially, Keyman and Sazak conclude their paper by arguing that 
Turkey’s ambivalence between multilateralism and bilateralism, conditionality and unfettered 
commitment, state building and nation building, cultural affinity and an objective conflict 
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sensitive approach continue to have serious effects on the effectiveness of Turkish aid and that 
these predicament should be further studied.121 
 
In conclusion, the literature recognizes four major discursive approaches to the phenomenon of 
humanitarian intervention and winks at the new work on rising powers in this domain. These 
are, namely, a duty-driven ethical approach; a political and conditional approach; a universalist 
approach risen on multilateralism, and a consequentialist approach. These four theoretical 
models are roughly placed in distinct historical eras and contexts. From an evolutionary 
perspective, what started as a duty-based intervention to alleviate the suffering of the victims 
of conflicts and natural disasters in the second half of the nineteenth century quickly took a 
political shape and form in the face of the destructions that the two world wars caused.  
 
While the Cold War politics adulterated the deployment of humanitarian aid to sustain a 
neorealist balance of power throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the increase in the number of UN 
peace operations in this era encouraged the latter to combine armed peacekeeping, political 
consultancy, economic reconstruction, and humanitarian relief all under one roof. This 
universalist approach increased the UN interventions worldwide. By contrast, the human 
resources, supplies, military contingents and political support that the increased number of 
missions required was not provided. This resulted in major catastrophes in diverse regions from 
East Africa to the Balkans and Eastern Europe where unilateralist approach to peace building 
was tried.  
 
Under the looming shadow of the failures of the 1990s, the peacebuilding community deployed 
its support with a grain of salt—a practice we have come to recognize as the consequentialist 
approach to humanitarian intervention. Yet, overvaluation of the interests of donors, and 
disregard for the local stakeholders’s needs in this era, have left the humanitarian community 
pursuing new avenues of reform. The recent experimentations with Responsibilities to Protect 
(R2P) and Responsibilities while Protecting (RWP) foster hope, for both approaches place the 
rights of victims, democratic minorities, women and children above all other factors. 
Furthermore, the advent of rising powers in the late 2000s and early 2010s has made the 
humanitarian community more diverse. Including Turkey, the rising powers community have 
introduced different motivations, new methodologies, and governance models in humanitarian 
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intervention. Although the literature on this comprehensive peace building era is still shaping, 
various studies conducted on some of these emerging powers and their approach to 
humanitarianism project new trends in the making. Turkey in this context deserves a special 
attention and invites more scholarly work on the ramifications of its unorthodox approach to 
humanitarian action. 
 
All in all, by shedding light on these discursive perspectives on different modalities of 
humanitarian interventions in different time intervals, the literature review has provided this 
dissertation with ample insight to construct processes that would help us better comprehend the 
successes and failures of traditional donors. Such process tracing exercise, enriched by 
comparative case studies and semi-structured interviews, is anticipated to provide an evaluation 
of Turkey’s own humanitarian intervention in a comparative manner. This will be further 
explained in the next section.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following research question: as an emerging actor in 
humanitarian sector, Turkey’s approach to humanitarian action diverges diametrically from 
traditional donor practices outlined in the earlier section. Hence the question is whether 
Turkey’s unique principles make its aid more effective compared to that of traditional donors. 
These principles can be summarized as Turkey’s departure out of moral, rather than 
consequential, motivations to engage with the victims of conflict; its preference for offering its 
aid without any political interests; and Turkey’s clear choice of engaging with the beneficiaries 
at a bilateral level, rather than operating out of a multilateral body.  
 
Three hypotheses are thus as follows: First, the more a country acts out of moral obligations 
and is less concerned with the consequences of its actions, the more effective its humanitarian 
intervention is. Second, the fewer the political conditions instilled in humanitarian response, 
the more effective it becomes. And third, the less a country operates through a universalist 
scheme to deploy its aid, the positive impact of its aid is greater.  
 
The three hypotheses may sound vague; however, they are eligible for testing via three research 
methods. The first research method is process tracing. As will be explained below in more 
detail, process tracing gives us a sequential relationship between the independent and depended 
variables. The logic of process tracing dictates that a sequence of events set in motion by the 
independent variable will manipulate the dependent variable in the exact same way across the 
cases every time when the exact sequence is followed. In other words, an event caused by the 
lineup of independent and intervening variables should be observed in any setting where the 
same independent, intervening and dependent variables exist.  
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The literature already suggests that a sequential relation exists between the application of 
certain principles to humanitarian intervention and results such treatment yields. One thus can 
look at the data on a nearly-century long traditional donor practices in humanitarian sector and 
predict certain outcomes. This dissertation in fact aspires to accomplish this. First, it seeks to 
dissect the sequential relationship between traditional donor practices and the type of 
humanitarianism these practices yielded. The study will use assign a number of benchmarks 
acreditted  by both Global Northern and Southern institutions as “acceptable standards of aid 
effectiveness.” I will introduce these benchmarks further in the conceptual and operational 
definitions chapter. Benchmarking in humanitarian sector has its own literature and discourse. 
They will both be introduced in the next chapter, and the selection of the benchmarks will be 
justified in accord with the discourse.  
 
Second, having demonstrated whether the century long practices of traditional donors have 
produced the results required by the benchmarks, I will lay out Turkey’s consideration of the 
principles employed by traditional donors. I seek to answer two supporting questions: First, 
whether Turkey has observed the same approach to humanitarianism as traditional donors in its 
brief history as “humanitarian state.” Or, provided that it acted on different principles and 
modalities, what kind of an impact did this preference have on the effectiveness of its aid? 
Again the effectiveness criterion will be evaluated by the application of the same benchmarks 
that I will have applied to traditional donor. Second, if pursuing its unique way of humanitarian 
engagement has not necessarily created more viable outcomes for the conflict-affected 
countries, what are the areas for improvement?  
 
In order to eliminate bias from process tracing, a quasi-experimental geographic setting, where 
both traditional powers and Turkey have been involved for a while, had to be selected. 
Therefore, to test the validity of process tracing and to present a clearer picture filtered from 
residuals, Somalia and Afghanistan have been selected as the two case studies to observe the 
hypothesized relationship between employing certain principles and strategies in humanitarian 
relief and its anticipated results.  
 
Third, content analysis and semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather the data to 
shed light on the hypothetical relationship between certain relief deployment practices and its 
supposed effectiveness. Cumulative data from UN peace operations, sovereign interventions in 
conflict-affected countries, iNGO campaigns, and global indices of humanitarian assistance 
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have helped developed a basic canvass of the type of conflicts and needs that attracted 
international humanitarian intervention. These data have illustrated the trends of engagement 
by donor countries, intergovernmental and governmental organizations. In addition, the data 
have also revealed key information about the magnitude of the conflicts in which both 
traditional donors and Turkish aid agencies have chosen to engage. It was interesting to observe 
some inward relations in terms of the scale of destruction of a specific conflict and the variances 
in the amount of attention it has received from certain traditional donors and Turkey.  
 
Databases on UN contributions, sovereign commitments, iNGO movements offer important 
inferences for process tracing as well. By relying on global indices of aid, one can reliably 
assess the motivation and calculations behind a donor’s engagement in a particular region or a 
conflict. For instance, the ratio of peacekeeper to analysts, consultants to relief workers, would 
disclose valuable intelligence on the real purpose of a UN mission anywhere in the world. 
Similarly, an increase in the USAID projects in some of the most hostile and unforgiving 
regions of Afghanistan and Iraq may stimulate due skepticism over the true objectives of these 
projects and their real contributions to the local communities. Furthermore, a comparative study 
juxtaposes the metrics of Turkish involvement in the same regions both in size and scale and 
speculate on the latter’s objectives.  
 
Large statistical studies are helpful in terms of broadening our horizon with respect to practices 
and trends in the field. They help us see the sequence followed by both traditional and emerging 
actors and aid us in making sense out of the results attained. However, statistical analyses reveal 
very little with respect to the measurement of aid effectiveness. A ubiquitously problematic and 
difficult feat, any effort to quantify aid effectiveness will almost certainly lead any researcher 
to parsimonious and fluid results. Heeding Diehl and Druckman’s caution:  
 
 Practical lessons about peace operation success depend on the yardstick(s) used to  
assess that success. First, vague or poorly specified standards for success will 
produce findings or lessons that are flawed or unusable; if we do not know what 
constitutes success, it will be difficult to ascertain what conditions produce that 
success. Second, studies that use different benchmarks for success may reach 
different or even opposite conclusions. For example, allowing peacekeepers to use 
offensive military tactics, or permissive rules of engagement, could help secure areas 
and prevent human rights abuses (two standards of success) but increase civilian 
 60 
casualties (another indicators of success) in the process. Conclusions drawn based on 
only a single standard will lead policymakers to adopt certain policies without being 
aware of the full consequences of those policies…. Nevertheless, immediate 
demands for quick appraisals and for bureaucratic accountability lead decision 
makers to look only at some success standards while ignoring others.1 
 
The methods that extract causal relationships from a large set of observations are vulnerable to 
this fallacy. In a large dataset of cases, with equally generous degrees of freedom, it will be 
difficult to assess exactly which independent variable(s) directly account(s) for the behavior of 
the dependent variable in a certain way. With more than one explanans (multiple independent 
variables and intervening variables), pinpointing the independent variable, and the necessary 
set of intervening variables, to which the explanandum is responding can be a losing battle. For 
example, tying aid to the introduction of inclusive political processes will have different 
consequences in different post-conflict settings. While countries with past experience in 
collaborative decision-making are expected to fare better and hence can use foreign aid more 
effectively, societies consisted of nomadic tribal culture will struggle and have more difficulty 
in good governance of structural assistance. Similarly, 5000 mosquito nets distributed to the 
refugees on the Sudanese-Ugandan border may produce less costly and more effective results 
than more expensive, more internationally visible, but less effective programs of providing 
malaria tablets and treatment centers at the hospitals in captials and metropolitans.  
 
As a result, to obtain a more accurate assessment of aid effectiveness, the methodology needs 
to reach a deeper level than just skimming the surface. With this concern in mind, the 
dissertation delved into the experiences of the beneficiaries at the most local level of analysis 
as possible. In addition to inferences from larger quantitative studies that enriched our 
understanding of how the behavior of traditional donors have affected the deployment and 
receipt of humanitarian assistance by host communities, semi-structured interviews have been 
conducted both in Turkey and host countries where case studies took place. These interviews 
have been valuable in terms of getting an effectiveness assessment first-hand from the 
beneficiary. Similarly, the conversations with the representatives of Turkish aid agencies, 
officials, and NGOs have supplied significant insights on the motivations, objectives and modus 
operandi of Turkish aid actors. The knowledge provided by these semi structured interviews 
                                                        
1 Diehl and Druckman, 2015, 93.  
 61 
conducted in Turkey, Somalia, and Afghanistan has helped me made some postulations on the 
effectiveness of Turkish approach to humanitarian assistance. However, the findings from these 
interviews have yet to be conclusive, and they leave ample loose hands to be further investigated 
with respect to Turkey’s peace building practices and effectiveness of its endeavors in conflict-
affected places.  
 
3.1. Explanation and Justification for the Research Methods Employed 
3.1.1. Process Tracing  
Process tracing is one of the indispensable methods utilized in qualitative analysis. The noted 
scholars Brady and Collier (2010), as well as George and Bennett (2005), affirm that process 
tracing fills an important void by providing greater systemization for causal inference in 
qualitative studies.2 George and Bennett especially refer to the instrumentality of process 
tracing in “1arge-N” statistical studies where “the tracing the processes that may have led to an 
outcome helps narrow the list of potential causes.”3 The method is used to understand the inner 
working of a case, by identifying a sequence of events that either supports the outcome of the 
case or suggests that there could be alternative hypotheses.4 In other words, process tracing 
dissects a case and makes sure that the hypothetical relationship that the researcher argues 
between two variables is in fact sequenced in the anticipated direction. “In process- tracing, the 
researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to 
see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in 
the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”5 In Bennett’s words, “careful 
process tracing focused on the sequencing of who knew what, when and what they did in 
response” can reveal the direction of the causal relationship between an independent and a 
dependent variable.6 Furthermore, this method is also proven effective in concluding whether 
the residual differences between two similar cases were causal or spurious in producing 
different outcomes for both cases.7 
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The principal objective of process tracing is to address two problems that are difficult to handle 
only by statistical analysis: “The first is the challenge of establishing causal direction: if X and 
Y are correlated, did Y cause X?”8 The second impediment is to overcome a potential 
spuriousness. Provided that there is correlation between X and Y, are we absolutely sure that X 
caused Y? How do we know that due to a selection bias on the dependent variable, Y is not 
necessarily caused by X but it also influences the independent variable? Or how do we ascertain 
that there is no confounding variable that causes both X and Y? Bennett states that process 
tracing is the right tool to determine whether X and Y are connected through causal relationship 
or that there are confounding variables manipulating the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables.9 
 
To determine whether or not there is a unidirectional chain connecting the independent variable 
to the dependent variable, process tracing employs a number of methodological variants, each 
of which is designated to investigate whether the sequencing of events within a case projects 
the hypothetical causal relationship postulated by the researcher. One of these variants is the 
existence of evidence that proves the suggested causal chain of hypothesized events. Collier, 
Brady and Seawright refer to this as causal-process observations (CPOs).10 CPOs in qualitative 
studies correspond to Data Set Observations in quantitative studies. Such correspondence is 
necessary to make sure that the same unit of observations also has matching equivalents in the 
qualitative interpretation of the hypothesized relationship. The data matrices in quantitative 
analyses provide the empirical foundations of the qualitative analyses, and that is the reason 
why the observations in data sets must be represented in CPOs.11  
 
However, as necessary as CPOs is the diagnosis (description) of the process that may or may 
not have resulted in the hypothesized relationship between the variables. Collier regards a 
thorough and accurate diagnosis of the sequence as the backbone of process tracing.12 He asserts 
that because trajectories of change and causation are the two pillars upon which process 
tracing’s conclusions are premised, a lack of adequate definition of the phenomena witnessed 
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at each stage must be described adequately, otherwise the researcher would end up with 
fallacious inferences.13 A failure to describe an event occurring at a time is likely to convolute 
successive snapshots to be taken later on the development sequence of the event. Without an 
accurate descriptive component, observing the change becomes immensely difficult and 
conducive to contamination by unrelated feeds. Only by knowing the key events in the entire 
sequential ordering of the process will we be able to assess the power of independent variable 
over the course of developments that resulted in the observed change in the dependent variable.  
 
A case in point is Tannenwald’s study of the “Nuclear Taboo.”14 In Collier’s reference to this 
illustration, we note Tannenwald’s burden to explain how the US policy on non-use of nuclear 
weapons was crafted in the exact following sequential order: First, she had to prove that the 
frenzy against a possible mutually-assured destruction did occur; second, she had to argue that 
the reaction originated within public and spread rapidly; third, the reaction did feed a nuclear 
taboo, which, in turn, influenced U.S. nuclear policy in the direction of non-use and 
nonproliferation.15 This anecdote shows that in process tracing the scholar’s objective is to 
illustrate the change in the independent variable that occurred over time. The scholar also bears 
the burden of showing the order of events, stemming from the independent variable and taking 
place in the hypothesized order. The scholar’s challenge is to demonstrate that all the specific 
observations, which could range from socio-cultural characteristics to demographic indicators, 
material objects, and even infrastructure and economic factors, all have robust explanatory 
power. In addition, placed in the same sequential order over and over again, these factors are 
expected to produce the exact same effect on the dependent variable.  
 
The information that feeds process training is obtained in two ways. One preferred method of 
data collection is content analysis. Collier informs us that in her “nuclear taboo” study, 
Tannenwald resorts to primary and secondary sources such as official documents, memoirs, 
and biographies. These documents have informed the scholar on the politics of nuclear policy 
making. Another method is conducting interviews. A good example of process tracing 
supported through information revealed from interviews can be found in Daniel Lerner’s The 
                                                        
13 Ibid.  
14 Collier quotes this illustration from James Mahoney’s 2010 article where Nina Tannenwald’s 1999 study was 
mentioned. For the original source of the quotation see Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United 
States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53 (3): 433-68.  
15 Tannenwald, 433-68.  
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Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.16 In this comprehensive study of 
the changing traditional Middle Eastern societies, the primary data came from interviews 
conducted in Middle Eastern societies exposed to sudden modernization.  
 
Both data gathering practices has tremendous relevance to this dissertation. I rely on, first, 
content analysis to have the bird’s view on humanitarian intervention practices by traditional 
donors and Turkey. Looking at the metadata provided by the indices of multilateral 
international platforms has helped me identify a pattern that emerges from a specific motivation 
of the donor and concludes with a somewhat familiar results across nearly all cases in which 
such donor motivation is observed. However, suspecting a sequential order that produces a 
replicable relationship between the given independent and dependent variables is not enough. 
The plausibility of the process in explaining the hypothetical relationship must withstand a 
number of empirical tests that would conclude whether we can accept (or reject) a certain 
hypothesis based on the COPs we have uncovered.  
 
Bennett offers brief summaries of these tests, which were originally formulated by Stephen Van 
Evera.17 They are namely straw in the wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive. Straw in 
the wind tests provide useful information that may support the hypothesis or may call its certain 
aspects into question. While passing this test does not automatically affirm the validity of the 
hypothesis, failing it does not necessarily result in the rejection of the hypothesis. The straw in 
the wind test simply tells us whether our hypotheses are pointing in the right direction. The 
hoop test, on the other hand, is used to eliminate alternative hypotheses. Passing hoop tests 
helps eliminate alternative hypotheses and affirms relevance of the hypothesis. In other words, 
once cleared through hoop tests, hypotheses are assumed to possess necessary, but not 
sufficient, criteria to explain a given phenomenon. The smoking gun test is more concerned 
with presentation of concrete evidence(s) that would attest to the conclusion inferred from the 
hypothesis. Put differently, it provides certain concrete events and developments created only 
by the hypothetical relationship between the two (or multiple) variables. In other words, the 
smoking gun test gives us the sufficient but no necessary observations to confirm our 
                                                        
16 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York: The Free Press, 
1958.  
17 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997.  
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hypotheses. Doubly decisive tests, lastly, provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
accepting a hypothesis.18 
 
I apply the first three of these tests to demonstrate that there is a pattern which supports my 
hypotheses on the motivations of the donors and the effectiveness of their aid. As will be 
explained in more detail in the segment of this chapter that discusses how I apply process 
tracing, case study, and semi-structured interviews to the dissertation, the three tests disclose 
important information on the validity of my hypotheses. The straw in the wind test concurs a 
general trend between donor’s approach to humanitarian intervention and the quality of its 
deployed aid. Similarly, the hoop test singles out criteria as self-interest, political motivation, 
conditionality, and overwhelming bureaucratic superstructures as necessary, but insufficient 
causes of a failure to reap the anticipated benefits of the humanitarian intervention. The smoking 
gun test, concurrently, lays out the criteria for success that an ethical, unconditional, bilateral, 
puritan deployment of humanitarian intervention hypothetically should possess.  
 
The smoking gun test relies on hard facts to validate the patterns identified by the two prior 
tests. And therefore, it necessitates the type of meticulous observations that can only be 
obtained via open-ended semi-structured interviews. As a consequence, while I have depended 
on large quantitative data sets to make inferences on the overall behaviors of traditional donors 
and Turkish actors, and how such behaviors have affected the impact of their interventions, the 
observations that I extracted from donor communities and beneficiaries were the only concrete 
evidence with respect to the success of interventions. These interviews provided me with the 
insight whether or not the unique practices of these donors really resulted in the hypothesized 
outcomes. Hence, responses to the interview questions served as the smoking gun in this 
research.  
 
In sum, process tracing is a significant research method that explains the sequential inner 
workings of a hypothesis. It assists the researcher with understanding and explaining the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. While large quantitative studies 
simply assume that the hypothesized relation exists simply by relying on the results of statistical 
analysis, process tracing strives to explicate not only the correlative aspects of an interaction 
between two variables, but it also demonstrates the causal process. They are thus essential to 
                                                        
18 Bennett, 210.  
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testing the validity of an assumed relationship made on a meta-level of analysis on the case 
level. A thorough description of the variables, the postulated relationship between them, and 
the sequence in which this relationship manifests itself is integral to the validity of process 
tracing at the case study level. An erroneous description of these components, or concept 
stretching, may result in parochial tabulations, which may stand in the context of a given case, 
but fail to explain the others. To avoid such fallacy, the researcher must subject the speculated 
sequential makeup of his hypotheses to the rigorous tests that Van Evera has developed. The 
Straw in the Wind and Hoop tests inform us whether our hypotheses point in the right direction, 
or whether the phenomenon we are attempting to explain can be better explained by other 
hypotheses, whereas the smoking gun and double decisive tests provide the irrefutable criteria 
that validate the hypotheses in discussion. Case studies are hence the best quasi-experiments to 
understand, explain, and generalize the interaction between the variables leading up to the 
hypothesized outcomes. Process tracing applied in this context complements case models and 
provides reliable alternatives to aggregate comparisons of cases. It emerges as the most capable 
tool to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes of a case.  
 
3.1.2. Case Study 
Supported by the methods of congruence testing and process tracing, cross case comparisons 
and within case analyses are central to qualitative research. Especially, within case methods of 
analysis have been proven to spare the researcher being exposed to the established risks of 
inferential mistakes. Using comparative methods alone and depending on statistical inference 
renders the researcher susceptible to these errors. More important, case studies capture the 
complexity of social life via typological theorizing better than the two-variable cross-
tabulations that are common in quantitative research methods in the social sciences.19 Cases 
studies also suit conflict studies. The detailed examination provided by the case study approach 
often reveals a historical episode with explanations driven by panel data from specific intervals. 
These explanations can also be generalizable to other cases around the world. Hence case study 
method’s substantial contribution to social science research are its ability to ground grand 
theories to observable implications in the field, to test these implications against empirical 
observations or measurements, and to discern the results of these examinations with a view to 
making further inferences on how best to modify the theories under evaluation.20 
                                                        
19 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, 2005. 
20 Ibid.  
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Typological theorizing via case studies addresses multiple challenges for social science 
research designs. It counters the problem of case selection, or selecting on the dependent 
variable by suggesting alternative research designs to investigate the extant cases that history 
provides.21 More important, through Bayesian logic, a single case has the power to subject a 
deductive grand theory to a tough test which would assess the generalizability of its 
hypothetical assumptions. In the same vein, as acknowledged by Harry Eckstein, the inferential 
value of instance where a theory fails to fit a case in which it is most likely to be true has to be 
taken seriously, since such failure greatly undermines the hypothetical construct of the theory 
in question. Similarly, if the theory fits the case in which it is least likely to be true, may offer 
a convincing support in favor of the theory after a careful examination of the process that had 
a role in this outcome.22 
 
Another advantage of case study, as suggested by the notable social scientist Arend Lijphart, 
whereas the “large N” statistical analyses are always preferable when sufficient data are 
available, these studies are prone to suffer from the misapplication of the degrees of freedom 
principle.23 The degrees of freedom refers to all other observations that remain besides the 
independent variable, intervening variables and that hence do not interact, or manipulate, the 
either variable. In other words, “in a multiple regression analysis, the number of observations 
is taken as the number of cases (or the sample size) and the number of parameters is the number 
of independent variables and one additional parameter for the value of the intercept.”24 As a 
result, in a statistical analysis, as the degrees of freedom increase through an increase in the 
sample size or a decline in the number of variables, the probability of the hypothetical 
relationship to occur due to chance increases. “Lower and lower levels of explained variance 
are necessary to conclude with some confidence that the relationship being studied is unlikely 
to have been brought about by chance.”25 A case study, in this regard, provides the lowest and 
deepest level of analysis. George and Bennett argue that even though in a single case, the degree 
of freedom is literally zero, this problem is fixed by the utilization of process tracing, which 
measures different attributes of the variables at different levels, and hence increases the number 
                                                        
21 Ibid., 48.  
22 Ibid., 60. 
23 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 
(September 1971), 682-693.  
24 George and Bennett, 69.  
25 Ibid.   
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of observations. “Within a single case there are many possible process-tracing observations 
along the hypothesized causal paths between independent and dependent variables. A causal 
path may include many necessary steps, and they may have to occur in a particular order (other 
causal paths , when equifinality is present, might involve different steps in a different order). 
Some analysts emphasize that defining and observing the steps along the hypothesized causal 
path can lead to a ‘plethora of new observable implications for a theory’ and circumvent the 
degrees of freedom problem.”26 
 
A case study is most conducive to the creation of alternative hypotheses to those that were 
originally advanced at the onset of the research. Archival research and interviews are especially 
useful in exploring new hypothetical relations within the same case. “If we ask one question of 
individual or documents but get an entirely different answer, we may move to develop new 
theories that can be tested through previously unexamined evidence.”27 Compared to case 
studies, statistical inference methods are less prone to identifying deviant cases with a potential 
for new hypotheses. The use of pre-coded, existing databases have no inductive means of 
identifying omitted variables. Compared to statistical studies, case studies also carry fewer risks 
of being caught in “concept stretching” by grouping dissimilar cases. Case studies therefore 
enjoy greater conceptual validity.  The more a concept is stretched—as so happens in 
conceptualization of democracy with such adjectives as “hybrid,” “authoritarian,” 
“presidential”—the greater the odds are for spuriousness. George and Bennett apply this 
criticism to the democratic peace theory, in which various interpretation of “democracy” 
supposedly generate new variables. Yet, all of these supposedly different explanatory paths, or 
“combination of sequences,” lead to the same outcome. Furthermore, these paths are likely to 
include one or more common variables.28 Therefore, at the end of the day, the hyphenated 
democracies overcrowd the conceptual definitions, but these variances of democratic 
governance add little explanatory power to the attributes of democracy that prevent them from 
going to war with one another.  
 
The case study approach, in summary, has a multitude of advantages. A case study is the trusted 
method of ensuring that the significance of a hypothetical relationship proven via inferential 
statistics also holds on the lowest level as well. As Lijphart’s comparative work on democratic 
                                                        
26 Ibid., 70.  
27 Ibid., 55.  
28 Ibid., 52.  
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regimes illustrates, one deviant case can sufficiently challenge the generalizability and 
parsimony of a hypothesis proven at the highest level of significance in a quantitative analysis. 
This application of Bayesian logic helps us eliminate any hypothetical construct that does not 
fit in the suggested relationship structure at the lowest level of analysis, while it also encourages 
us to accept the type of a relationship with little chance to emerge out of a given sequential 
order between the independent and dependent variables. Among the other chief virtues of case 
studies is their potential for achieving high conceptual validity, their reliable procedures for 
fostering new hypotheses, their capability and means to examine closely the hypothesized role 
of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases, as well as their suitability to address 
causal complexity. On the other hand, if the researcher depending on a case study to model his 
hypotheses is always susceptible to committing a case selection bias when he unwittingly, or 
worse knowingly, selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent variable 
of the relevant population of cases.29 This is nearly synonymous to cherry picking of causal 
paths only leading to the dependent variable of interest. In this context, the outcome of the 
research suffers from the researcher’s deliberate selection of cases that share a particular 
outcome, also known as selection on the dependent variable. Another tradeoff that a case study 
researcher must be mindful of is the representativeness of a case study. The case researcher 
should be candid about his intention that he is not after determining the frequency with which 
the phenomenon occurs, but is concerned with identifying the process and conditions under 
which specified outcomes occur. “In view of these trade-offs, case study researchers generally 
sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively 
contingent generalizations that apply to well defined types of subtypes of cases with a high 
degree of explanatory richness.”30 
 
3.1.3. Interview 
The face-to-face and questionnaire interviews have been the third method utilized in this 
dissertation. The questions were directed at both agents representing the donor country or 
agency and the beneficiaries on the ground.  The questions for each category of respondents 
have been fixed. In other words, beneficiaries and donor representatives had to answer the same 
set of questionnaires designed for each group. This was to make sure that the variations in 
answers followed not from different questions, but from the differences between the 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 63.  
30 Ibid. 73.  
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respondents and their experiences. Since the interviews conducted were semi-structured and 
concurrently the questions were fixed to a degree, the open-endedness of questions at the same 
time allowed the researcher to demand elaborations on certain answers to better understand and 
key in the respondent’s experience on and with the subject matter. While positing these open-
ended questions the following rules and characteristics defined by Nachmias and Nachmias 
(1976) were applied: 1) the respondents were identified and selected on the condition that they 
have had experience in the researched topic and have been qualified to provide useful answers; 
2) the interview questions and topics covered were identified and analyzed before the interviews 
took place; 3) the interview proceeded on the topics relevant to the research and stayed on this 
course; 4) the interviews strictly focused on the subjective experiences of the respondents with 
respect to the situation that was being studied.31  
 
The questions were especially asked open-endedly for three reasons. First, since Turkey was a 
newcomer to the humanitarian sector as a donor, and as the interviews have proven, there are 
no established concepts or specialized terms through which the interviewee could formulate his 
or her answers. For example, the most crucial question was if the respondent could describe 
Turkey’s approach to peace building. The interviews with officials and NGO representatives 
demonstrated that no Turkish actor involved in relief and reconstruction projects knew what 
peace building was. Nor could anyone offer a proper description of his or her own 
conceptualization of peace building. Therefore, to give the respondent space for self-
expression, questions were open-ended. Second, some of the interviews were conducted in 
conflict-affected places such as Mogadishu and Kabil. Given that there were cultural 
differences with the interviewer and the interviewees in these places, open-ended questions 
omitted fixed definitions of certain concepts and allowed respondents to formulate his or her 
own response that had the same functional equivalency. Spontaneous expression of thoughts 
often led to follow-up questions on unintended issues, which could help the researcher evaluate 
the issue at hand from an alternative perspective. Therefore, I did not want to risk curb 
spontaneity.  
 
The interviews were conducted in different times. Initial interviews with a view to finding out 
about Turkey’s approach to humanitarian intervention and broader peace building were mainly 
conducted between 2012 and 2015. These interviews involved mainly government officials, 
                                                        
31 David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1976), 101.  
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representatives of governmental aid agencies, and representatives from private, mostly faith-
based charities. The interviews in Afghanistan were conducted in 2014 during a ten-day field 
trip to Kabul and Mazar-I Sharif in the northern Balk province. The interviews with 
stakeholders in Somalia and corresponding Turkish counterparts in Ankara and Istanbul were 
conducted in 2014, 2015 and as recently as in 2017. The last batch of interviews consisted of 
emailed questionnaire to representatives of various government branches dealing with 
humanitarian programs abroad and nongovernmental charity organizations. Since these 
interactions took place after the coup attempt in 2016, the respondents accepted to provide 
written answers to the emailed questions on the condition of anonymity.  
 
3.2. Application of Process Tracing, Case Studies, and Interviews  
As was alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, this dissertation is set to carry out an 
unprecedented enterprise by seeking to accomplishing two tasks. One is to identify patterns in 
traditional donors’s approach to humanitarianism and to verify that the types of choices that 
they have made over a century-long career in this sector in fact resulted in the current landscape 
of distorted humanitarianism and peace building, as suggested by the literature review. The 
other task is to study Turkey’s short experience in this field, investigate if and what it is doing 
differently vis-à-vis the deployment of its humanitarian assistance, and find out if it is working, 
and working better than that of Global North. Both are perilous tasks, because while the first 
assignment requires a careful review of a long list of practices developed over a hundred years, 
the second objective is even more difficult in light of little data from a nascent actor in the field.  
 
These circumstances have therefore dictated the utilization of two case studies, process tracing, 
and interviews as the best three qualitative methods to circumvent the aforementioned 
challenges. Before the application of these three methods, content analysis, consisted of careful 
reviews of databases and reports from credible intergovernmental organizations, independent 
NGOs and government agencies were conducted to identify general patterns among both 
traditional donors and on Turkey’s side with respect to their preferred principles and modes of 
engagement on humanitarian missions. The following databases and reports have provided 
valuable data to help me trace certain patterns with respect to each actors’s behavior and 
motivation in conducting humanitarian interventions to conflict-affected countries:  
• Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports 2014 – 2017 
• OECD Data on Development in Afghanistan and Somalia 2014 – 2017 
• UN OCHA Annual Reports 2012 – 2017 
 72 
• Turkish Development Assistance Reports 2012 - 2016 (by Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency)  
• Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)  
• The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
 
Both statistical data and analytical studies offered by these various organizations, databases, 
and annual reports provide sufficient information on traditional donor and Turkish practices to 
trace a process in accord with the hypothesized relationship between intentions for 
humanitarian intervention and the function of the aid to improve human security and 
sustainability in conflict-affected countries. The data from the listed sources, and from 
countless iNGO reports such as Oxfam, SaferWorld, Overseas Development Institute, hint a 
process in traditional donors’s mode of engagement in conflict affected countries that very 
much stand the straw in the wind test and is in line with the hypotheses of this dissertation.  
The process is as follows: a global catastrophe or conflict erupts. Whether the conflict is 
somehow driven by a great power, or occurs in its sphere of influence, traditional donors 
calculate the political risk of ignoring the human suffering. They act if political risk of dismissal 
is greater than remaining indifferent. They also act, validating Fearon’s argument, when they 
have significant political gains either at home with their constituencies or in international 
community. Once agreed on intervention, traditional donors make sure that an international 
bureaucratic superstructure is already deployed and other large iNGO platforms are available 
to apply a concerted effort, which groups armed peacekeeping, emergency relief operations, 
and political, social, economic reconstruction and rehabilitation under one roof. The next step 
is the setting of an immediate deadline and cost-effective benchmarks of success that can be 
met in a short period of time, and the donor can declare success despite the continuing plight 
of the beneficiary on the street. All the cases studied by the previously-mentioned 
establishments feature a somewhat similar process of intervention by traditional donors, 
instigated by the same set of political concerns or interests and followed with limited 
consequentialist strategies implemented by large supranational bureaucracies, while ignoring 
the needs of the beneficiary on the ground. The result of the process is more human suffering 
across the board in conflict zones, more instability, and higher risks of relapsing into conflict, 
although consequentialist approach was previously praised in the literature for its grand strategy 
designs to eliminate such relapse.  
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Process tracing therefore justifies the negative hypothetical relationship between increased 
political interests, consequentialism, and multilateral interventions and aid’s intended effect of 
improving human life and dignity in conflict affected countries.  
 
By the same token, the selection of Somalia and Afghanistan as cases therefore provides an 
important opportunity for a quasi-experiment for a number of reasons. First, the hypothesized 
causal relationship between a country’s approach and aid effectiveness can be comparatively 
observed in both countries. Major traditional donors and Turkey’s approaches to 
humanitarianism can be compared, because both actors have been in these countries for some 
time, even though Turkey’s entry is relatively new to the traditional donors. Although they 
acted in collaborative ways from time to time, each entity diverges from the other significantly 
in terms of its own approach to human suffering. Somalia, for example, has a long history with 
humanitarian relief agencies, the NATO and U.S. military forces, as well as the multilateral UN 
schemes. While Somalia was devastated due to these unplanned interventions motivated by 
short-term political and security interests, the advent of Turkey brought a new understanding 
on ending humanitarian suffering and going about it committing its aid without political 
interests, calculated risks and deploying its assistance bypassing a complex mega bureaucratic 
giant. Afghanistan too provides ample attributes of traditional donor and Turkish models of 
engagement and presents platform for comparison. There are no other entrenched conflict zones 
that bring together traditional donors and newcomers than Afghanistan and Somalia.  
 
Another reason why Somalia and Afghanistan make vital cases is the geographical, political 
and cultural differences between the two countries. Located in different continents and forged  
by dissimilar political, social and economic developments, there are no local similarities (save 
religion) that would manipulate the relationship between the variables the same way in both 
countries. Therefore, we can safely assume that if the approaches of each actor produce the 
same results in two distinctly dissimilar countries, this ought to be due to the nature of the 
hypothetical relationship, and not because of the local political, social, economic, or cultural 
dynamic.  
 
Overall, process tracing and case studies conducted in Somalia in regard to traditional donor 
and Turkish humanitarian practices and their outcomes warrant a robust relationship between 
the principles of engagement and a particular form of humanitarian intervention’s potential to 
alleviate suffering and restoring dignity among the communities of conflict-affected countries. 
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However, neither method reveals the criteria for success. Neither process tracing nor a bird 
eye’s view on the tenets of humanitarian operations conducted in these two countries provide 
us with unified criteria of effectiveness. The methodological approaches focusing too much on 
the logical and sequential evolution of the causal observation from distance often misses the 
hidden element that defines the measure of success—or in this dissertation, the measure of 
effectiveness. Therefore, interviews conducted with the beneficiaries at the local level and the 
donors are fundamental to our understanding of the criteria of success. The expectations of the 
beneficiary, as well as his perception of the donor and the way in which the interaction with the 
donor has changed the life around him, can only be obtained by directly engaging with these 
individuals. The same goes for comprehending donor perceptions as well. Since there is much 
content on Global Northern humanitarian practices, strategies and motivations, a thorough 
content analysis can adequately draw a picture of a Western donor for us. However, that is not 
true for emerging actors such as Turkey. Because the literature, data, and discourse on Turkish 
humanitarian practices and motives are currently shaping, interviews prove more useful in 
terms of accruing how donor communicates his vision and interprets the actions it has taken to 
realize this vision. In short, interview is the only instrument that supplies us with the necessary 
standards and benchmarks for aid effectiveness. In other words, without knowing what 
effectiveness means for the beneficiary and the donor, we do not have a smoking gun. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BENCHMARKS, CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
 
The last chapter concluded with an important question: what makes humanitarian intervention 
effective? Further derivatives of this question can be formulated as such: How can we ascertain 
that political ambitions, strategized approaches, and multilateral approaches of traditional 
donors render their aid less effective than that of Turkey? By the same token, are we absolutely 
sure that Turkey’s apolitical, unconditional, bilateral, and duty-driven ethical approach yields 
more effective humanitarian assistance?    
 
Evaluating the success or failures of the donors with unbiased, relevant, and adequate 
benchmarks is key to an objective analysis on actors’s performances. It is important to recall 
Diehl and Druckman’s cautions while employing the right standards of evaluation. The authors 
argue that the evaluation of peace operations is challenged by same uncertainties that apply to 
the performance of any international interventions on a particular crisis. These challenges 
pertain to the identification and “distinction between performance or process and outcomes, 
multiple goals and stakeholders, developing effectiveness metrics, the distinction between 
problem-solving, legal, economic and political approaches to the meaning of effectiveness.”1  
Of this list, metrics concerns this dissertation the most. As the scholars acknowledge, these 
metrics are essential to deriving the right lessons from peace operations and to evaluating their 
success or failure.2 The authors determine the first order of business as the identification of 
stakeholders: “Although often ignored or not addressed directly, there are several sets of 
stakeholders in peace operations, each of which might generate different standard for success: 
the international community, states contributing personnel, the main protagonists states or 
                                                        
1 Diehl and Druckman, 93.  
2 Ibid., 94.  
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groups, the local population, and partner organizations including international organizations 
(IOs) and nongovernmental organizations.”3 
 
The literature review has already verified this list of stakeholders. However, it has not ranked 
the hierarchy of stakeholders based on the prioritization of each stakeholder’s interest and 
needs. Although this study is not qualified to place the stakeholders in some form of a 
descending order, it is not difficult to infer from literature and data, referred to in various parts 
of this study, local communities (and local beneficiaries) remain at the bottom of the food chain 
from the traditional donor point of view. From that perspective, usually sovereign nation 
interests and intergovernmental organization agendas are located at the top of the metaphorical 
pyramid, as these entities muster the funds and resources. Regardless of their hierarchical 
rankings, the relations and intentions of these stakeholders against one another are integral to 
the swift deployment of humanitarian intervention.4 A clash between those who want to 
intervene and those who are party to the conflict and geared to preserve the status quo is likely 
to delay any humanitarian solution to the suffering on the ground. Diehl and Druckman 
acknowledge that matters get more complicated with the arrival of suprastates and other 
intergovernmental organizations, because these organizations not only have a byzantine 
decision-making system due to their obligation to secure some sort of consensus with member 
states, but they also reserve different political and security interests with respect to the regions 
where conflicts occur.5  
 
Determining a baseline for assessment is as nearly important as identifying the stakeholders. 
This assessment is necessary to make sure that the alleged success of a peace operation can be 
compared to the status quo before the operation took place. In other words, the purpose of a 
baseline assessment is to predict which will produce better results: intervention or no action. 
There are many confounding factors that will contaminate the results of the baseline 
assessment. One of them is the implications of a negative treatment, which is “no action.” Any 
intervention may be better than something that was not in place to begin with. However, 
illustrations from literature, especially from the late 1980s and 1990s demonstrate that this is 
not necessarily the case. Interventions can also deteriorate the problems in the conflict-affected 
country as illustrated by Somalia case. Therefore, to conclude in favor of access, the researcher 
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4 Ibid., 95.  
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needs to take a good stock of the state of the conflict when the action was taken. Diehl and 
Druckman forewarn that “that assessment is almost inevitably going to be positive for 
deployment made during the height of hostilities. It will be less positive if forces enter just after 
a ceasefire. In the latter case, conditions could remain the same, improve, or deteriorate because, 
at least in part, factors exogenous to the operation.”6 
 
Another trap against which the scholars warn is the association of the abatement of conflict and 
humanitarian intervention. Although one fundamental goal of peace operations is violence 
abatement, the reduction or elimination of armed violence over the long term is becoming more 
difficult. Abatement only seems possible in the short term when peacekeepers are instructed to 
use force on the hostiles to protect the local populations. However, with longer-term 
multifaceted peace operations, such as ones in Afghanistan, the moment peacekeeping force 
leave or goes to reductions in its ranks, relapse into conflict occurs. This is true for the majority 
of conflict-affected countries. As verified by the ACLED data, even in post-conflict countries 
that still receive humanitarian assistance sporadic fighting breaks out and mass casualties are 
sustained. Such assessment certainly applies to both Somalia and Afghanistan. Both countries 
receive nearly the greatest portion of Turkish Humanitarian aid according to TİKA, yet Al-
Shabaab and Taliban attacks on government targets and civilian areas have yet to cease.7 
 
Taking these words of caution into consideration, the benchmarks for aid effectiveness used in 
this study are drawn from among the priorities of both conventional actors and sensitivities of 
Global South. With respect to the benchmarks shared by Western humanitarian community, the 
thirty-one OECD DAC (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Development Assistance Committee) indicators, evaluated by Nancy Birdsall and Homi Kharas 
in a Brookings Institution report on “The Quality of Official Development Assistance 
(QuODA),” provide usable qualifiers.8 Cumulated in four broad objectives, these indicators 
assess the success of humanitarian intervention through the action’s capacity to “maximize 
                                                        
6 Ibid., 99.  
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Development Aid to the World – The 2014 Report) Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (TİKA) 
April 2016, 66. The report notes that Turkey’s official bilateral development assistance to Somalia has dropped 
35.72 percent—from nearly $115 million to $74 million—since 2013. See also, “2015 İdari Faaliyet Raporu” 
(The 2015 Administrative Activity Report) Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (TİKA) April 
2016, 32. Also see ACLED database on violent fighting in Somalia and Afghanistan, 
https://www.acleddata.com.  
8 Nancy Birdsall and Homi Kharas, “The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA),” (Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution, 2014), 5.  
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impact,” “foster institutions,” “reduce burden,” and increase “transparency and learning.”9 
Under the capacity maximizing category, DAC evaluates the deployed assistance by a 
traditional or emerging donor according to following subsequent benchmarks:  
• Share of allocation to poor countries; 
• Share of allocation to well-governed countries; 
• Low unit administrative costs; 
• High country programmable aid share;  
• Focus/specialization by recipient country; 
• Focus specialization by sector;  
• Support of select global public goods facilities.  
 
Similarly, to conclude whether humanitarian intervention fosters institutions OECD DAC 
evaluates commitments on the bases of:  
• Share of aid to recipients’s top development priorities;  
• Avoidance of project implementation unit costs; 
• Share of aid recorded in recipient’s budgets;  
• Share of aid to partners with good operational strategies; 
• Use of recipient country’s systems; 
• Share of scheduled aid recorded as received by recipients; 
• Coordination of technical cooperation; 
• Coverage of forward spending plans/Aid predictability. 
 
DAC also attaches values to the donor’s ability to reduce the burden on the host country through 
a list of criteria. Burden reduction can easily be interpreted as not to overwhelm the host 
government by overcrowding the extant bureaucracy with additional consults, operatives and 
other personnel. It is all the better if the donor unclogs the communication channels among 
other multilateral (universalist) actors of humanitarian intervention. The seven criteria that 
DAC require for an intervention to be successful are as follows:  
• Significance of aid relationship; 
• Fragmentation across donor agencies; 
• Median project size; 
                                                        
9 Ibid.  
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• Contributions to multilaterals; 
• Coordinated missions; 
• Use of programmatic aid;  
• Coordinated analytical work. 
Finally, DAC ensures that attributes of useful intervention includes concerns for transparency 
and learning within the host country. To achieve this DAC requires donors to fulfill the 
following conditions:  
• Become signatory to International Aid Transparency Initiative; 
• Implement IATI’s data reporting standards;  
• Obtain recording of project title and description; 
• Possess the details of project descriptions; 
• Report the aid delivery channels; 
• Ensure the quality of main agency evaluation policy; 
• Ensure completeness of project level commitment data; 
• Concentrate aid on partners with good monitoring and evaluation frameworks.  
 
Although the listed OECD DAC criteria may appear complex and difficult to monitor, they are 
not unique to this Global Northern agency for development assistance. It is welcoming to see 
the equivalent criteria for the effectiveness of the aid also exist on the Global South side. 
Developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NEST), the following criteria are used to 
evaluate the quality of humanitarian cooperation: First, the action must be inclusive. That is; 
regardless of gender, race, religious, ethnic, or sexual orientation of the recipient, all victims of 
the conflict ought to be reached. Second, humanitarian action must prioritize national 
ownership. The host government should be unequivocally in charge of the aid distribution. It 
may seek consultancy from donor agencies; however, it must have absolute authority on the 
implementation of the assistance. Third, humanitarian intervention should be deployed with a 
view to securing self-reliance and sustainability of the recipient. Fourth, similar to the final 
dimension of the OECD DAC matrix, accountability and transparency must be adhered. Finally, 
the resources should target efficient development by being largely channeled into programmatic 
enterprises, rather than plenary, administrative or bureaucratic affairs.10  
 
                                                        
10 Neissan Besharati, “Welcome to NeST Africa!” South African Institute of International Affairs, March 16 
2015, accessed December 23, 2016  www.saiia.org.za/news/welcome-to-nest-africa.  
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In light of the convergences between OECD DAC indicators and NEST criteria, 
operationalization of effective aid necessitates the following requirements. The donors respect 
national ownership and devise their intervention programs according to the needs of 
beneficiaries. The donors must invest in the institutions of the donor country, leaving the 
political decisions on how to run those institutions solely to the host government 
representatives. It is obligatory that know-how is provided for self-sustaining organizations, 
without the donor’s imposition of its own agenda. Furthermore, a significant portion of funds 
and other resources must be directed to the programs that provide evaluation, monitoring and 
learning in order to foster transparency and accountability in the country. To corroborate the 
effectiveness of aid, the research in pursuit of benchmarks should also be mindful of the funds 
going directly into the budget of the country or local NGOs without the capability to utilize 
these funds. Any practice of working with a local, international or the donor country contractor 
will render the assistance wasteful. The final component of effective aid that the synthesis of 
DAC and NEST indicators yield is the donor’s effort to unclutter the intervention pipeline. It is 
the donor’s responsibility to make sure that there is no overcrowding of the humanitarian 
scenery by unnecessary actors pursuing their own political, economic, and security agendas. 
Hence emerges coordination and cooperation among donors and complex intergovernmental 
organization as the last benchmark of aid effectiveness.  
 
4.1. Other Conceptual and Operational Definitions / Limitations 
This dissertation primarily concerns itself with humanitarian intervention. It employs a broad 
description of this concept. It defines humanitarian intervention as a group of activities that 
alleviates the suffering of a human being due to violence inflicted by man-made or natural 
catastrophes. Damage and destruction caused by natural disasters are outside the scope of this 
study. This particular research is concerned only with humanitarian crises emerging from 
armed-conflicts. Therefore, in the parlance of this dissertation, humanitarian intervention, 
which sometimes is used interchangeably with humanitarian action, encapsulates any short or 
long-term assistance in the shape or form of distribution of emergency relief supplies, providing 
shelter, reconstructing destroyed infrastructure and institutions, restarting economic activity, 
provision of short term security services. While humanitarian intervention is not exhaustive to 
this list, it does cross over to the turf of development assistance.   
 
For the purposes of this research, it is necessary to acknowledge that in Turkish context 
humanitarian intervention is regarded as an indispensable component of peace building. As will 
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be further illustrated in the next chapter, in Turkish jargon on humanitarianism, peace building, 
peace operations, peacemaking are all synonymous to humanitarian assistance. During the 
interviews with government officials, when asked to define peace building, or peace operation, 
they immediately began referencing to humanitarian campaigns that Turkey is running around 
the world.  Therefore, we are exposed to a less militarized more incentivized and humanized 
perception in Turkey of a peace operations.  
 
With respect to independent variables utilized in this research, the definition should be carefully 
made. Bilateral mode of engagement can be interpreted as Turkey’s inclination to form 
exclusive relations with the recipient countries. Through engaging bilaterally Turkey deploys 
its assistance without operating in tandem with the extant multilateral platforms. Nor does it 
feel obligation to coordinate its efforts with other sovereign agents or NGOs operating in the 
same sphere. Multilateral, or universalist, mode of engagement on the other hand refers to a 
concerted effort by one or several intergovernmental organizations to oversee all aspects of  a 
peace building mission including armed peacekeeping, relief missions, and reconstruction of 
host government’s collapsed infrastructure and institutions. Since the definition of duty-based 
ethics and consequentialist approach to engaging in humanitarian operations have already been 
made abundantly in the literature review chapter, they will not be further explained in this 
segment.  
 
The concept of beneficiary can also lead to confusion in humanitarian terminology. While the 
donor clearly refers to the sovereign, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental entity that 
commits the humanitarian assistance, the definition of beneficiary could be a bit more 
complicated. The beneficiary is most commonly the person who has suffered serious losses—
both health-wise and in property and livelihood—as a result of either a man-made (war) or 
natural disasters (act of God). However, intergovernmental organizations and international 
NGOs immersed in humanitarianism two years ago decided not to refer to these individuals 
with victimizing labels. Therefore, the term “beneficiary” was replaced by “right holder.” The 
term “donor” became “duty bearer.” However, due to the technicality of the new terms, 
humanitarian sector has yet to embrace them. For the purposes of this study, using these terms 
eliminates conceptual confusions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TURKEY’S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING 
 
 
 
 
Turkey owes its status as a rising power to the steady political and economic development that 
it enjoyed in the first years of the twenty-first century and to the weakening of the Western, 
rule-based liberal order. This has enabled regional actors with relative economic stability and 
security to assume certain responsibilities that traditionally fell to the Great Powers in the Cold 
War era. Like most BRICS countries and other rising powers, Turkey has ridden the tailwinds 
of this global opening. Turkey also shares with some other rising powers the experience of rapid 
economic growth, relative stability, and an ongoing political transition and reform. As the world 
shifts to a more multipolar system, Turkey has been using its religious, ethnic, and cultural ties 
to try to consolidate its soft power, both regionally and further afield. During this period, Turkey 
has raised its profile as a regional actor and an emerging power, especially as the Arab Spring 
produced opportunities, crisis, and warfare on its borders.  
These lessons, as well as the country’s status as a European Union candidate, a committed 
NATO ally and a buffer state for the West, increase Turkey’s role in ushering peace in the 
region and reinforce its image as a bridge between geographical and cultural divides. As a 
Western-oriented, secular state with a majority Muslim population, Turkey is increasingly 
regarded as a pivot in effectively addressing both humanitarian and security aspects of the 
entrenched conflicts in its neighborhood, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Turkey 
hosts approximately 3.5 million Syrian refugees At the same time it provides support for 
opposition forces in Syria and allowed members of the anti-IS (Islamic State) coalition, such as 
the United States to use its airbases. For much of its history, however, Turkey has been plagued 
by rampant insecurity and economic and political instability. It has experienced four military 
coups and a thirty-year armed insurgency. As such, Turkey’s recent activities may be supported 
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by economic and international shifts in power, but its conceptualization and approach to 
peacebuilding is very much informed by the country’s experiences of insecurity.  
 
5.1 The Emergence of Turkish Peacebuilding 
Security and stability are two central issues that have guided Turkey’s strategic considerations 
In the wake of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, modernization through 
alignment and membership of Western institutions was seen as crucial to preserving the security 
and stability that had been lost in the preceding years. It is also in this context that some of the 
traditional principles of Turkey’s foreign policy have emerged, such as non-interference and 
respect for sovereignty. Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies have also been significantly 
influenced by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. A number of his speeches, 
particularly the phrase “Peace at home, peace in the world” have been used to frame Turkey’s 
international engagement, from its first forays into peacekeeping in the 1990s to recent 
peacebuilding activities. Former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had also reiterated this 
principle, stating that Turkey has tried to build a proactive foreign policy based on peace and 
stability at home.1 This ideal, however, has come under significant strain since the Arab Spring 
spread to the Levant, and its transformation into a violent civil war in Syria and rampant 
insecurity in Iraq. These issues have directly affected Turkey’s own security and stability. The 
suicide attacks since the June 7, 2015 general elections that have hit major towns in the 
southeast, the Turkish capital Ankara, and the country’s largest city Istanbul, are nearly all 
traced to IS cells that infiltrated the porous borders in the South. This has been accompanied by 
renewed clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 
which are equally detrimental to Turkey’s stability. In an additional blow to Turkey’s security, 
it endure a coup attempt on July 15, 2016, which has led to the purging of thousands from the 
military, education institutions, judicial and state agencies. 
For much of Turkey’s history, security and stability were conceived in military terms and in 
relation to territorial integrity. Turkey’s first and only international intervention during the Cold 
War was its mediation between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. This can be seen from a traditional 
security perspective, given the proximity of both countries to Turkey’s eastern flank. Following 
the loosening of the Cold War strictures, the Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 with the objective of expanding Turkish 
                                                        
1 Ahmet Davutoğlu (2012) Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and. Regional Political Structuring, Center for 
Strategic Research, No. 3, April 2012. 
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relations with the newly independent Turkic States of Central Asia. TIKA was conceived as a 
mechanism of Turkish soft power through cooperation in the economic, cultural, and 
humanitarian fields.2 For much of this period, however, TIKA was left to languish as an agency 
due to internal instability and a focus on a harder, security-driven concept of military 
engagement. Turkey’s first foray into peacebuilding during this time was in the Balkans in the 
1990s, contributing troops to multilateral peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions with 
the UN and NATO.  
The shift from such hard security-based peacebuilding to the civilian participation and technical 
assistance that characterizes Turkey’s activities in recent years was facilitated by a change in 
domestic dynamics. Over the last decade, the Turkish Armed Forces has been losing its 
influence in foreign policy matters, which are now primarily determined by civilians in 
government. This was accompanied by expanded civilian and police participation in peace 
operations, increased engagement in multilateral organizations, and a revival of TIKA 
activities. Facilitated by a period of relative political and economic stability and internal 
reforms that eased restrictions in political, religious, and social spheres, Turkey began to expand 
its official development. Although retaining a strong military was a necessity due to the 
instability of the surrounding region, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) civic and 
economic power was promoted as a more sustainable method of foreign engagement. 
Domestic changes were accompanied by a restructuring of Turkish foreign policy priorities and 
goals under the AKP. This has served to both promote the prestige of a more internationally 
active Turkey and to reinforce the success of the country’s leadership to a domestic audience.3 
Guided by then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (key adviser and later foreign minister from 
2009-2014), a multilateral foreign policy emerged that sought a balance between proactive 
engagement and crisis management. Turkish leaders have emphasized the need for preventive 
diplomacy that should be intricately linked to any conflict management strategies, whether it is 
peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities. Identifying mediation and dialogue as essential tools 
in this preventative diplomacy, officials have stated that “peace mediation and facilitation 
efforts are the most cost-effective and efficient way of preventing and resolving conflicts” 
(United Nations Security Council, 2015).4 Reflecting this position, Turkey has headed a number 
                                                        
2 Teri Murphy & Onur Sazak (2012) Turkey’s Civilian Capacitry in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Istanbul: 
Istanbul Policy Center 
3 Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler and Auveen Elizabeth Woods. (2015, March). Turkish Aid 
Agencies in Somalia; Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace, Safeworld and Istanbul Policy Center, p. 4. 
4 UN Document S/PV.6472. 
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of initiatives. In 2005 the Alliance of Civilizations, which promotes interreligious and 
intercultural dialogue, was launched by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey. In 2010, 
Turkey and Finland created a “Group of Friends of Mediation” consisting of 41 countries that 
supports efforts by the UN and regional organizations in the area of mediation. In May 2016, 
Turkey hosted the first World Humanitarian Summit, in Istanbul. These are diverse and cross-
cultural examples that Turkish officials have identified as reflecting the country’s approach to 
peacebuilding. Through these initiatives Turkey has sought to promote flexibility, trust, and 
cooperation as the basis of successful mediation. In parallel to these efforts, Turkey launched a 
process on peacebuilding during its time on the Security Council from 2009-2010, which 
included these initiatives and brought together the Council for thematic meetings in Istanbul 
from 2010 to 2013. 
Issues around “hard security” are still a strategic priority for Turkey’s foreign policy, as seen 
in the country’s engagement in Syria. But conceptualizations of security have broadened. As 
Davutoğlu stated, “stability cannot be built on the basis of force alone.”5 Referencing the decade 
of reforms inside Turkey, Turkish officials have sought to find a balance between freedom and 
security in order to achieve stability.6 Over the years the concept of “security” has become more 
multidimensional, focusing on human needs through good governance and economic stability. 
This is evident in Turkey’s rhetorical embrace of “humanitarian diplomacy,” an ambiguous 
concept that Turkish officials have increasingly used to frame its repositioning in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring. Humanitarian diplomacy as a concept claims to reject state-centric 
realpolitik and external interference in domestic affairs. Highlighting the importance of 
acknowledging “local values” and local ownership,  it instead emphasizes the need to put human 
dignity and human security at the forefront of policy considerations.7 There are of course limits 
to such aspirations, which can be seen Turkey’s strategic engagement to the crises in Iraq and 
Syria.  
 
5.2 The Tools of Turkish Peacebuilding 
There is no concept paper that explicitly describes Turkey’s definition of peacebuilding. It can, 
however, be understood through bilateral and regional activities, norms, and discussions, such 
as those already mentioned, that have emerged among the country’s representatives over the 
                                                        
5 Davutoglu, 2012. 
6 Murphy and Sazak, 2012.  
7 Fuat Keyman & Onur Sazak, ‘Turkey as a Humanitarian State’, POMEAS, Paper No 2. 
http://pomeas.org/Home/index.php/publications/pomeas-papers/419-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state 
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last decade. Most Turkish officials discuss the term peacebuilding within the context of 
development and reconstruction of a conflict-affected country. Turkey’s approach to 
peacebuilding can be characterized as a twofold process, encompassing both state building and 
peacemaking within society. Reflecting a structural approach to peacebuilding, Turkish 
officials emphasize the centrality of good governance, strong responsive institutions, and rule 
of law for building an effective state and, therefore, in their view, a stable and peaceful society.8 
Activities related to these goals by officials include infrastructure projects, technical assistance, 
and capacity building programs for state institutions and personnel. This kind of structural 
peacebuilding must also be accompanied by an inclusive peacemaking process at all levels. 
Turkish officials feel that this is only possible through national ownership of goals and 
culturally sensitive engagement with all stakeholders, including civil society, professional 
associations, and women. This is particularly important with regard to political institutions and 
inclusive economic recovery, which Turkish officials say are essential for a peaceful society. 
Activities associated with societal peacebuilding include mediation efforts, education 
programs, religious support, and inclusive economic development.  
Like other rising powers, economic interests are intricately linked to Turkey’s foreign policy 
and its peacebuilding activities. Such interests have not only led to financial dividends for 
Turkey in the past but also promoted peace in some cases. Notably, the historically tumultuous 
relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish neighbors in Iraq has greatly improved with 
ongoing military cooperation between the administrations in Ankara and Erbil. The expansion 
of economic and diplomatic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan not only helped to improve relations 
but was also a lucrative partnership.9  At the time, exports to Iraq in 2013 reached $12 billion, 
with $8 billion going to the Kurdish Regional Government, becoming one of Turkey’s largest 
export markets. There are also some links between Turkey’s economic interests and its aid 
practices in general. In Afghanistan, Turkish companies’ ranked fifth in terms of total number 
of foreign investors, with 140 registered in the country in 2013. Turkey’s bilateral trade with 
Somalia was $72 million by 2015. Officials have also been frank about their interest in 
expanding economic relations with Somalia, one of the most prominent countries in Turkey’s 
development activities (Interview with Foreign Ministry Officials, August 2015). While not a 
specific policy, a pattern has emerged in which the establishment of a diplomatic presence in a 
                                                        
8 Telephone Interview Foreign Ministry official, Ankara, March 26, 2015 
9 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Embracing Iraq’s Kurds as Trade Erodes Old Enmity,” Bloomberg Business, July 
11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-10/turkey-s-embrace-of-iraqi-kurds-shows-trade-
eroding-old-enmity 
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new country is often soon followed by investment from Turkish companies and new flight links 
through Turkish Airlines.  
Turkish diplomats are firm in their conviction that trade is better than aid for development 
(Interview with a Turkish Diplomat, February 2014). Many Turkish officials regard economic 
development, ideally through the diverse participation of the society as an essential component 
of peacebuilding, with one diplomat stating “[W]e don’t think that peacebuilding could achieve 
its goals if there is no economic recovery and participation of the whole part of the society in 
the program” (Interview with Foreign Ministry Official, June 2015). Officials believe economic 
investment provides alternative financial opportunities to criminality and extremist narratives, 
and supports national ownership of development.  
Many of the initiatives that Turkish officials consider as peacebuilding activities are funneled 
through Turkish development aid. In 2017, Turkey's Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
was reported as $8 billion.10 This figure places Turkey on top of the United States, which by 
various organizations such as OECD and UN have deemed the largest contributor to 
humanitarian assistance, and Germany.11 This represents nearly a twofold increase between 
since 2014, alone. Despite Turkey’s participation in a number of multilateral initiatives, the 
vast majority of this aid is provided in bilateral assistance. For example in 2013, only $151 
million of $3.3 billion of ODA was provided through multilateral contributions. In 2014, this 
was $88 million. This illustrates Turkey’s preference for bilateral engagement.12 
Turkey has expanded its activities to some of the world's most entrenched conflicts. From 2011 
until 2014, Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan were among the top five largest recipients of 
Turkish ODA.13 While Turkey does provide support to non-Muslim countries such as Ukraine, 
Macedonia and Kenya, to name just a few, the bulk of the State’s activities appear to be carried 
out in Muslim majority states. Many of these countries would also be on the list of least 
developed or fragile states. Examples of both the structural and social peacebuilding approaches 
                                                        
10 “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018,” Development Initiatives, June 19, 2018, accessed July 1, 
2018, http://devinit.org/post/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2018/.  
11 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report acknowledges that although Turkey’s assistance volume is the largest 
and it reports to DAC on voluntary basis, Turkey’s assistance is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. Turkey’s reported value therefore is not strictly comparable with the international 
humanitarian assistance from other donors.  
12 Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., “Turkish Development Assistance 2015, Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (2016).  
13 Gür et al, 2016.  
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of Turkey are evident in its activities in conflict-affected countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, 
and Balkan countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.   
 
Much of what can be defined as Turkey’s structural peacebuilding activities consist of technical 
capacity programs, infrastructure projects, and the provision of basic services that are focused 
on the recipient state institutions. Technical assistance, or cooperation as it is alternatively 
called, is broadly defined by Turkey as “strengthening capacities and effectiveness of 
individuals, organizations and institutions through transfer of ideas, technologies, knowledge 
and skills.”14 This can include a wide range of activities from the state to the local level such as 
trainings and scholarships to the provisions of equipment and materials. Additionally, a strong 
understanding of constructive development is common to both Turkish state agencies and non-
state actors, has strong historical roots. Since the Ottoman Empire, privately funded 
philanthropic development has focused on the construction of buildings and infrastructure, as 
well as the funding of services such as schools, hospitals, and mosques. Examples of 
infrastructure projects include renovating state buildings such or building schools and roads are 
common across all the countries in which Turkey is engaged.  
Many infrastructure and technical cooperation programs appear to focus on improving the 
provision of basic services such as medical and judicial standards. For example, Turkey 
provides a range of trainings from judges and prosecutors in Kosovo to medical staff in 
Somalia. Turkish officials have said that they feel capacity-building programs directly support 
state building by legitimizing the state’s authority and making services more effective. From 
this perspective, a legitimate and effective state is a form of peacebuilding that offers 
alternatives to non-governmental organizations such as militant or secession groups. However, 
Turkish officials are quick to emphasize that their support must be seen as apolitical in nature, 
stating “We can only offer them certain technical expertise without any strict recipe. It is after 
all the requirements of the host country to determine how they will proceed.” (Interview with a 
Turkish Diplomat, August 2015). 
Technical assistance and capacity building programs are also a characteristic of Turkey’s social 
peacebuilding, given their broad definition and aims. Most of capacity-building programs 
include training and technical assistance to support economic empowerment and appear to be 
focused at the local level through municipalities and communities. Technical equipment 
                                                        
14 Gür et al, 2016.  
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assistance has been provided, for example, to the Governorship of Sar-e Pol in Afghanistan for 
vocational training programs for women, and the Agricultural Development Project in East 
Bosnia was established to support the return of families from the 1992-1995 war (TIKA, 2014). 
These are just some of the local projects aimed at economically empowering communities. 
Technical assistance is also a part of other social peacebuilding activities in the education field, 
such as providing technical equipment for high schools and universities.  
Education initiatives have been one of the more widely known areas associated with Turkey’s 
peacebuilding activities. This is due in part to the publicity around its extensive scholarship 
programs in Somalia. State scholarships have been provided by, among others, Diyanet (the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs) and the Education Ministry to students from Central Asia, Africa, 
the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Türkiye Bursları, n.a). Most education programs in the 
past had been run by third sector organizations such as Hizmet or Gülen-linked schools. In 
many countries programs associated with this group have since been closed. The Turkish state 
tends to run smaller education-orientated programs, such as providing school materials and 
equipment, funding and renovating buildings, and promoting Turkish language and cultural 
courses. Education initiatives such as these are not only a method of expanding Turkish soft 
power, but are also felt to contribute to social peacemaking through intercultural dialogue. Both 
officials and third state actors believe that education is a key peacebuilding tool that can counter 
the narrative of extremism and provide opportunities for the future. 
Finally, Turkey’s social peacebuilding activities are also characterized by an emphasis on 
mediation and religiously sensitive programs. Officials have stated the importance of 
mediation, not only at an inter-state level but also at the local level, through everyday activities 
and engagement with locals. This may range from consulting with communities to discussions 
with political authorities on bilateral projects. Turkish officials feel that mediation and 
consultation are mechanisms that support their own espoused principles of national ownership. 
These principles can perhaps also be seen to guide the concept of cultural and religiously 
sensitive programs. These range from sponsoring intercultural activities such as visits to Turkey 
or football tournaments to providing Qurans or circumcision ceremonies for boys for example, 
in countries such as Afghanistan and Niger.15 The building of mosques or events during Islamic 
festivals such as book fairs or iftar have been staged from Afghanistan to Mogadishu and 
Pakistan. Given the scope of these programs globally, religious sensitivity is clearly a central 
                                                        
15 Ibid.  
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aspect of Turkey's activities. Such programs are not only pragmatic but they also add legitimacy 
to Turkish activities in the eyes of locals. In Afghanistan, reports noted that Turkish projects 
were more acceptable to communities than others because of their perceived sensitivity to local 
Afghan culture.16 
 
5.3. Impact  
Over the last decade, Turkey’s approach to peacebuilding has transformed from the strategic 
state-centric security engagement of the 1990s to a more multifaceted conceptualization that 
encompasses both state building and social peacemaking. This has been facilitated by a change 
in civil-military power dynamics since 2000 and a broader understanding of security that 
considers the issue of human needs. Peacebuilding activities in recent years range from 
technical assistance for state services to education and religious programs. This has been 
developed in parallel with new foreign policy activities that emphasize both mediation and 
enhanced economic ties as potential peacebuilding strategies that are of mutual benefit to both 
Turkey and recipient states.  
In spite of Turkey’s good intentions to promote peace and stability in its region and the rest of 
the world, Ankara’s capacity to execute this vision has some shortcomings. An estimated 2.9 
million Syrian refugees, the resurgence of war with the PKK, IS’ penetration deep into the 
country’s urban centers, the continuing political volatility in the aftermath of the July 15 coup 
attempt and a receding economy constitute serious obstacles to the sustainability of Turkey’s 
peacebuilding operations. In addition, for the last several years Turkey’s ambitious foreign 
policy goals and determination to project its soft power have alienated various supporters. 
Counting on African support to win another term on the UN Security Council in 2016, Turkey 
only received the votes of 60 countries out of 193.17   
Turkey’s struggle against the Gülen network over the last few years, which is accused of 
orchestrating the July 15 coup attempt in addition to undermining the government of the AKP, 
has also affected the country’s relations with developing countries. Ironically, Gülenist charity 
organizations had been among the most visible NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance to 
sub-Saharan Africa. Viewed in light of Turkey’s false predictions about the longevity of the 
Assad regime in Syria, Ankara’s recognition of the depth of the crises that it is trying to help 
                                                        
16 Murphy and Sazak, 2012. 
17 Sassounian, “Why the UN Rejected Turkey’s Bid for a Security Council Seat,” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/why-the-un-rejected-turke_b_6036878.html 
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resolve both domestically and internationally, and its influence over the respective parties is 
challenging. In other words, the rhetoric-capacity mismatch in Turkish foreign policy risks 
moving Turkey farther away from “zero problems with neighbors” towards the dangerous 
territory of “zero neighbors without problems.”18 
A number of basic organizational challenges have also hindered the Turkish state from realizing 
its potential to increase the quality and range of its peacebuilding initiatives. The most persistent 
of these impediments is coordination problems. First identified in a 2012 report a lack of 
effective interagency cooperation has been the most visible problem in Turkish peacebuilding 
activities. The most vital ministries and government agencies that are involved in peacebuilding 
operations, such as the Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry, Development Ministry, and TIKA, 
were not informed about each other’s activities both at the higher echelons of decision making 
or in the field. Recent research indicates that very little progress has been made in this area in 
recent years at both the state and third sector levels.19 One representative of an international 
organization based in Ankara volunteered that most TIKA bureaucrats in charge of coordination 
are not even familiar with the basic UN procedures and terms (Interview with UNDP-TIKA 
coordinator, August 2015). The lack of institutional training and knowledge of procedures 
within organizations like TIKA also complicates communication and coordination between the 
field offices and Ankara. In such situations, the quality and effectiveness of the country 
programs often depends on the individual in the field office: If the person assigned to a country 
office is in fact interested in the mission, TIKA operations in that particular country often 
provide more substantive results for the beneficiaries (Interview with the UNDP-TIKA 
coordinator, August 2015). 
This lack of consistency in coordination and consistent implementation of principles and goals 
also affects the development and monitoring of programs. There is a disparity between the 
prestige and rhetoric around Turkey’s engagement and the actual effectiveness of the activities 
implemented. While TIKA publicly provides data on the number of participants or equipment 
involved in technical assistance programs, greater analysis on how these programs are 
determined or their impact is not made available. There have been reports in the past of 
peacebuilding programs such as infrastructure projects or trainings being implemented without 
consultation with local authorities or research on other aid groups working in the area. These 
problems appeared to have occurred in countries that TIKA had become newly active in, such 
                                                        
18 Ibid.  
19 Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, and Woods, 2015. 
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as Somalia, Senegal, or Uganda (Interview with UNDP-TIKA coordinator, August 2015). This 
also indicates an important vacuum in the pre-deployment analyses and monitoring activities 
for state operations in the field. Such patterns can, however, exacerbate overcrowding, 
duplication, and waste. 
These internal capacity issues that the Turkey has grappled with have undoubtedly been 
exacerbated by the post-coup purges that have ravage state institutions, agencies and civil 
society organizations. In addition to these problems is the equally detrimental challenge of 
financing international operations. The influx of Syrian refugees, for instance, has cost the state 
an estimated $12 billion and led to nearly $2 billion worth of resources being rechanneled from 
foreign operations. This has diverted significant Turkish resources from high profile activities 
in fragile countries such as Somalia.20 In addition, the volatility of the Turkish lira against hard 
currencies, as well as ongoing political uncertainty, has taken a toll on the economic stability 
that is necessary to sustain the funds for Turkey’s peacebuilding initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
                                                        
20 Achilles, Sazak, Wheeler, and Woods, 2015. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SOMALIA CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
In much of the 2000s, Turkey successfully transformed its political economy through internal 
achievements in security, good governance, and economic development. The Justice and 
Development Party government initiated several reforms that sustained economic and political 
stability in Turkey in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This led to Turkey’s utilization  
of parts of its internal revenue and civilian capacity towards reconstruction of conflict-affected 
states. Although the political, economic, and security conditions in Turkey have changed today, 
Turkey continues to maintain its involvement in humanitarian causes and struggles to stay afloat 
as an island of stability in a turbulent Middle East characterized by failed states, Islamist 
resurgence, and sectarian wars. In that regard, Turkey has greatly increased its international 
engagement in development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding.. Since 2011, 
Turkey has elevated its level of engagement with Somalia and has committed robust 
humanitarian assistance, development aid, and civilian capacity to resuscitate the fragile state. 
 
This case study seeks to shed light on Turkey’s peacebuilding and development work in 
Somalia. Since the outbreak of civil war in 1991, several countries and international 
organizations have committed resources and capacities to resolve the conflict and to end the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. However, few have taken Somalia’s stabilization as high 
priority as Turkey. Launched during then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s historic visit 
in 2011, Turkey’s humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia has been considered as 
one of its most high profile peacebuilding endeavors. Since this visit, the volume of Turkey’s 
official aid to Somalia has reached nearly $400 million, which singles out Turkey’s engagement 
in Somalia as its largest humanitarian campaign abroad.1 As the fourth largest recipient of 
                                                        
1 “Turkey and Somalia: A Synopsis of Technical and Humanitarian Cooperation 2011-2015,” Directorate-
General for Africa, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, February 2016, 3.  This 
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overall Turkish aid in 2014, and the second biggest beneficiary of Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency (TİKA) projects in 2015,2 Somalia offers several insights into Turkey’s 
humanitarian engagement with conflict-affected countries. It demonstrates how Turkey’s 
practices differ from those of other “rising powers” and “traditional donors,” such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. More important, 
Turkey’s engagement with Somalia illustrates how Turkey utilizes its humanitarian and 
development-based approach to facilitate and sustain peace on the ground. In that regard, the 
analysis is divided into four sections to better illustrate the breadth and depth of Turkey’s unique 
contributions to Somalia’s peace and stability. The first section provides a comprehensive 
overview of the current political, security, and economic landscapes in Somalia. The second 
segment deals with key tenets of Turkish foreign policy principles that serves as the driver of 
its Somalia policies. The third section discusses in detail Turkish peacebuilding activities in 
Somalia, while the next section offers some contrasts with other actors—both traditional and 
new—that also are currently involved in  stabilization and development in Somalia. The 
conclusion draws on these contrasts and advances several policy recommendations to forge a 
more effective peacebuilding initiative in Somalia.  
 
6.1. Somalia Context  
Three years into its term and the Federal Government of Somalia is still struggling to achieve 
many of the benchmarks it set for itself when it came to power in 2012. Amid continued 
insecurity and political wrangling that has seen three Prime Ministers in three years; the 2016 
election format of “one person, one vote” has been scrapped.3 Much of the lack of progress 
stems from the fragile nature of the state—as one recovering from a long civil war. On top of 
that, Al-Shabaab continues to launch attacks on the government and AMISOM (African Union 
Mission in Somalia) upon which the government is dependent on for its existence. Adding to 
the government challenges is the high number of IDP families in the country. There are an 
                                                        
value has also been confirmed by Dr. Kani Torun, former Turkish Ambassador to Mogadishu at the conference 
entitled “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Preventing Conflict and Sustaining 
Peace,” Istanbul Policy Center, May 23, 2016.  
2  Füsun Gür, Gökhan Umut et al., eds., “Türkiye’den Dünya’ya Kalkınma Yardımları 2014 Raporu” (Turkey’s 
Development Aid to the World – The 2014 Report) Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (TİKA) 
April 2016, 66. The report notes that Turkey’s official bilateral development assistance to Somalia has dropped 
35.72 percent—from nearly $115 million to $74 million—since 2013. See also, “2015 İdari Faaliyet Raporu” 
(The 2015 Administrative Activity Report) Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (TİKA) April 
2016, 32.  
3 Kaplan, M. (2015, July 30). “United Nations in Somalia: Failure to Hold 2016 General Elections 'Unacceptable'”, 
International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/united-nations-somalia-failure-hold-
2016-general-elections-unacceptable-2031818. 
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estimated 369,000 IDPs in and around Mogadishu alone.4  Most are headed by women. In 
addition to this there are third-generation Somalis in refugee camps in Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Kenya who are slowly returning to regions of the country and pose a unique 
security risk as a vulnerable group. There is also continued animosity among the different clans 
and regional administrations such as Puntland and Jubaland, who simply do not trust the 
fledging federal state. This is a point put succinctly by the Finish Minister for International 
Development Pekka Haavisto: “When fragile states lack legitimacy and the trust of their own 
people, rapid state-building efforts can actually work against rather than for peace building, 
inspiring resistance from those who fear how state authorities will wield their new power.”5 
 
The trigger for many of these issues was the collapse of the Somali state infrastructure in 1991. 
The overthrow of the Siad Barre government instigated over two decades of conflict that the 
country has yet to recover from. In the absence of an effective government, warlords and armed 
groups loosely affiliated to clans have vied with each other for power and dominance 
throughout the country. The current structure of the Federal Government is still based on the 
exclusionary 4.5 formula.6 The two main sources of conflict are the clan structure of Somali 
society and competition over resources and their distribution; particularly over the role of the 
state in this process. Clans are a source of patronage, security and justice for most Somalis—a 
status that has only been heightened in the stateless paralysis of the country. On one side, there 
is a culture of blood-revenge or alternatively blood compensation (Diya) in the clan system that 
can further heighten conflict.7 On the other hand, the clan system is also the source of traditional 
Somali conflict-resolution methods such as the Shir Beeleed (clan assembly), led by the clan 
Elders or Guurti. 8 The Shir Beeleed is a slow and time-consuming negotiation and dialogue 
technique that can last for weeks or even months. It is through this method that the 
administration of Somaliland came into existence.9 The paradoxical nature of clans as 
                                                        
4 Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre “Somalia IDP Figures Analysis” (2014, December). Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center. Retrieved from http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-
africa/somalia/figures-analysis  
5 Menkhaus, K. (2014).If Mayors Ruled Somalia: Beyond the State-building Impass. Nordic Africa Policy 
Institute, Policy Note 2. Retrieved from http://www.nai.uu.se/news/articles/2014/04/29/154351/index.xml 
6 The 4.5 formula equally distributes seats among the four major Somali clans, with all minority clans together 
receiving only .5 percent representation.  
7 Leonard, D.K., & Samantar, M.S. (2011). What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract 
and the State?  Development  and Change, 42(2), 559-584. DOI: 10.1111/j.14677660.2011.01702.x. 
8 Hansen, S.J. (2003). Warlords and Peace Strategies: The Case of Somalia. The Journal of Conflict Studies. 23:2. 
9 Balthasar, D. (2013) Somaliland's best kept secret: shrewd politics and war projects as means of state-making, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:2, 218-238, 
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mechanisms for conflict or peace is embodied in the role of women. Women hold a unique 
position in the traditional system; belonging to both their father and husband's clan. This has 
allowed them to act as a go-between with clans. They, therefore, have had the power not just to 
fuel peace but also violence.10  
 
This delicate balance between peace and conflict in the clan system has been further 
exacerbated by international interventions and meddling by neighboring countries, due to 
security concerns. Since the mid-1990s, Somalia has been the site of proxy wars among 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti; all of whom have, at times, allied with various Somali 
clans, regional administrations or political groupings in order to destabilize a rival or gain 
access to a resource. Ethiopia and Kenya continue to align with regional administrations in 
Somalia to support a federal system with a weak central Somali state. The decision to add 
Ethiopian and Kenyan soldiers to AMISOM alongside Ugandan and Burundian troops has been 
considered an unfortunate move given the hostility and suspicion most Somalis feel towards 
both countries.11  
 
The early 1990s also witnessed a succession of failed UN peacekeeping missions and other 
multilateral interventions whose ripple effect was felt well into the late 2000s. The heydays of 
these short-lived interventions fell within the 1992-1995 period. United Nations Mission in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) was UN’s entry point to Somalia in 1992 with 3000 peacekeepers.12  
Although the deployed peacekeepers’ mandate was strictly to aid delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, the number was not adequate.13 In less than a year, 30,000 U.S. troops and 
peacekeepers from other nations were deployed under UN Operation Restore Hope. Restore 
Hope featured many “firsts.” It was the first UN mandated NATO mission in Africa (also 
known as UNITAF, where a Turkish contingency also served in 1993-94), and “for the first 
time in its history, the Security Council approved unilateral UN intervention with the use of 
offensive military force in a sovereign nation.”14  Amid immense challenges caused by 
                                                        
10 Ingiriis, M. H., & Hoehme, M. V. (2013). The impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles of Somali 
women: a blessing in disguise. Journal of Eastern African Studies. 7:2. 314-333. 
DOI:10.1080/17531055.2013.776281  
11 Geeska Africa Online (2015, October 7). “Uganda: AMISOM Peacekeeper’s Position to Prolong AU mission 
to Earn Money”, Geeska Africa Online. Retrieved from http://www.geeskaafrika.com/uganda-amisom-
peacekeepers-position-to-prolong-au-mission-to-earn-money/10086/#sthash.CMys14dp.dpuf 
12 Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State (London: Zed Books, 2012), 
Kindle edition, location 1072 of 3914.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
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complexities on the ground, the mission (by this time it was called UNOSOM II) continued to 
expand in personnel and costs, while the conflict in Somalia had grown more violent and dire.15 
The killing of twenty Pakistani peacekeepers by the faction leader Mohamed Farah Aideed’s 
forces June 1993 and the Black Hawk Down incident, which killed hundreds of Somalis and 
eighteen US troops, four months later deteriorated what little hope there was left. 1994 saw the 
withdrawal of the U.S. troops. The remaining UN peacekeepers followed the suit and left in 
1995. A decade would pass before the next generation of peacekeeper arrived with the 
deployment of AMISOM peacekeepers in 2007.  
 
Beneath the epic collapses in the early history of peace operations in Somalia lie the lack of 
understanding of Somalia’s complexities by foreign actors and international organizations at 
the time and turning themselves—albeit inadvertently—into a party to the conflict. On the 
peacekeeping side of things, “some Somali factions started to perceive the armed foreign 
peacekeepers as if they were members of a rival clan, which could only be dealt with violently, 
especially when they behaved in what appeared to be a provocative way.”16 The killing of the  
Pakistani peacekeepers, the ensuing disproportionate response retaliating on a particular 
warring faction, and the shooting down of U.S. helicopters and killing American soldiers are 
illustrative of the mistakes that occur from misplaced and fragmented cognition of local 
dynamics.  
 
Similar errors were committed in humanitarian and political spheres of UNOSOM missions. 
With UN’s arrival on the scene, not only  political and military approaches began to overshadow 
humanitarian work, but a conscious effort was made to gather all three under the UNOSOM 
mandate.17 “Initially conceived of as a primarily humanitarian intervention to mitigate the 
effects of state collapse and famine, the UN missions of the 1990s were transformed from a 
humanitarian enterprise with a short-term clear-cut mandate (1992-93 under UNOSOM I and 
UNITAF) to longer-term projects of  political reconciliation (1993-95 under UNOSOM II), 
increasingly emphasizing peace-making (political) priorities and de-emphasizing humanitarian 
ones.”18 Not only these political pursuits made humanitarian NGOs under UNOSOM II 
                                                        
15 Laura Hammond and Hannah Vaughan-Lee, “Humanitarian Space in Somalia: A Scarce Commodity,” 
London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012.  
 
16 Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong (Kindle edition), location 1086 of 3914.  
17 Hammond and Vaughan Lee, 2.  
18 Ibid., 9.  
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mandate a party to the conflict, the collapse of the Somali state saw the emergence of the 
political economy of aid in a tremendously complex conflict setting. After that moment on, 
humanitarian NGOs were not only associated with armed peacekeepers, but with various 
warring factions due to the funding, political advice, and supplies provided to factional leaders 
as part of UNOSOM policy. In an environment defined by thinning funding and withering 
resources, UNOSOM handsomely paid armed guards and authorities for protection, while also 
making available humanitarian supplies to friendly factions that would later sell them in black 
markets and tarnish the reputation of humanitarian agencies as well as locals’ trust for iNGOs 
operating in the field with respectable track record long before UNOSOM missions.19 
 
6.2. Turkish Foreign Policy Priorities: Explaining Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia 
Humanitarian diplomacy is one of the guiding principles of Turkish foreign policy that alludes 
to Turkey’s engagement with other states on the bases of cooperation, aid, development and 
restoring human dignity and integrity. The principles reinforce Turkey’s reputation as a 
“humanitarian state,” which is a strategically crafted concept that demarcates state building and 
nation building, and it reveres the former over the latter. The promotion of state building in 
Turkish foreign policy vernacular indeed accents a discursive debate that transcends beyond 
any national or cultural confines.  
 
Turkey chooses state building over nation building. This is a natural extension of an essential 
Turkish foreign policy principle that dismisses a “values-free realpolitik agenda, solely focused 
on advancing its economic and security interests.”20 Ethics, civil rights, upholding human 
dignity and integrity, on the other hand, are central tenets of Turkish foreign policy. Building 
on these values, the humanitarian state approach is free from ideological impositions of nation 
building; it prioritizes good governance and best practice-driven development and humanitarian 
assistance without any conditions based on race, gender, ethnicity, or religious orientation. The 
humanitarian state, all in all, encompasses any official and private relief initiative that enables 
resources and best practices—free of conditions or earmarks—for the reconstruction of 
institutions and infrastructure that are critical for people in conflict sensitive areas to live in 
dignity, prosperity, and peace.  
 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 6-8.  
20 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems in a New Era,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2013, accessed February 27, 2014 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/zero_problems_in_a_new_era_turkey 
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Interviews with Turkish aid officials, NGO representatives, and beneficiaries on the ground 
have revealed unconditionality, bilateralism, non-securitization of aid and personnel as the 
distinguishing traits of Turkish humanitarian assistance.21 Especially the principle of not 
holding humanitarian assistance hostage to short-term political interests and tactical security 
goals is unequivocally shared by a diverse of group of high level bureaucrats and senior 
representatives of Turkish NGOs.22  
 
6.2.1.Unconditionality 
The distinguishing attributes of humanitarian assistance are the principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence. By definition, humanitarian assistance thus has to 
be free of conditions and not driven by accomplishing any military goals. The first and most 
important of all is that “humanitarian aid ‘does no harm’ and is sensitive to conflict.”23 Second, 
it cannot be a means to achieve a military objective or a political goal.24 In other words, 
humanitarian aid should not be provided on the condition of cooperation with military forces 
or supplying information for counterinsurgency operations. Any aid given on the basis of 
recipients’ political and military cooperation dismantles the founding principle of “do no harm.” 
Third, the aid must be comprehensive; it should not be confiscated by a political aid; and the 
donors must ensure that it benefits all walks of a society, especially the lowest common 
denominator. Fourth, community support and ownership of the relief program must be ensured. 
Turkey’s and many other emerging donors’ experiences demonstrate that from health services 
to school constructions, the projects that communities support and own are more cost-effective 
and stand a better chance to endure.25 Last, the aid must be free of ideology.  
 
                                                        
21 Senior representatives of the following state agencies and nongovernmental organizations have been interviewed 
periodically from 2012 to date: Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkish Development Ministry, Turkish Justice 
Ministry, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms 
and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), Doctors Worldwide: Turkey, Dost Eli Foundation, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 
Cansuyu Foundation, Yardımeli Foundation, Deniz Feneri, Gülistan Foundation. The data collected through the 
interviews supplemented and synthesized in Teri Murphy and Onur Sazak, Turkey’s Civilian Capacity in Post-
Conflict Reconstruction (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2012); Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, 
and Auveen Elizabeth Woods, Turkish aid agencies in Somalia: Risks and opportunities for building peace 
(London: SaferWorld, Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University, March 2015. The interviews were 
conducted off-the-record.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Oxfam International, “Whose Aid Is It Anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, 
No. 145:2, February 2011, accessed June 14, 2014, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-
whose-aid-anyway-100211-en_0.pdf 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
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Turkey’s humanitarian assistance and development support for fragile states, on the other hand, 
come without conditions. As often reiterated by Turkish Foreign Ministry, and intermediary 
organizations, Turkey does not discriminate race, religion, language and gender, nor does it 
place political or economic conditions on its resources to alleviate the suffering of victims of a 
catastrophe and restore human dignity.26 Furthermore, with its focus trained on higher goals 
with more benevolent ends such as “good governance”, administrative reform, and capacity 
building in recipient countries, Turkey does not attach political conditions to its assistance 
programs.”27  
 
6.2.2. Securitization of aid and personnel 
The traditional donors, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, have often come 
under criticism for violating the “do no harm” clause by associating aid with their greater 
military and political objectives in the conflict-affected countries. This is also a derivative of a 
foreign policy infested with realpolitik. In fact, since the European reconstruction at the end of 
World War II, both ODA and humanitarian assistance have been the preferred instruments of 
great powers in advancing their broader hegemonic aspirations. In the dawn of the “war on 
terrorism,” showcased by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, “winning the hearts and minds” 
have been the popular mantra of the twenty-first century relief programs that hide subtle, yet 
prominent, political, economic and military intentions.28  
 
Moreover, the twenty-first century has seen a new trend in securitization with the worsening 
safety conditions for civilian experts and aid workers in conflict zones. Commonly referred to 
as the “securitization of personnel,” or “compounding of aid,”29 due to increased attacks on 
civilian representatives of international humanitarian agencies and relief organizations, the 
members of this community are confined to heavily fortified living and working quarters in 
conflict zones. In fact, from the moment they receive their new postings, they go through almost 
a ritualistic security training and are immersed in security protocols that cut them off from the 
                                                        
26 “Humanitarian Assistance by Turkey,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed September 17, 2015, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa.  
27 Senem Aydın Düzgit and E. Fuat Keyman, “Democracy Support in Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2014, accessed on September 17, 2015 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/25/democracy-support-in-turkey-s-foreign-policy. 
28 Oxfam, “Whose Aid Is It Anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, No. 145:2, 
February 2011, accessed June 14, 2014, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-whose-aid-
anyway-100211-en_0.pdf 
29 Mark Duffield, “Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life in Post-Interventionary 
Society,” The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4:4 (December 2010): 453-474.
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communities that they are supposed to reach out.30 In turn, these practices and heavily guarded 
compounds render aid agents of traditional actors immobile and alien to the needs of 
beneficiaries on the ground.31  In Somalia, the bunkered mentality is observed in the extreme.  
For many years, international diplomats and other personnel that worked on Somalia were 
based in Nairobi and just flew into the Mogadishu airport for a few hours, never left the 
compound, and departed on the same day of completing their businesses.  
 
By contrast, both Turkish government provided personnel and NGO representatives are on the 
ground, outside the walled compound, listening and responding to the needs of the victims.32 
Both on the government side and in NGO operations, Turkey utilizes a “direct aid” approach, 
which stands for the practice of Turkish aid agencies, “manned by Turkish staff, who directly 
oversee the management of aid distribution on the ground, from its arrival…to its delivery to 
final beneficiaries.”33 This approach has a number of advantages over the bunkered and 
compounded practices of the traditional donors.  One visible impact of the “direct aid” practice 
is that it reduces the cost of aid delivery by eliminating middle men. The middle men, or 
brokers, are heavily used by traditional donor agencies and country missions, which are 
reluctant to allow their agents wander outside the security archipelago amid hostile security 
conditions.34 Turkish relief workers, on the other hand, take that security risk, penetrate into 
inaccessible areas, and through their good relations with local partners, they deliver their aid 
directly to the beneficiaries.35 
 
6.2.3. Bilateralism  
Although in the Somali case Turkey subscribes to a more multilateral approach—by signing up 
with platforms like the New Deal for Somalia and supporting regional peacekeeping actors such 
as AMISOM, bilateralism is still the defining attribute of Turkey’s engagement with and 
response to recipient countries. Since 2013, Turkish peace operations in Somalia adopted a 
visible military presence. Turkey’s pledge of financial and military training assistance to the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) heralded that Turkey’s activities in Somalia 
                                                        
30 Ibid., 455-457. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview with a senior executive from the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) on August 26, 2015. 
33 Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, and Auveen Woods, “Turkey and Somalia: Making Aid Work for Peace,” 
SaferWorld Briefing, March 2015, 10.  
34 Duffield, 457-458. 
35 Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, and Auveen Woods, 10.  
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would no longer be limited to humanitarian and development assistance. Turkey at the time had 
committed 1 million USD financial support for AMISOM and undertook the training of a 
modest number Somali troops and policemen in Turkey.36 Furthermore, Turkish Armed Forces 
recently announced that it was building a training facility for the Somali Forces in Mogadishu.37  
Reportedly, to be run by the Turkish Armed Forces personnel, the academy is expected to train 
1500 Somali troops and to host 200 Turkish officers a year.38 The academy is envisaged as a 
center for excellence for training missions encompassing the entire continent.39  
 
TİKA reports that in 2014 Turkey’s official development assistance reached $3.591 billion. Of 
this total, bilateral ODA accounted for $3.502 billion, whereas contributions through 
multilateral platforms were at mere $88.73 million.40 The bilateral engagement with the 
recipient countries has a number of indispensable advantages. A vital offshoot of bilateral 
engagement, for instance, is the opportunity it provides the donor to get to know the actors on 
the ground well. This knowledge is essential for symmetric distribution of the aid to all of the 
actors, rather than leaving it to the discretion of a political elite in a society.  
 
However, the bilateral engagement model also brings out a number of serious coordination 
problems, especially in the areas of personnel deployment (level of expertise and personnel 
insurance packages), absence of a reliable monitoring and evaluation model and language 
constraints.  Encountered with the limitation from the absence of reliable monitoring and 
evaluation model, Turkey has taken a new initiative to build a foreign aid strategy. The Foreign 
Aid Law is also in the process of creation. Turkey, nonetheless, remains acutely aware of the 
international analysis of global dynamics but prefers bilateral development assistance 
arrangements. Roughly 90 percent of [all Turkish] aid efforts [globally or in Smalia?] are 
coordinated directly between Turkey/TIKA and the donor recipient country. The main reason 
why Turkey prefers bilateral arrangements is the effectiveness of this model in expediting the 
process and delivering tangible results, according to the Turkish officials who have frequently 
commented on this issue.  
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6.3. Turkey’s Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia  
Much has been made of Turkey’s high profile intervention into the devastating 2011 famine 
that stalked south-central Somalia. Perceptions regarding this singular event often belie the 
historical relations between the two countries and the growing interest of Turkish authorities in 
Somalia in the preceding years.  
 
The countries’ historical links stretch into the past of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century 
where Turkey controlled the strategic port of Saylac and parts of northwestern Somalia.41 
During World War One, the Ottomans armed Somalis in their rebellion against the British.42 
Despite a cessation in Somali-Turkish for much of the Cold War, Somalia was nonetheless one 
of the few locations in Africa where a Turkish embassy was opened during this period, in 1979. 
The embassy remained active until its closure in 1991 at the beginning of the country’s civil 
war. It was reopened on 1 November 2011. With the exception of the General Çevik Bir as 
force commander for UNOSOM II in 1993,43 the Turkish state had no relationship with Somali 
authorities until the visit of President Sheikh Sharif of the Transitional Federal Government in 
2009, which began to pique the interest of Turkish authorities that eventually led to Turkey’s 
intervention in 2011.  
 
Since 2011 the Turkish state has been engaged primarily in Mogadishu. This remains the case 
as officials interviewed for this study point out that it is the area with greatest need that is 
accessible to personnel.44 Over these four years Turkey has, however, expanded its political 
engagement to include Kismayo, Puntland, Galkayo and Somaliland, with confirmed 
development programs already active in the latter two.45 There is no general framework or 
policy document publicly available that guides such activities or outlines annual goals of 
Turkey’s work in Somalia. Rather than having their own specific priorities, officials state that 
they try to develop projects in consultation with Somalis while conscious of their own available 
capacity and strengths.46 
                                                        
41 Mukhtar, M. H. (2003). Historical dictionary of Somalia. African Historical Dictionary Series, 
No. 87. The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford, 2003, p. 268 
42 Fergusson, J (2013), The World’s Most Dangerous Place, Da Capo Press; Boston, 2013, P. 69 
43 Mukhtar, (2003), P. xlii 
44 Telephone interview, Turkish Red Crescent, Ankara, 26 August 2015.  
45 TIKA, (N/A). “Somali: Proje ve Faaliyetler 2011-2015”. Retrieved from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2015/Prestij%20Eserler/somali.pdf  
46 Interview, Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 25 August 2015. 
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While each project may not be conceptualized in terms of a grander peacebuilding goal or 
“reconstruction” as Turkish officials term it,47 Turkey’s approach to Somalia, particularly south 
central falls into two categories: state building and social peacemaking. According to the 
Turkish Ambassador to Mogadishu Olgan Bekar, providing humanitarian assistance, 
development aid, and state building advice simultaneously is key to lasting peace and stability 
in Somalia: “Peacebuilding and state building in Somalia require a comprehensive approach. 
This comprehensive approach also requires humanitarian approach humanitarian aid, political 
engagement, security and development assistance… Purely humanitarian approach to 
protracted conflict areas and conflict-affected countries offers only a short-term solution. 
Assisting affected countries simultaneously and in tandem with long term development tools 
increases the resilience and capacity of the beneficiaries. This in the long term reduces the 
vulnerability and increases the capacity of the recipient local actors to respond to humanitarian 
crisis themselves.”48 
 
Dr. Kani Torun, Ambassador Bekar’s predecessor in Mogadishu and a mediator between the 
Federal Government and Somaliland, also underlines the indispensability of state building for 
an enduring peace and sustainable development in Somalia: “State building is very important, 
because I have seen the kind of destruction that can happen to a society without a functional 
state as a result of a civil war…[Therefore] state building was our priority; we worked with the 
state particularly to improve the way in which the state operated… ne area we worked with the 
government closely was the security area. Turkey worked with the police and army to build 
strong security forces to provide security. Security investment and other things will come. Even 
aid is related to security.”49 
 
This holistic approach necessitates a wide range of projects from reconstructing infrastructure 
such as buildings, institutional capacity and the social services they provide in communities to 
direct engagement on social relations through education initiatives, cultural events and a 
physical presence on the ground with people. Ambassador Bekar illustrates the virtue of this 
approach with the Digfer hospital example in Mogadishu: “We demolished the old Digfer 
                                                        
47 Interview, Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 25 August 2015. 
48 Ambassador Olgan Bekar’s remarks at the conference entitled “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Innovative 
Approaches to Preventing Conflict and Sustaining Peace,” Istanbul Policy Center,  Istanbul, May 23, 2016.  
49 Ambassador Kani Torun’s remarks at the conference entitles “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Innovative 
Approaches to Preventing Conflict and Sustaining Peace,” Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, May 23, 2016.  
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hospital and built a new Mogadishu research and training hospital. This was a big improvement 
with 220 beds. Then we equipped it and sent doctors and nurses and other personnel to run the 
hospital. But we did not run it on our own; we developed a good partnership with the Somali 
side and established a joint management with the Somali management staff. Today we provide 
internships and trainings for young Somali doctors.”50 
 
At the international level, Turkey takes part in a number of multilateral initiatives on 
peacebuilding issues in Somalia. In particular Turkey is co-chair of the Somalia New Deal 
Compact and will host the next meeting of its High-Level Partnership Forum in 2016. Signed 
in March 2013, the New Deal is meant as a guide for external actors in engaging in Somalia 
and a three-year statebuilding and peacebuilding roadmap (2014-2016) that focuses on 
developing Somali political, legal, economic and security capacity through local ownership and 
leadership. 
 
At an inter-state level, there are a range of Turkish ministries, state and semi-state agencies 
working in Somalia. They include the Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (TIKA), the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the Presidency for Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay),51 the Ministries 
of Health, Education, Foreign Affairs and Defense, and the Turkish Armed Forces. Each of 
these ministries and state agencies is capable of enacting their own bilateral projects. In addition 
to these actors, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister 
have been involved in mediation attempts between the Somaliland government and the Federal 
Government in Mogadishu.52  
 
These mediation attempts are overseen by former Ambassador Dr. Kani Torun. Dr. Torun 
initiated the talks between the Federal Government and Somaliland. He has personally gone to 
                                                        
50 Ambassador Olgan Bekar’s remarks at the conference entitled “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Innovative 
Approaches to Preventing Conflict and Sustaining Peace,” Istanbul Policy Center,  Istanbul, May 23, 2016.  
 
51 Although it tries to act more independently from the politics of the state, the Turkish Red Crescent holds the 
ambiguous position of offering assistance to the public but of being neither a full NGO nor state agency. Due 
to the legal foundations of the organization in which it received state money when it was established, it is 
included in Turkey's ODA.  
52 Garowe Online (2015, March 02). “Somalia: Turkey-brokered talks break down”, Garowe Online. Retrieved 
from http://www.garoweonline.com/page/show/post/1900/somalia-turkeybrokered-talks-break-
down,%20http://www.raxanreeb.com/2015/05/somalia-somaliland-calls-for-resumption-of-talks-with-
somalia-government/www.un.org/press/en/2015/sg2218.doc.htm 
 106 
Hargesia and talked to Somaliland officials. He made considerable leeway in terms of getting 
the Federal Government and Somaliland representatives to talk to each other. When he explains 
the factors in his accomplishments, Dr. Torun values the importance of going off the script: 
“When I talked to them, I did not talk the way career diplomats talk…by the book, if you will. 
I instead talked as if I were one of them. When they saw my sincerity as well as my open and 
frank engagement in discussion, they had trust and initiated the talks with the federal 
government. I have met them four times.”53 
 
Alongside this consistent political intra-state engagement, Turkey’s programs and approach to 
Somalia has evolved. Most of the Turkish state aid until 2013 can be classified as humanitarian 
assistance. This was largely in the form of emergency food, medical services and supplies to 
IDP camps in and around Mogadishu area. Since 2013, Turkish state engagement in Somalia 
has focused on capacity building and technical assistance programs. For example, in 2013 both 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Central Bank began to provide 
technical assistance and training to their Somali counterparts.54 These exchanges were 
accompanied by greater cooperation and training between the Turkish and Somali Armed 
Forces through two agreements signed in 2010 and 2014.55 Such activities are closely 
associated to statebuilding and peacebuilding for Turkish officials who argue that fundamental 
services and institutional capacity need to be strengthened to provide legitimacy to the Federal 
Government, and therefore counter the allure of extremists.56 Many of these state capacity 
programs also have a direct impact on local security and social services.   
 
At a local level, Turkey’s education programs such as scholarships, sponsorship of orphanages, 
religious-cultural initiatives and physical and visible presence of these programs on the ground 
are specifically aimed at changing dynamics and conditions in local Somali society. In 
particular, Turkish officials view education programs as important peacebuilding initiatives that 
can challenge the allure of extremist narratives. Since 2011, Turkish officials estimate that 
                                                        
53 Ambassador Kani Torun’s remarks at the conference entitles “Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Innovative 
Approaches to Preventing Conflict and Sustaining Peace,” Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, May 23, 2016.  
54 Sazak,S., Wheeler, T., & Woods, A. (2015). Turkey and Somalia: Making Aid Work for Peace. Istanbul Policy 
Center/Saferworld.  
55 Today Zaman, (2012, November 09), “Turkey-Somalia military agreement approved”, Today Zaman. 
Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-297699-turkey-somalia-military-agreement-
approved.html     
56 Interview, Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 25 August 2015. 
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nearly 3,000 scholarships have been provided to Somali students from both state and NGOs.57 
The visible presence of Turkish personnel directly delivering aid to communities and 
implementing projects also challenges one of the central conflict drivers in the country; brokers. 
According to one Turkish Red Crescent official: “Our representatives have always delivered 
their supplies to the recipients’ camps on their own without involving any brokers. If the 
security situation is not conducive for us to go to a certain site, we don’t go there, but we also 
do not entrust our supplies to some third entity who we know would not deliver it to the address 
it was supposed to go and would make profit out of it by selling it.”58 
 
Despite ongoing security challenges that have targeted then, Turkish officials and personnel 
remain the most visible foreigners in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu.  
 
2015 marked yet another shift in Turkey’s approach to Somalia. Turkish public-private 
enterprises that characterized the frenzied environment until 2013 have evolved. Improvement 
in domestic security has been accompanied by an increase in private Turkish companies that 
have won contracts in a number of key sectors: Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle International 
Airport is managed by Favori LLC59 and Mogadishu Port by Albayrak.60 The capacity building 
programs of the Turkish state have entered their second stage with a greater emphasis on 
sustainability and local ownership. This involves the transfer of responsibility and 
administration of Turkish programs to their Somali counterparts. An example of this is the 
garbage collection program in Mogadishu that continues to be run by the Turkish Red Crescent. 
The Turkish government is in the process of delivering equipment so that it will eventually be 
run solely by Somalis.61 Similarly, Şifa Hospital in Mogadishu, which is run by the Turkish 
Health Ministry, is now in the second phase of a five-year plan and is being co-administered 
with the Somali Ministry of Health. Today, civil and military training programs are 
administered either on the ground in Somalia or more often in Turkey (Interview MFA), partly 
due to the continued insecurity in the country. 
 
                                                        
57 Ibid.  
58 Telephone interview, Turkish Red Crescent, Ankara, 26 August 2015. 
59 Favori LLC Website. Retrieved from http://www.favorillc.com/. 
60 Diriye, A. A. (2015, July 13). “New management at Albayrak port in Mogadishu creates hope”, The Somali 
Investor. Retrieved from http://somaliainvestor.so/index.php/travel/item/109-new-management-at-albayrak-
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61 Interview, Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 25 August 2015. 
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Somalia is still the largest recipient of Turkish aid in Africa, but this is changing. The focus on 
collaboration and capacity building programs has resulted in a decline in spending and projects 
allocated to Somalia. Turkish officials, however, argue that this does not signal a lessened 
commitment by Turkey.62 They highlight President Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Mogadishu in 
January 2015, as one of his first overseas visit as President of the Republic of Turkey. To them, 
this visit was symbolic in that it depicted the importance of Turkey-Somali relations to 
Erdoğan’s administration and showed a strong commitment to Turkey’s pre-existent 
commitment to Somalia. 
 
6.4. Response and Perceptions of Somalis 
Somali response to these myriad of Turkish activities and actors has been generally positive. In 
comparison to other actors, Turkey’s approach is seen as practical; their projects tangible and 
of good quality, say most Somalis. “They brought orphanages, education. The best hospital was 
built by them. They train and build capacity, service delivery and business.”63 Through such 
projects people feel that Turkey has contributed to the rejuvenation of the war-torn Mogadishu: 
“Look at the airport, for a country that has been out of touch for 25 years to have that kind of 
airport… They are planning to build- have built roads, the Turkish. They brought this town 
back.”64  
 
This sentiment is one shared by many interviewees. The Somali Ambassador to Turkey has 
stated that the “(Turks) ha(ve) returned a sense of normalcy to people, which is necessary.”65 
Turkey’s activities are credited with helping to change the narrative around Somalia as a failed 
state and the image of Mogadishu as a no-go-area. In particular, Turkey’s approach has 
challenged the Nairobi-based model of long-distance aid that many international organizations 
and states use for Somalia. This model has a higher potential for diversion as it relies on middle-
men or brokers to deliver to aid to communities.  
 
From a Somali perspective, Turkey is distinguished from other actors, even African states, by 
its impact on the ground, “The Turkish move around freely with no protection, no guns, nobody 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
63 Interview, Somali Civil Society Activist, Mogadishu, 25 August 2015. 
64 Interview, Official at the Office for Diaspora Affairs, Mogadishu, 23 August 2015.  
65 H.E. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali, “Turkey’s Role in Somalia”, at the Chatham House-Coventry University-IPC 
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else can do that.”66 The visibility of both Turkish projects and personnel on the ground is 
perceived as a success aspect of their approach, “They (the Turkish) are not politically visible, 
they are in the community and that is the most important aspect – a community-centered 
approach.”67 The community-centered projects of Turkey are felt to positively contribute to 
peacebuilding, “They provide basic needs. Terrorists recruit younger people with no hope for 
the future but through providing the basics the Turkish help to mitigate the allure of what the 
terrorists promise.”68 This is supported by the Somali Ambassador to Turkey, who believes that 
Turkey’s maximum value is in scholarships in particular which have provided opportunities for 
Somali youth.  
 
However, despite the expansion of some projects to other parts of the country such as training 
for Somaliland diplomats69 or technical assistance to orphanages in Galkayo, Turkey’s 
engagement in Somalia remains overwhelmingly focused on Mogadishu. With few 
exceptions70 the benefits of these programs have generally only been felt by residents in 
Mogadishu. If the goal of these projects is to support the legitimacy and stability of the Federal 
Government then it is geographically limited. Given the historical perception of Mogadishu as 
the center of patronage and oppression is still potent, Turkey risks being perceived as biased 
towards the capital. The potential negative implications of this have already been felt with 
Somaliland parties implying is biased for support the Federal Government’s goal of a united 
Somalia.71 
 
The Turks were seen through the prism of fellow coreligionist and not still another foreign 
power after its own interest. This is starting to change. A criticism levied by Somalis is that 
Turkish state agencies and business could do more to hire local people “They are all Turkish 
companies not Somali private sector, we have nothing to do with it.”72  If Turkish state agencies 
                                                        
66 Interview, Official at the Office for Diaspora Affairs, Mogadishu, 23 August 2015. 
67 Interview, Somali Civil Society Activist, Mogadishu, 25 August 2015. 
68 Ibid.  
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and companies are importing Turkish workers to work on Turkish projects, it creates an insular 
dynamic that does not benefit local communities or youth. While such an approach may avoid 
some local conflict actors such as gatekeepers, it also deprives communities of economic 
opportunities that could support peacebuilding and undermines the capacity building efforts of 
Turkish state actors.   
 
Somalis also highlight interstate conflict at the international level between Turkey and other 
states. In particular the specter of the Somali state as a source of personal patronage reemerges 
in the minds of Somalis regarding the controversy over Mogadishu Port: “There was no 
transparency in the procurement of the tender for the port which resulted in suspicions of foul 
play by the West; the Turkish were criticized as not being honest.”73 While donor officials stress 
that there is and must be international cooperation on Somalia, this does not allay the perception 
among Somalis that “(t)here is no coordination between the West and the Turkish which creates 
conflict.”74 International rivalry over business and contracts is a legitimate concern for Somalis 
given the history of the country and its susceptibility to regional and global shifts.  
 
Actors engage in activities geared towards building peace for various reasons, some clear and 
others not as clear. For example, Ethiopia is involved in activities in Somalia as a neighboring 
country and regional power with the aim of providing much needed support as an act of 
solidarity with the people of Somalia and in the interests of regional progress. The same 
reasoning could be applied to Kenya and any of Somalia’s other neighboring countries. 
However, some suspect that there is more to such support than immediately meets the eye.75 
 
When asked which states predominantly conduct peacebuilding activities in Somalia, 
interviewees in and outside Somalia inadvertently referred to Turkey, almost always first, then 
the Gulf States, Kenya, Ethiopia and China and Italy to a lesser extent. Interviewees 
distinguished between the activities of states and non-state actors very clearly. In describing the 
activities of organizations such as the World Bank and the European Union, it was stated that 
they are service providers and focus primarily on systems.76 Examples of these systems that 
were cited are human rights, accountability, transparency and good governance. This was 
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contrasted to the approach of states that are perceived to be more practical in their 
engagement.77 
 
Perceptions are important in most situations, and they matter even more in fragile environments 
such as Somalia. As in most conflict-affected states, as well as in post-conflict states, a large 
number of external actors are engaged peacebuilding activities in Somalia. Much work has been 
done to improve the livelihoods of Somalis, with activities ranging from the provision of basic 
services to capacity building in the form of training and scholarships. While this is the case, the 
motives behind the delivery of this support are not always transparent, and consequently, benign 
intentions can be negatively perceived, as some of our observations from Mogadishu confirm. 
 
Interviewees stated that the support from African states is not as welcome as that of Turkey, 
the Gulf States and some Asian countries. In fact, it was stated in one interview, that often other 
Africans are grouped with state actors from the Global North. The main reason for this appears 
to be the historical tensions between Somalia and her neighbouring states especially Ethiopia 
and Kenya. It was stated that local dynamics come into play and while on paper it appears that 
Al-Shabaab is being defeated, recruitment levels are higher than ever because of the impact that 
the activities of Kenya and Ethiopia have on the ground amongst the civilian population. These 
people allegedly feel betrayed by the African continent through the African Union in particular 
which has permitted what is perceived as interference from these regional actors who are 
believed to be pursuing anti-Somali agendas. These perceptions are confirmed by scholarly 
experts on Somalia. 
 
On July 6, 2012, the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) became formally integrated into the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This transition was effected by the AU Peace 
and Security Council (AUPSC) on January 5, 2012 and endorsed by the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) on February 21, 2012.78 Almost two years later, AMISOM again welcomed a new 
member, the sixth African country, when the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) 
officially joined the mission on January 22, 2014.79 
 
                                                        
77 Interview, Somali Civil Society Activist, Mogadishu, 25 August 2015. 
78‘Kenya troops re-hat into AMISOM, Nairobi’ retrieved from 
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79 ‘Ethiopian troops formally join AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia’ retrieved from http://amisom-
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Officially, the mandate of the ENDF when it joined AMISOM in 2014 was to clear Al-Shabaab 
from sectors under their command while implementing AMISOM’s concept of operation in 
each activity.80 In reality, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have been strained for 
decades. In 1978, the two states went to war against each other. There have been disputes over 
territories such as the Ogaden that are ongoing. In 2006, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in 
order to remove the Islamic Courts Union from their position of power81, these are a few 
examples of the complex regional relationship that exists.  
 
Ethiopia’s position on a federal system of governance in Somalia is questionable because of the 
threat that this poses to domestic stability in the state; it is alleged that extremist elements from 
Somalia have provided support to rebel groups in Ethiopia. Federalism, it is feared, will 
strengthen such groups who will then influence activities across the border. According to 
Browne and Fisher, part of Ethiopia’s foreign policy on Somalia has therefore been to support 
political representatives who have been opposed to political Islam as a form of governance.82 
 
Kenya’s 2011 unilateral military intervention and the activities of the Kenyan military changed 
the perception of the state which had until that period employed a conservative approach to the 
situation in Somalia.83 In 2012, Kenya’s Minister of Defense stated that “Kenya’s engagement 
in Somalia is motivated by its desire to create a stable and conducive peaceful environment for 
enhancement of development.”84 While this is Kenya’s position on activities in Somalia, some 
believe that Kenya is solely interested in Somalia’s natural resources and strategic positions. 
The presence of peacekeepers from regional powers has created a conflict of interest.85 
 
When asked what peacebuilding activities these states are involved in, it was stated that the 
main focus has been on security, diplomacy and politics. However, the perception that they 
engaged in a quest for regional monopoly, to a large extent, casts a negative light on the progress 
and positive impact these initiatives have had.86 It was explained that Ethiopia and Kenya 
employ different approaches. That of Kenya is allegedly less subtle than that of Ethiopia. 
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Interviewees opined that Ethiopia has a very strategic approach and policy to Somalia; Somalis 
can travel to Ethiopia and feel welcomed whereas it is the opposite in Kenya where flights from 
Somalia (Mogadishu) into Kenya (Nairobi) land at a remote airport for the planes and 
passengers to be searched before proceeding to Nairobi. In addition to this, Somalis report being 
frequently harassed and at a risk of abuse.87 All of these issues contribute to the impact and 
sustainability of the activities on the ground.  
 
The excerpt below, quoted from an analysis of peace and security developments in Africa, 
relates directly to the perspectives of those who were interviewed and offers a facet that might 
be worth considering:  
 
[w]hile there is no doubt that AMISOM needs all the support it can get, it is far from 
clear that Ethiopia is best placed to provide it, given the long and contentious history 
between the two countries. It is worth remembering that although both the Kenyan 
and the Ethiopian forces are now part of AMISOM, their involvement began 
unilaterally, and they only assumed the mantle of the continental force retroactively. 
In other words, both countries have their own interests in Somalia, which may not 
always be aligned with AMISOM’s stated objectives.88  
 
The Gulf States, in particular Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are identified as 
another set of emerging actors that are engaged in peacebuilding activities with increasing 
influence.89 Where Kenya and Ethiopia were said to focus more on security and diplomacy, the 
UAE is reported to be focusing in the provision of basic commodities and services, similar to 
Turkey. However, there exists a perception that the UAE is attempting to compete with Turkey 
in order to gain influence and visibility. This has allegedly meant that although actors from the 
UAE are more welcome than those from other African states, many are wary of their motives. 
One of the remarkable means employed to offer support has been the provision availability of 
establishments for Somali businesspeople in the UAE. Another activity has been the training 
and capacity building of soldiers, in particular. However, it is alleged that the UAE is providing 
heavy ammunition to Puntland, Jubbaland and South West State in a bid to extend relevance. 
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These actions have been criticised as demonstrating a lack of conflict sensitivity. Other 
emerging actors with less influence are Asian states, China being identified the most often.90 
 
From the discussion above it is clear that the current, post-conflict situation in Somalia, if it can 
be described in this way, is extremely complex and fragile. There are many issues that exist 
below the surface that are not easily perceived from the outside. That emerging actors are 
engaged in activities that are innovative and different to that of traditional actors is a fact. 
However, based on the information gathered from the interviews that were conducted, the 
approach of some of these actors is, at the least, questionable. Not all activities conducted in 
the name of building peace appear to be contributing towards a lasting peace.  
 
The main difference in the approach of traditional actors and that of emerging actors in Somalia 
was identified as being on the aims and application of such activities. As previously mentioned, 
while traditional actors are said to focus more on systems, checks and balances, most emerging 
actors are perceived to have a more practical approach, that is, one that focuses on the needs of 
the people on the ground be they security, capacity building, roads and livelihood interventions 
through economic ventures. An interviewee stated that systems cannot appear overnight and 
because of their focus on this, less is expected from traditional actors.  
 
A noteworthy point is the fact that instead of being most welcome in Somalia, actors from other 
African states are often the least welcome. This is important in highlighting that the sentiments 
and perceptions of the local population in environments emerging from conflict play a big role 
in the success of peacebuilding initiatives. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that emerging actors 
are becoming more and more invested in building peace. A way in which to improve the work 
that is being done is by creating a model in which there can be transparency about the support 
that is given in order to avoid a duplication of efforts, conflict of interests and improve 
peacebuilding activities overall.  
 
Turkey’s peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia highlight important novel approaches promoted 
by each actor, while offering vital lessons for all stakeholders to improve upon. The Somalia 
case study reveals several best practices, implemented by Turkish state and non-state actors that 
can be applied to other post-conflict reconstruction settings. Deploying personnel into active 
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conflict zones, operating out in the open without being confined to security compounds, 
refraining from securitizing and attaching conditions to aid, avoiding middle men in order to 
avert security risks, engaging local partners, inquiring about and directly responding to the 
beneficiary’s needs, and not overcrowding or clogging the arteries of the host country’s vital 
bureaucracy are some of the novel approaches that Turkey brings to the spectrum.  
 
The case study has also affirmed that there is still room for improvement for Turkey’s peace 
operations in Somalia. The bilateral engagement on the ministerial level with Somali entities, 
without informing other Turkish state organizations and NGOs on the ground, leads to force 
coupling, overcrowding of the theater, and waste of resources. Although Turkey has taken 
concrete steps to address some of these issues by coordinating its efforts with international 
community and organizations, on domestic level, interagency cooperation still lags. Worse, 
institutional and legislative remedies to unravel this Gordian knot linger. Therefore, Turkey 
should use the Somalia case to single out some of its coordination problems and devise a 
solution that can be generalized to uproot similar problems that recur in Turkey’s other overseas 
missions. Nonetheless, Turkey’s commitment to the New Deal for Somalia, interest in 
partnering with AMISOM and both technical and material support for such platforms are 
welcome developments.  
 
Turkey’s diplomatic and humanitarian presence in Somalia demonstrates more than anything 
the resolve of emerging actors to supporting fragile states in reconstruction. Somalia, 
contemplated by many as risky for humanitarian work indicates the resolve of new actors in 
hedging the risks, and intervening not just where there is peace to keep; but even in turbulent 
regions of the world. This is quite in line with recommendations from the UN Advisory Panel 
for the review of the Peacebuilding Architecture which posits that peacebuilding should cut 
across the conflict spectrum and not only come when normalcy has been established.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
Nearly 16 years after the U.S. invasion and the ensuing International Security Assistance Force  
(ISAF) overseen by NATO and complemented by various UN agencies, Afghanistan is on the 
brink of relapsing into a failed state. With the expiration of ISAF at the end of 2014 and the 
withdrawal of nearly 400,000 strong international troop contingents, Afghanistan has become 
an unstable and dangerous place for reconstruction efforts to continue. Taliban has made a 
strong comeback in the last two years, unchallenged by the deteriorating Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), which includes the army and the police. Last year only, the deadly 
security incidents in Afghanistan increased compared to the year before.1 150 people died in 
attack in the middle of Kabil in May 2017, marking the deadliest bombing attack in Afghan 
capital’s recent history. The continued suicide attacks on the capital, coupled with ongoing 
fighting between Taliban and government forces in southern provinces, create significant strain 
on President Ashraf Ghani’s government to hold his coalition and the rest of the country 
together.  In June 2017, a meeting hosted in Istanbul brought together delegates from major 
political parties. Senior Afghan officials who participated in the meeting announced the creation 
of a new political coalition. Two important items on the conference communique were the 
proposals to form a new National Unity Government and to decentralize Afghanistan’s budget.2  
 
Afghanistan’s current instability was foreseen four years ago, by the time ISAF mission was 
coming to conclusion. The approaching withdrawal of the coalition troops and skepticism over 
the readiness of the 300,000 strong ANSF had raised questions with regard to the sustainability 
of Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In a twelve-year period between 2002 and 2014, ISAF had 
been the central administrator of a broad range of operations from combatting terrorism to 
                                                        
1 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 
July 30, 2017, 71.  
2 Ibid.  
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administering provincial reconstruction projects. ISAF had stretched thin, but it was the sole 
provider of stability, security, and development at the same time. A country that had been torn 
by nonstop conflict for consecutive three decades had twelve years of relative abatement of 
violent conflict and resumption of some normalcy. During these years international community 
including the neighboring, near neighboring and regional actors provided substantial 
development and technical assistance that has transformed the socio-economic dimensions of 
Afghanistan.  
 
Since 2002 the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan have 
been the top donors for Afghanistan. Each year on average, the United States provided 30 
percent of the assistance Afghanistan received, while Japan, Germany, UK and the EU made 
up roughly a little over 30 percent. And nearly 40 percent of the funds came from other 
countries.3 In the same vein, a mid-period OECD report on “Monitoring the Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” 
found that the aforementioned order was correct, although there had been upward and 
downward mobility observed as regards the UK and Germany.4 The 2017 OCHA Financial 
Tracking Service data indicate more or less the same ranking: With $103.3 million in 
contributions, the United States is the top funder. It is followed by the European Commission  
($39.5 million), UK ($32.2 million), Australia ($16.3 million), Germany ($15.4 million), South 
Korea ($14.0), Japan ($12.8 million), Sweden ($12.0 million), and Norway ($10.7 million). 
Once again, the order—at least the top five tear—has more or less remained the same sincet the 
first boots on the ground.  
 
Furthermore, 2017 and 2016’s funding appears to have focused on the following clusters (in 
the ranking order): Coordination, Food Security and Agriculture, Health, Aviation, Nutrition, 
Protection, and Water, Sanitation and Hygene.  Although the donations appear to be targeting 
the local needs, the providers of these services are not always the local entities. One of the most 
cited problems in the OECD reports during the ISAF period was that while employment was 
one of the first priorities of national stakeholders (government and civil society), when defining 
                                                        
3 UN OCHA, “Afghanistan Country Snapshot,” Financial Tracking Service, 2017, accessed February 12, 2018, 
https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2017.  
4 “Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” OECD, 2010, 
acccessed June 21, 2017, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/monitoring-the-principles-for-good-
international-engagement-in-fragile-states-and-situations-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan_9789264091245-
en#page3.  
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both development needs and causes conflict, international donors did not take that as a priority 
during the reconstruction process. They continued their well-established practice of either 
importing goods from foreign companies or contracted out services to their own national 
enterprises.5 In fact, the breakdown of the U.S. funds deployed to Afghanistan from 2002 to 
2017 represents the priority areas for traditional donors when they engage a conflict-affected 
nation. Of the $119.74 billion the United States had appropriated for Afghanistan since the 
beginning of the reconstruction, half of it ($73.54 billion) was allocated to security operations 
(including a broad range of operations from fighting terrorism to counternarcotic operations). 
Of the remaining, nearly $40 billion went directly to the government of Afghanistan. Allegedly 
some portion of these funds were spent for development although data on specific activites are 
missing. This left approximately $15 billion for civilian and humanitarian causes. While nearly 
$3 billion was spent for humanitarian aid, $11 billion was allocated for civilian operations.6 
Although at the 2010 Kabul Conference, the United States and other international donors 
supported and increase to 50 percent in the proportion of civilian development aid delivered 
on-budget through the Afghan government to improve governance, cut costs, and align 
development efforts with Afghan priorities. In the successive summits in Tokyo (2012) and 
London (2014) donor nations reaffirmed their commitment. As of 2016, this goal had yet to be 
achieved. For 2017 and 2018, none of the donor governments so far lived up to their 
commitment of higher share of allocations for civilian programs.7  
 
Worse is that due to increased security risks8, many reconstruction and development assistance 
sources are leaving the country, with approximately 3.5 million left in need of humanitarian 
assistance.9 The further escalation of the conflict in 2017 resulted in the numerous breach of 
international humanitarian law as a result of deliberate targeting of Afghan civilians by the 
Taliban. The latter has used, and is expected to continue using, heavy weapons in civilian 
populated areas. The Taliban takeover of civilian infrastructure and civilian hostages is not a 
new phenomenon. Attacks on schools, medical facilities and aid workers, as well as deliberate 
attempts to block the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people have been 
                                                        
5 Ibid.  
6 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 
July 30, 2017, 65. 
7 Ibid.  
8 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 5,234 civilian casualties in the 
first half of 2017, highest recorded fort his period since 2009.  
9 “Humanitarian Need Overview 2018: Afghanistan,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
December 2017, 9. 
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documented by various UN agencies that are still on the ground.10 Attacks affect most and 
disproportionately women and children. October 2017 saw one of the deadliest weeks in 
Afghan history. In 6 consecutive days more 600 Afghans were killed as a result of a terrorist 
attack targeting one or several of the victims and civilian spaces mentioned earlier.11 On a 72-
hour timeframe on this week, 60 wounded were admitted to hospitals suffering serious injuries 
and requiring surgery.12 
 
The security situation throughout Afghanistan is expected to worsen in the absence of 
government’s incapacity to address the security problems on central and local levels. 
Furthermore, the dwindling numbers of local capacity building programs and lack of 
investments in civilian programs have stripped Afghans from the services and management 
structures needed in a time where major services are disrupted by intensified attacks. UN 
OCHA expects that the worsening conditions in 2018 will have a significant impact on the 
humanitarian community’s capacity to provide timely and effective assistance to the civilian 
population. “In 2017, Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world 
for humanitarians to operate, with 17 aid workers killed, 15 injured and 43 abducted in the first 
ten months of the year.”13 
 
In fact, OCHA’s estimation that growing insecurity discourages many organizations from 
leaving relatively more secure provincial capitals to access affected populations in conflict 
affected districts matches with the projection of dwindling security conditions in Afghanistan 
back in 2014 during an interview with the author of this research and UN OCHA representatives 
in Mazar-i Sharif.14 The representatives had volunteered that especially the aid workers 
operating in back country were facing increased hostility from local strongmen and provincial 
governments with the scheduled ISAF withdrawal in December 2014. While there was 
enormous potential for NGOs to function in these regions, tribal structures were reportedly 
emboldened with the relaxing security measures and increasingly targeting humanitarians for 
ransom.  
 
                                                        
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 14.  
14 Interview with UNAMA – UNOCHA representatives, Mssrs. Malik Sizi and İlyas Grazi, Mazar-i Sharif, 
October 21, 2014.  
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Last year’s most important development was the ICRC’s decision to reduce its presence in 
Afghanistan after a series of attacks on its staff. This was a sign of how difficult it has become 
for humanitarians to operate in Afghanistan amid the relapse into conflict. “Between July and 
September 2017, the number of humanitarian partners reporting at least two of the following 
activities—delivery of assistance, needs assessments or monitoring missions—fell from 170 to 
153.”15  
 
7.1. Turkey’s Level of Involvement 
The latest Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) report from 2015 lists 
Afghanistan the fifth largest recipient of Turkish humanitarian and development aid.16 
Afghanistan received $56 million in bilateral form from Turkey in 2015. Even though we do 
not have data from 2016 and 2017 on the distribution of Turkish aid in Afghanistan, the 2015 
data suggest that Turkey kept implementing direct education, health, and civil and security 
administration support programs. The data also imply that Turkish agencies engage their 
partners on one-on-one basis rather than contributing into government funds or multilateral 
funds founded by traditional donors to funnel monies to a particular sector.  
 
Reconstruction of major infrastructure either damaged or destroyed during the conflict has been 
Turkey’s contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Turkey accepted partaking in 
NATO’s ISAF mission on the condition that its contingents would be regarded as non-
combatant forces and would be recused from combat missions. In an unprecedented way at the 
time, Turkey used its military presence in Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes. “In a January 
2012 interview with the NATO channel, Kabul Provincial Governor Dr. Zabibullah Mojadid 
said, ‘Contrary to some other international forces here, the Turks don’t march through our 
streets with their guns and their caravans, ready to fire. When you see other forces with their 
hands on their triggers, people are very intimidated. Afghans don’t look at the Turkish forces 
as foreign forces here, they somehow view them as their own.’”17 
Eventually half way into its ISAF contributions, Turkey raised its troop contributions to 1300 
peacekeepers. This was an important step and counted towards Turkey’s taking ISAF’s civilian 
command twice between 2004 and 2006. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin held 
                                                        
15 Ibid.  
16 Nurçin Yıldız et al, Turkish Development Assistance Report 2015 (Ankara: Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2016), 19.  
17 Karen Kaya, “Turkey’s Role in Afghan Stabilization,” Military Review (July-August 2013): 23.  
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the NATO Senior Civilian Representative twice. Since 2006, Turkey military force has 
occasionally operated the Kabul Regional Command in 2009 and Istanbul has hosted several 
Tripartite Summits, with a view to facilitating peace between Afghanistan and its neighboring 
Pakistan. Turkey’s real value added contribution to Afghanistan’s development and 
stabilization between 2002 and 2014 was the establishment of two Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs).  
NATO’s first solely led civilian PRT was launched by Turkey in November 2006.  Based in 
Wardak, this team of 130 civilian operatives was administered by a civilian diplomat.  During 
the next four years, nearly 200 projects were completed.  Under the direction of Turkey’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 
(TIKA) appropriated approximately $30 million USD to development and capacity building 
efforts.  The PRT in Wardak assisted Afghan authorities with reconstruction efforts and 
enhanced development and stability within the province. It focused on providing health care, 
education, police training and agricultural alternatives to local farmers. All projects were 
coordinated and structured to meet the benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact Document and 
the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy.  TIKA’s efforts aimed to improve the 
quality of life in Afghanistan through the re-construction of its sorely needed civil 
infrastructure.  Examples of completed projects include: 68 schools established or restored; 
nursing and midwifery education centers for women opened; 250 tons of humanitarian aid 
handed out; 17 hospitals and outpatient clinics built or reconstructed; thousands of Afghan 
police officers and soldiers trained; education programs for judges, prosecutors and district 
governors provided, and several roads, bridges and wells completed.  In addition to the aid and 
assistance given through TIKA during this timeframe, Turkish entrepreneurs also completed 
projects worth nearly $2 billion USD.18   
 
Turkey opened its second PRT in Jawzjan, where it continues to implement reconstruction 
projects to date. After careful deliberation and several consultations between Turkey’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Afghan Government, a second PRT for the 
northern provinces of Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul was established in 2010.  For purposes of the 
CIVCAP case study, we have chosen to focus more closely on this PRT because it is currently 
operating.  We were able to access a wide scope of research data by speaking directly with PRT 
                                                        
18 Murphy and Sazak, 2012. 
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Deputy Coordinator Ali Erbaş.  Headquartered in the city center of Shibirghan, the Jawzjan 
PRT is led by a Civilian Head (senior diplomat) and a Civilian Deputy Head (diplomatic staff) 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  A staff of 22 administrative personnel coordinates the 
efforts of the approximately 220 deployed experts and advisors who represent the Turkish 
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Interior, TIKA, 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, several universities, and a Police Special Operations Team.19   
Originally, Jawzjan PRT’s objectives were modeled after the Wardak PRT with specific focus 
given to Development Projects (DP) and Capacity Building Projects (CBP).  A unique addition 
to the Jawzjan PRT are Quick Impact Projects (QIP) which take place over a shorter and more 
intense duration period of time.  TIKA’s responsibility is to coordinate, assist in 
implementation, and monitor the development of these projects in close cooperation with PRT 
administration and the contracted agency. There are no legal frameworks in place with recipient 
entities to initiate or sustain projects.  Instead, project determinations are based upon the 
assessment of on-the-ground needs and formal UN or Afghan Government protocols which 
include operations in line with the UN Security Council Resolutions and overall objectives of 
NATO / ISAF in Afghanistan; preparation of  projects in close consultation with provincial 
authorities; meeting the priorities of the Afghan Government and needs of the local people; 
assisting in development of and observe Provincial Development Plans and ensuring effective 
donor coordination/cooperation to avoid duplication, and most importantly pursuing Afghan-
first procurement policy.20 
 
Turkey’s contributions to ISAF were more SSR-oriented than any other peace operation that 
Turkey had undertaken in the past. As will be elaborated further in the next section, Turkey’s 
peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan had a strong component of training for the Afghan 
National Security Forces.21  Turkey’s training and expertise assistance was comprehensive. 
Turkey not only renovated and refurbished cadet schools and military academies in strategic 
northern towns such as Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif, but it also sent instructors, designed curricula, 
and provided education materials.22 Turkish military academies in Ankara and Istanbul, as well 
                                                        
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Skype interview with an Afghan liason for NATO, Brussels, June 21, 2015.  
22 Skype Interview with an Afghan liason with NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. June 21, 2015.  
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as police academies and excellence centers in Anatolia, have admitted and trained thousands of 
young Afghan military and police officers since the beginning of the ISAF.23  
 
A more important attribute of Turkey’s peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan has been the 
inclusion of good governance and an inclusive, civilian oversight of the Afghan security and 
justice sectors. Both the courses offered in Turkey and the modules developed and taught by 
Turkish security experts in Afghanistan have dedicated considerable amount of time and space 
to trainings on the rule of law, upholding the Afghan constitution, gendered approach to 
security, diversity within security forces and sensitivity for minorities.24 Although a modest 
number of cadets and officer candidates might have benefitted from these specific courses, 
Turkey’s initiative to integrate them into the core curricula represents a sea change in Turkey’s 
new thinking on Security Sector Reform.  
 
Turkey’s recent engagement with Afghanistan has given a special consideration to national-
ownership, inclusivity, and gender mainstreaming as part of its training modules. The 
International Police Training for Afghanistan since 2012 has graduated over 3000 cadets, 300 
of whom are women.25 The academy’s training guidelines stress that “modules are 
professionally administered, technically and tactically correct, moreover relevant to current 
security situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, they are developed after conducting training needs 
assessment.”26 The courses taught on the rule of law, protecting and defending Afghan 
constitution, rules and regulation regarding policing, human-rights and police ethics almost 
match rudimentary training modules in terms of class hours-dedicated to these areas.27  
 
Today Turkey continues to run successful education and community empowerment programs. 
In 2015, TİKA completed the construction of the 42-classroom Baher School Service Building 
in Mazar-i Sharif. The new service building increased school’s admissions up to 7000 student. 
Similarly, TİKA continues to provide scholarships to Afghan University students to study at 
Turkish universities. In 2015 23 Afghan students enrolled in Turkish higher education 
                                                        
23 Ibid, also see “Afgan Polisler Sivas’ta Eğitiliyor,” Sabah, June 11, 2015, accessed December 21, 205, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/2015/06/11/afgan-polisler-sivasta-egitiliyor.  
24“IPTA – International Police Training in Afghanistan: 1st year Evaluation Report,” International Police 
Training Academy in Sivas, Turkey, 2012.  
25 “Afgan Polisler Sivas’ta Eğitiliyor,” Sabah, June 11, 2015, accessed December 21, 205, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/2015/06/11/afgan-polisler-sivasta-egitiliyor.  
26 “IPTA – International Police Training in Afghanistan: 1st year Evaluation Report,” International Police 
Training Academy in Sivas, Turkey, 2012.  
27 Ibid. 
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institutions.28 TIKA appears to have been undeterred by the escalating security risks in Northern 
Afghanistan; as of 2015 it started on water well projects and experimental irrigation systems at 
Kabul University’s Faculty of Agriculture. As draught following flash floods that destroy 
thousands of acres of irrigable land, sustainable agriculture comes on top of priority 
development projects in Afghanistan. TIKA continued digging water wells and tanks in 
different centers of the Balkh region—the province that hosts the capital. TIKA also run an 
earthquake relief program in the aftermath of the 7.5 magnitude tremors that hit the Badakshan 
province in October 2015. Cooperating with the Turkish Emergency and Disaster Management 
Directorate (AFAD) TIKA delivered humanitarian aid consisting of 5 tons of medication to 
Kabul. That year, TIKA-run humanitarian programs also included medical supplies, basic 
emergency relief kits, and psycho-social support for the victims of terrorism, flash floods, 
avalanche and landslides.  
 
In summary, Turkey may have a modest footprint in Afghanistan’s humanitarian and 
development sectors. However, in proportion to its financial and resource capacity, evidence 
have shown that through its development and cooperation agencies, Turkish humanitarians 
appear to have maximized their impact in the country. During the 2014 field trip, the author 
had an opportunity to observe Turkish security and civilian personnel’s ability to operate 
outside the security bubbles that confined Western actors to their secure compounds. There had 
been instances in Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif where both military and civilian experts would 
conduct goodwill tours in the city, visiting a number of stakeholders who either enrolled their 
children in Turkish-constructed schools or got treated in Turkish-built clinics in these towns. 
To observe this was important to put in perspective the commitments traditional donors claim 
to have made on paper, but in reality—as assessed by the OECD—went to foreign or domestic 
(donor country) contractors. The effectiveness of Turkish approach, willing to take certain 
security risks, was even more appreciated, having waited a few hours at the gates of the EU 
compound to interview with the country chief of EU POL (European Union’s police training 
mission) due to the fact that our clearance had not been communicated to the protocol office. 
Therefore, any study that analyzes the impact of assistance committed to complex places like 
Afghanistan must take into account the impact of modest, but unorthodox methods of 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
                                                        
28 Yıldız et al, 45. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation started down on a path to explain the impact of two diametrically different 
actors’s dissimilar approaches to humanitarianism on the effectiveness of their humanitarian 
interventions in conflict-affected countries. It argued that the choices these actors have made 
between attaching political, economic, security objectives and discharging assistance solely on 
ethical premises without being influenced by a greater system or self-interest set the quality, 
breadth, efficacy of the intervention. It further postulated in three hypotheses that the greater 
the donor’s concerns for self-interest, political objectives, and operating through an 
international bureaucracy, the less effective its intervention would become. In addition, the 
study relied on a number of benchmarks agreed upon both by Global Northern and Southern 
actors. These benchmarks included inclusiveness, national ownership, transparency, institution 
building, learning and sustainability.  
 
The cases of Somalia and Afghanistan indicate the differences between the implementation of 
two diametrically approaches to humanitarian intervention. The trends the literature has 
suggested on traditional donor and Turkish approach to humanitarianism have been spotted 
both in Somalia and Afghanistan cases. The Somalia study revealed that Turkish agents of 
humanitarian aid have operated outside the conventional multilateral international platforms. 
They have prepared their needs assessment analyses by interacting with the locals. Turkish aid 
actors’s diligence to get to know who is who in Somalia have informed their decision in 
identifying the recipients without resorting to hiring a middle-man. The study also showed that 
while Turkish actors on the ground maintain good relations with Somali officials, and while 
they support the country’s economic reconstruction by contributing financial assistance, they 
do not replicate the traditional donor practice of attaching conditions to the cash. Turkish 
government does not dictate how its financial aid should be used. Nor does it throw large sums 
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into various government funds that were supposed to help reconstruct certain functions of the 
society from justice to local protection, education to healthcare. As we have seen in the 
Afghanistan case, rather than flooding the system with cash and encouraging corruption, 
Turkey deploys its civilian capacity to construct the needed services or the infrastructure on its 
own. However, as the Somalia case demonstrated, Turkey’s overseeing its own development 
projects did not mean Turkish workforce has built everything. On the contrary, just as was in 
Afghanistan, Turkey’s policy has always been hiring local to make sure that Somalis were 
provided with livelihood and they learned new skills via on the job training.  
 
In Afghanistan, a country in which Turkey has been involved much longer than it has in 
Somalia, the similar principles were at work. The cultural ties between Afghanistan and Turkey, 
which went all the way back to 1921, motivated Turkey to act out of moral obligation in the 
aftermath of Afghanistan’s post-9/11 invasion. Acting on its moral obligation to help its Afghan 
brethren at a time of great distress and uncertainty, Turkey in fact did not put much political 
calculation or projection on the consequences of its action. While it sent a small contingency, 
it made sure that these troops would not draw its arms against a society which it went to rebuild. 
Therefore, again we encounter a case where Turkish soldier initially dig water wells, construct 
schools and dormitories. Furthermore, during the tenure of Minister Çetin as the Senior Civilian 
NATO administrator, Turkey helped with projects to increasing Afghan government’s capacity. 
It provided training for local administrators, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, as well as the Afghan 
police force. To date, an impressive number of Afghan female police cadets are still trained in 
the Sivas province of Turkey. Afghan army cadets are also trained at Turkish military 
academies in both Ankara and Mazar-i Sharif. These are convincing evidences of Turkey’s 
commitment to Afghanistan’s national ownership of reform concerning its security and 
government sectors.  
 
Both cases also showed that traditional donors involved in these countries have acted in similar 
ways to which have been predicted in the literature. In Somalia, first attempts to bring peace 
and stability to the country under a universalist intervention regime, namely the UNOSOM 
missions resulted in a civil war which lasted for another two decades. Currently, while 
international community aspires to execute another multilateral, coordinated and concerted 
humanitarian campaign, the hostile conditions on the ground have mainly confined it either to 
the Mogadishu international airport or Nairobi. The consequentialist and political motives 
unsurprisingly increased humanitarian considerations for Somalia in the face of intensifying 
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U.S. operations against al-Shabaab. In Afghanistan’s case, the drive of international 
community’s engagement under the U.S. leadership was purely political and self-interested. 
Afghanistan had harbored the terrorist mastermind of the 9/11 attacks Osama bin Laden and his 
organization Al-Qaeda. It was a safe heaven for Islamist insurgents and transnational terrorists, 
and therefore, first it had to be cleansed of these entities through a rigorous military campaign. 
And then it had to be rebuilt in the democratic image of the Western liberal order so that no 
terrorist would seek refuge in this country. The result was another universalist intervention 
regime which lasted for over a decade and stretched itself thin to implement a military, political, 
economic, and humanitarian mission all at the same time. The consequentialism nested in the 
traditional donor approach results today in the declining number of humanitarian operations in 
Afghanistan in light of the intensifying security problems that have pursued the conclusion of 
ISAF.   
 
Another important lesson both cases offered was the principles of intervention associated with 
traditional donors and Turkey, as a representative of the rising power camp, were not exclusive 
to each actor. Both of them have stolen a page from one another’s playbook, and that fact 
complicates a clear analysis of aid effectiveness. In Turkey’s case by opening a military 
academy in Mogadishu and by increasing the number of contracts it has handed out to Turkish 
companies to operate Somalia’s lucrative assets like the ports and the airport, Turkey risks 
making the same mistakes as the traditional donors. Attaching political and economic interests 
to its humanitarian engagement may taint Turkey’s image in the local Somali’s eye as a 
“humanitarian state” and encourage him to see the Turkish aid agents on the ground in the same 
light as he sees traditional donors. Similarly, the unavailability of 2016 and 2017 data from 
TIKA on the status of Turkey’s humanitarian involvement in Afghanistan makes one wonder 
if the increased hostilities have forced Turkey to calculate the consequences and political risks 
of continuation its work in Afghanistan. By the same token, as indicated per OECD reports, 
more and more traditional donor institutions are getting interested in supporting projects that 
directly contribute to the national ownership and sustainability objectives of the host countries.  
 
Although the dissertation has presented situations in which Turkey’s adherence to different 
principles and utilization of different practices affects the outcome of humanitarian 
interventions, there are still a number of legitimate questions regarding the effectiveness of aid 
and novelity of these approaches. One standing question that can be further elaborated in a new 
study is whether even though the literature offers historically validated cases on the limitations 
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of puritanical approach to humanitarian action, is Turkey’s decision based solely on ethical 
considerations still relevant for the twenty-first century. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the 
case studied here, there are valid suspicions that Turkey is entirely motivated by duty-based 
ethics. Its experiences in Somalia and Afghanistan demonstrate that the longer Turkish aid is 
embedded in a country, the greater the chances of its being aligned to donor objectives become. 
While there is no time-tested, strict boundary demarcating exactly where Turkey’s ethical 
motivation leaves its place to realpolitik, it is difficult to conclude that Turkey is not guided by 
consequentialist approach or subtle political objectives.  
 
Furthermore, another unaddressed area left by this dissertation, and that which necessitates 
another comparative study, is the negative externalities of Turkey’s choices with respect to 
bilateralism over universalism, moral responsibilities over consequentialist considerations. 
Even though the thesis establishes that the employment of universalist tactics in the 
humanitarian field at the end of the Cold War convoluted the humanitarian action theater and 
caused more harm than good in certain instances, operating as part of a network has its perks. 
One advantage, for instance, is to depend on the resources and institutional memory of a 
multilateral body, such as the UN or ILO, with experience surpassing sixty years. By using 
these resources, Turkey, or any emerging country, could have a greater understanding of the 
dynamics on the ground and could develop a more effective pre-deployment strategy.  
 
Similarly, a consequentialist approach, albeit without giving into the political, economic, and 
security interests motivating the traditional donors, could be helpful in terms of an emerging 
country’s coordination and cooperation capacities. Throughout the preparation of and 
researching for this dissertation, a constant challenge was to reach well-reported data, both on 
the government agency- and NGO- sides. This was due to the dominance of moral reasons and 
rewards of carrying out the humanitarian action. As discovered through the interviews, there 
was very little interest in the material gains, calculations on tactical level with respect to the 
management of resources or a reporting device—with the exception of TIKA’s annual reports. 
A consequentialist approach—balanced by the supremacy of moral obligation—can help 
creating databases and data evaluation. This can help the agency make  informed decisions 
about how to best utilize its remaining resources, while all the same remaining vigilant about 
carrying out its moral obligation and avoid succumbing to political, business, and other 
interests.  
 
 129 
The landscape is therefore ripe to conduct further studies on these issues as part of a post-
doctoral research. While the conclusion of this dissertation confirms the validity of the general 
trends associated with traditional donors and Turkey as a rising actor by the hypotheses, 
whether these trends increase or decrease aid effectiveness remains to be seen. This is due to 
the fact that data are inconclusive. In addition, Turkey’s status as a relative newcomer to 
humanitarian sector leaves it with ample time to be confronted by the same challenges as 
traditional donors. Turkey’s adherence to moral superiority, unconditionality, faith in the 
constructiveness of bilateral relations can provide a valuable anchor in enduring new challenges 
and maximizing the breadth and impact of its aid.  
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